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1

CHAPTER ONE : INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is about the relationship between citizens and their elected officials in Africa.
Specifically, it asks the following question: Under what conditions do citizens in Africa’s new
democracies contact their national representatives or members of parliaments (PM)?
The legislator-constituent relation is at the heart of representative democracy (Fenno,1978). Peter
Veit et.al (2008) assume that representative democracy is an “institutionalized form of
participation” that compensates for the impracticability of direct democracy on a large scale.
However, representative democracy plays its full role only when legislator play their role as the
direct linkage between citizens and their governments (World Resource Institute, On Whose Behalf,
2008: 5). Thus, legislator-constituent relationships involve two ways of contacts between MPs and
their constituents. The first, and most explored, way is the top-bottom. In this top-bottom
perspective, MPs initiate contacts and strive to stay connected to their constituents. For instance, in
the case of the United States, these interactions include Members of Congress (MCs)'s ’activities
in Washington DC and in their districts related to constituency services, sending out mails,
newsletters, press releases, and interviews. The second way of the contacts goes from citizens to
their representatives. This includes individual or group initiative to reach out to their MCs. In this
dissertation, I call these interactions the bottom up contacts. Citizens establish these direct contacts
using several tools of communication such as face-to face, regular or electronic mails, phone calls,
and lately, social media. The volume of these contacts in the United States speaks to their
importance in the policy processes1. According to Jacob R. Strauss and Matthew E Glassman
(2016:5) citizens initiated nearly 400,000,000 emails, 22 million of franked mailed.
______________________________________________________________________________
1. As an international student living in the United States for the last 12 years, I have been impressed by numbers of ways in which the
American society operates. One example is the timely response of firemen to emergency calls of 911; another example is the relatively
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reassuring presence of law enforcement agents in communities (of course, the debate about police brutality toward minorities still
continues).

1.1

Importance of Constituent-Representative Relationship

The citizen-MP relationship has numerous advantages in democracy. According to the National
Democratic Institute (NDI, 2008), the citizen-MP relationship highlights the primacy of citizens in
the representative democracy, irrespective of the electoral system. It also sheds a light on the linkage
function of legislators (8). The National Conference of State Legislatures in the United States
(NCSL) states that one of the primary jobs of MPs is to bridge the divide between citizens and often
a faceless and arcane government. Moreover, the MP-citizen relationship provides a channel for a
flow of information and meaningful conversation between citizens and their law makers in order
for citizens to have their inputs in the policy process (Kutz,1997:6). Finally, a healthy MP-citizen
relationship allows MPs to embrace diverse concerns and integrate them in the democratic policy
processes (Dahl,1989). Yet direct contacts between MPs and citizens in African countries raise
some eyebrows because of the persistent culture of patrimonialism (Bratton et.al. 2005, 151).
However, Kurtz (1997) maintains that a healthy MP-citizen relationship in new democracies
deepens the roots of democratic tradition (3). Lindberg (2010) corroborates that such a relationship
helps to educate citizens to hold realistic expectations about their MPs (who are often seen as
"walking ATM” (Kurtz1997:17). In sum, contacts are important because they embody and vindicate
the democratic theory of representation. In the words of one the eminent political scientists, V.O.
Key, Jr. (1961:15) if citizens, for whatever reasons, fail to have their input in the democratic policy
process, the whole fuss about normative theory of democracy becomes meaningless.
______________________________________________________________________________
Although these two examples put the United States in stark contrast with Guinea, they have not piqued my curiosity as the
representative-constituent relationship in the United states has. This relationship, often taken as granted by many Americans, continues
to puzzle me for at least two reasons. First, the legislator –constituent relationship highlights the primacy of citizens in the democratic
system; and second, this relationship validates and materializes the very abstract concepts of principle-agent theory (PAT). Simply put,
the PAT suggests that elected officials are the agents who work for the principle, their constituents (Gailamrd,2012).
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Without direct contacts between citizens and their representatives, the democratic linkage of
accountability breaks down, causing the representative to be insulated and nonresponsive. With
such an importance, contacts between citizens and their representative become a noteworthy subject
of study. So, I set out to find out about conditions under which contacts between citizens and their
MPs happen in African countries.
To start my investigation, I turned to the Afro barometer’s public opinion surveys to get an
appraisal on the topic with a particular emphasis on the types of contacts their targets in Africa. The
Afrobarometer reports that citizens in Africa initiate eight types of contacts. These contacts target
their local councilors, their national members of parliament (MP), party officials, government
agencies, traditional rulers, religious leaders and some influential persons. A quick look at the raw
data from the Afrobarometer round 6 shows that on average, 29% of citizens contact their traditional
rulers, 37% of Africans reach out to their religious leaders, and only 12% contact their national
representatives in these 36 countries. Furthermore, there is wide variation among countries. For
instance, whereas 35 % of Liberians contact MPs, only 3% in Madagascar bother to do so. As for
contact of informal leaders, 58% of Sierra Leoneans contact religious and 65% of them contact
traditional rulers. On the other hand, intriguingly, not one citizen contacts traditional rulers or
religious leaders in Mauritius and Cape Verde, countries rated as free by Freedom House. I quickly
discovered that these data raise more questions than they answer. Among these questions are the
following: Why do Africans contact more informal institutions (traditional rulers and religious
leaders) more than their formal ones (MP and local councilors)? The conventional wisdom will
point to some observable institutional and structural differences as explanatory factors (electoral
rules, geographical size, colonial past, demographic, or gdp). However, these variables fail to
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explain thoroughly the variations. Consider these cases. Take Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire. These two
countries have approximately the same size, same demographic, and same electoral system (the
First Pass the Post), but Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire have drastically different contact rates. On
average, 18% of Ghanaians contact their MPs on the yearly basis. In contrast only 8 % of citizen in
Cote d'Ivoire do so. Another example is Togo and Sierra Leone. The two countries are similar in
every aspect but different in their contact rates. Still another example, Tanzania and Uganda. These
countries have different electoral systems, geographical size, but they have virtually the same levels
of contact of their MPs. What explains these widespread variations? More generally, what explains
the interactions between citizens and their representatives?
1.2

.Literature Review
Contacts, along with voting, campaign activities, contribution, protest, are what scholars

have called conventional political participation (Brady Schlozman, and Verba, 1995). Now,
political participation is a multidimensional concept whose definition has generated innumerable
heated debates among scholars. One of the controversial issues has to do with where to draw the
line between conventional and non-conventional acts of participation. That debate remains
unsettled. Nevertheless, scholars have agreed on a minimal common denominator in defining
political participation as "ways in which citizens communicate information to government officials
about their concerns and preferences and to put [hopefully] pressure on them to respond” (Verba,
Schlozman, and Brady,1995; Rosenstone, 1993; Bratton,2005; Teixeira, Griffin, Frey 2017). But
what does the literature say about causes of contacts?
As with other forms of political participation, scholars have found citizen-initiated contacts
to be related to three broad categories of variables: individual level variables (socio-economic
status, demographic, issues preferences), institutional level variables (electoral systems, party
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systems, resources, decentralization, political history), structural variables (geographical size of the
country, population density). At the individual level, four schools of thought debate about the causes
of contacts: the Columbia school, the Michigan school, the Rational Choice school, and the Civic
voluntarist model. The Columbia school, known as the sociological school, was the first political
behavior school. Led by Lazarsfeld and his colleagues in the 1940s, this school posited that political
participation is rooted in citizens’ sociological characteristics (social economic status). Drawing
from the economic model of behavior, the Columbia school likened citizens to consumers. Like
buyers, citizens are more influenced by brand loyalty and their social networks; they are less
influenced by commercials. Hence their later controversial thesis of “minimal effects of
campaigns.” Furthermore, and perhaps mistakenly, Lazarsfeld et.al (1948) argued that party
identity had negligible effects on political participation(voting). Such conclusion shows why the
Columbia school failed to account for Truman’s victory in 1948 where Dewey was given serious
chance for winning (Niemi, 2010:15). This failure of the Columbia school sets the stage for a new
paradigm that explains political participation. The new paradigm was the social psychological
perspective promoted by the Michigan school. In the American Voter (1960) the proponents of the
Michigan school, Campbell, Converse, and Miller, (1960), proposed a new model that revolves
around three attitudes: Americans’ attitudes toward the Democratic and Republican parties, their
attitudes toward daily issues, and toward political actors (Niemi, 2010:17). Campbell, Converse,
Stoke and Miller put an extra emphasis on party identification, contending that this variable has
“long and short term effects” (Niemi et.al, 2010:16). With this argument, the Michigan school
explained plausibly Truman’s electoral victory in 1948, which, they contend, was due to party
identity’s long term effects of Democrats toward Truman. The party long term effect is people’s
long standing psychological attachment to the party irrespective of its performance (Niemi
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et.al.2010). The crux of their theory is the “Funnel of Causality.” The Funnel of Causality integrates
individual social backgrounds, psychological attachment to one’s family and to one’s party.
However, putting the party identification as the primal mover and neglecting variables such as daily
issues drew severe criticisms to the Michigan school. For instance, the Michigan Model showed its
weakness in failing to explain the switch of many republicans in 1964 presidential election, causing
Lyndon Baines Johnson to win a historical landslide victory (Niemi, 2010:23). In 1964,
preeminence of domestic issues not party identification make people switch.
The most vocal critic of the Michigan school was the rational choice theory school.
According to the proponents of this school (Downs,1957; Fiorina,1974, to name few) people get
involved in politics not because of psychological attachment or purported sense or civic duty but
out of their own personal interests (Downs,1957). Put another way, issues people care about weigh
heavily in their motivation to participate. The Rational Choice Theory school’s explanation of
political participation has been credited as the most elegant and parsimonious theory in the sense
that it puts the finger on what really motivates people to get involved in the first people (Brady,
Schlozman, and Verba,1995: 283). At the same time, the opponents of the Rational Choice Theory
argue that if the core premise of the rational choice theory (the cost benefits analysis) is taken to its
logical conclusion, there would be hardly a reason to partake in crucial forms of participation such
as voting. Indeed, it has been shown that the costs of voting outweigh its benefits, at least for
ordinary citizens (Green and Shapiro,1994:75 ). As a result, political participation would be an
irrational act. Furthermore, Green and Shapiro contend that any attempt by Rational Choice
theorists to add civic duty as justification for political participation amounts to committing a posthoc fallacy (Green and Shapiro, 1994:72-96).
To date, the most comprehensive model explaining political participation [contact] is the
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civic voluntarist model, promoted by Brady, Schlozman and Verba hereafter (BSV) in 1995. In this
model, BSV start by acknowledging the merits of the Rational Choice theory’s terse explanation of
motives of participation, then quickly criticize it for its incapacity to evaluate how many people
would likely participate (284). To determine why, who, and when do people participate, BSV, forge
a theory that integrates preceding variables (Social connections, SES, demographics, and issues)
and add new variables: civic skills learned from social institutions and stockpiled throughout life
(12). The originality of the civic model lies in its effort to highlight the roles of "pre-political"
institutions such as unions and religious institutions that provide individuals with transferable skills
to smooth their navigation in a political world. As highly generalizable as they are, these theories
have been more focused on matured democracies than on nascent democracies, like those in Africa.
Specifically, when it comes to political participation in Africa, the majority of studies take a macro
level perspective involving the institutional variables: electoral systems the Single Member District
(SMD) also known as the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) and the Proportional Representation (PR), or
some variants or mixed of the two, political parties’ formal structure and linkages to its members,
countries' history (colonial legacy), political culture (patrimonialism, authoritarianism),
decentralization, and countries’ structural variables (geographical size, population density).
Electoral system is the first variable and probably the most purported as the cause of
variations in rate of contacts between MPs and citizens (Lijphart 1989; Mattes and Mozzaffar 2016,
Bratton et.al. 2005, Cho 2010). According to this argument, in comparison to the PR system, the
SMD system tends to encourage more direct contacts between constituents and their MPs than does
the PR system. In the SMD system, most of MPs' electoral fortune depends on the nature of their
relationships with their districts. As a consequence, MPs take advantage of the smallest opportunity
to connect with their constituents. On the other hand, in the PR system, MPs owe their presence
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and position in the legislature to the party officials; their loyalty is stronger toward the party than
toward their districts. In short, as Kurtz puts it, while the SMD promotes “downward
accountability,” the PR system favors the “upward accountability” (Kurtz,1997:13). The literature
is full of examples supporting this argument. In the case of the SMD, scholars point to electoral
rational that underpins the potency of the constituency. Constituency potency manifests itself
through a high volume of interactions between the representatives and her voters and the reflection
of voters’ preference in public policies (Stoke and Miller 1963: 48). One way constituency potency
manifests itself is what Mayhew (1974) calls Electoral Connection in the United States. In this
constituent- representative connection, all members of Congress do can be summarized in three
activities: advertisement, credit claiming, and position taking. The goal of these activities is to be
in sync with her district. For instance, the congressional literature has demonstrated the validity of
the constituency potency argument through several investigative approaches including experiments
(Glazer and Robbin,1985, Kousser, 2007) and innumerable quantity of observational studies (Fenno
1978, Mayhew 1974, Kingdon 1981, Lazarus 2010). Altogether, the argument is that MCs strive to
conform to their districts because the survival of their political career depends on their districts.
Scholars often picturize this adaptability of MCs using evolutionary biology terminologies. For
instance, using a natural experiment, Glazer and Robbin show that MCs ideological stance
“mutated” by 15% to align with that of their new districts redrawn after the 1980 reapportionment
(265). They contend that “MCs are not like leopards who do not change their coast. MCs are like
chameleons who adapt to their political environment” (269). Kousser et. al (2007), through another
natural experiment, stress MCs’ adaptability to the preferences of their districts. Kousser and his
colleagues took advantage of the opportunity of the recall of the California’s Democratic governor,
Gray Davis in 2003, to evaluate the ideological readjustment of the Democratic party’s legislators
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in the California’s General Assembly. They found that elected Democrats who understood the
signal sent by the Democratic governor’s removal saved their seats by shifting about 5 to 15%
rightward (834). Stimson et al. (1995) use the same simile by likening MCs to “Antelopes in an
open field; they cock their ears and focus their full attention on the slightest sign of dangers” [
coming from the district.] (559).
Legislative-constituent relationships in emerging democracies are also examined through
party voter linkages. The argument is that party’s formal structures and its membership tend to work
as motivator or inhibitor of contacts between MPs and citizens. Because party systems and
structures are direct consequences of electoral systems (Duverger, 1952), the discussion on electoral
systems finds some echoes here. For instance, in the SMD systems, “party discipline” tends to be
laxed, leaving individual legislators a considerable room for autonomous initiatives (Mayhew
1974:34). In addition, in the SMD system, MPs' districts are known, relatable, and form a concrete
geographical and political areas where elected officials cultivate their MP-constituent relationships.
On the other hand, the PR system extols strong party discipline, often punishing any legislator who
toes the party line. In this case, MPs in the PR system are forced to favor their party position often
at the expense of the preferences of their districts (Mattes and Mozzaffar, 2016). Mattes points out
that in extreme cases of the PR system, it is the very concept of constituency that constitutes the
problem. Some MPs from the PR system such as in South Africa do not have a specific district. In
lieu of a geographically distinct area, they are assigned “shadow districts” where constituency
becomes a loose reality (Mattes 2002:34). However, other scholars question the party structure
logic in this SMD versus PR system. Mezey (1994) contends that more than parties’ formal
structure, it is the party’s internal working and country specificity that explains variations of
contacts between citizens and their MPs. Carey’s (1996) study of Costa Rica substantiates Mezey’
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argument. Carey (1996) shows that in Costa Rica, a country staunchly attached to the PR system
with strong discipline, MPs and Citizens have a higher rate of contacts than in surrounding countries
using the SMD system. This is so because MPs are encouraged to cultivate constituency service
and to stay connected with their assigned districts (17). Butler et.al. (2016) reports strong dyadic
relationships between MPs and their voters in Sweden, a PR country with powerful parties. Butler
et al. (2016: 2-27) explain that big parties have started cultivating dyadic relationships and pay
attentions to local issues due to the electoral successes of small niche parties. To sum up, the
argument of electoral system as primary explanatory variable is too inconsistent to pretend an
unquestionable explanation of contacts between citizens and their MPs. The rational of party
membership is also proposed as an explanatory variable. The rational of party membership is the
justification that undergirds citizens’ attachment to their party of choice, i.e., the so-called “votersparty linkage.” Kitschelt (1997, 2002, 2002) enumerates three types of rational that justify citizens’
adhesion to parties: “symbolic”, “issue-based,” and “clientelist.” Symbolic linkages describe a type
of relationships between a “charismatic leader” and his fellow citizens whereby the “charismatic
leader” seeks to please everyone, despises formal policy processes, lacks any ideological
consistency, and favors parochial interests over national ones (1454). Kitschelt understands
"clientelistic linkages” to be unequal relationships that tie a "client" to a patron whereby the patron
provides privates goods in exchange for political or electoral support. As for the “issue-based” or
programmatic linkages, Kitschelt contends that they are based on the sharing of ideological stances
or issue position among party members. Empirical evidence shows that “clientelistic linkages” and
“symbolic linkages” are more common in emerging democracies than in consolidated ones.
Scholars debate about disastrous impacts of these types of linkages on democratic process (1456).
Kitschelt (1997, 2000, 2002), Bratton and Van de Wall (2003), complain about the polluting effects
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of these “clientelistic” and “symbolic linkages” on civic efficacy and democratic accountability.
Others, Keefer (2007) Lindberg (2010) and Hagopian (2007), while acknowledging the nefarious
effects of clientelistic linkages, somehow project a hopeful future for emerging democracies. For
instance, Keefer (2007) Keefer and Khemani (2007: 1-27) claim that clientelistic relationships are
necessary phases that emerging countries have to go through as long as their living standards remain
low. They argue that in the long run, when people’s living standards improve to a sustainable level,
they will make it a point of honor to have their voice heard, not bought. Another way party
membership influences contact is through the pattern of party formation. Manning (2005) reports
that parties in Africa emerge not out of social pluralistic incentives like in the western world but
from economic mismanagement and ethnic or geographical motives. This pattern of party formation
exacerbates reinforcing cleavages instead of making parties a tool of overlapping politically
relevant identities. Manning (2005) suggests that parties could serve as training grounds for
democrats, when they increase the level of crosscutting cleavages among their members (723).
Outside the realm of political party, decentralization is one of the main institutional
variables seen as cause of contacts between citizens and their MPs. Decentralization consists of
devolving certain measure of power to local authorities (Hankla and Downs, 2010; Tiebout,1954;
Treisman, 2001,2007; Ackerman, 2007). This institutional design is hailed by its proponents for its
governing aspect of bringing closer governors and governed. The assumption is that the closeness
and better knowledge of people’s needs improve contacts, and basic service delivery (water,
sewage, schools, and health services). Pioneering studies done by Tiebout (1954) and successive
scholars (Lewis 1998; Ackerman, 2007) have evidenced that decentralization reduces corruption,
increases contact between citizens and their MPs, and provide swift responses to citizens' demands.
But decentralization has its critics as well. Scholars such as Treisman (2001, 2003, 2007), Wibbels,
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and many others counter argue that decentralization hampers economic growth (Zoe and Davoodi
1997), promotes corruption, increases inflation (Treisman 2003). Veit et.al (2008) contend that in
most case in Africa, decentralization in reality amounts to nothing but a deconcentration, in the
sense that the transfer of authority to local citizens is done without a real transfer of power to carry
out their tasks (On Whose Behalf? 2008: 12). Hankla and Downs (2010:32) also insist that the
legislative bodies in decentralized localities ought to be elected and, as much as possible,
representative both descriptively as well as substantively. A pretty high standard scarcely reached
in Africa’s hyper centralized political systems (Veit, 2008). In conclusion, one realizes that both
individual level and institutional level variables offer causal explanations that are at best partial and
often shaky.
1.3

Gaps in the Literature

Some important observations transpire from the above review. First, the enumerated individual
level variables purported to cause contacts between citizens and their MPs (political participation)
have arguably to do more with mature democracies than with new democracies. Because contacts
between citizens and their MPs necessitate both individual and contextual variables, one should not
jump into a conclusion that an increase in citizens’ social economic status will translate into a
corresponding increase in their level of contacts in every country. For instance, Larreguy and
Marshall (2013) found that education, a key individual level variable in the SES argument, is not
conducive to active participation in politics in Nigeria (36). Secondly, in the case of emerging
democracies, the literature on MP-citizen relationships focuses more on macro-level variables
(states, legislative branch, parties, and elections) and neglects the interactions between elected
officials and citizens. Moreover, the existing literature overlooks numbers of variables with
potential explanatory power regarding contacts between citizens and their MPs. These variables
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include the role of memberships in informal associations, and the roles of local and traditional
leaders and citizens’ perception of their MP’s willingness to listen to their concerns. The present
dissertation aims to fill these gaps.
1.4

Theory and Hypotheses
Against the conventional wisdom, I argue that one should not assume that SES and

demographic variables the leading explanatory variables that motivate citizens to contact their MPs
in Africa. Take for instance gender, education, and residency. Existing theories would want us to
believe that higher level of education and urban dwelling correlate with higher level of political
participation. However, Larreguy and Marshall (2013) find that although education increases
support for democracy, further investigation shows that this support is abstract and shallow;
educated people pay a mere lip service to democracy. When it comes to concrete democratic actions
such as using formal channel to contact MPs, education has an inconsistent effect (8). However,
this is absolutely not a validation of Huntington’s 1968 gradualist thesis about education producing
a so-called “anti-democratic sentiment among educated citizens in developing countries (Quoted in
Larreguy and Marshall,2013:7). Rather, a neutral effect of education on active participation in
Nigeria might be highlighting a far more sinister political environment where educated people,
already seen as suspicious or subversive individuals to authoritarian governments, refrain from any
type of political involvement. In addition, the variable gender has a negative relationship with
contacting MPs. This relationship is perhaps shedding a light on cultural and social barriers that
continue to prevent women from getting involved in public affairs like their counterpart men in
several areas in Africa. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, scholars who have investigated
how citizens are connected to their governments in Africa have observed a general disconnect
between governs and governors. Barkan (1978, 2004) writes about citizens’ weak attachment to
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their political system in Africa. Specifically, Bratton et.al.2005 use the term “Representation gap”
to describe the scarcity of interactions between representatives and their constituents (151).
The central argument of this dissertation is that citizen would initiate a direct contact with
their representative only if the latter displays a willingness to listen to her constituents. But because
citizens’ perception of MP’s willingness to listen to them is low, I contend that ordinary Africans
contact their elected representative through two intermediary informal institutions. The first
intermediary institutions are memberships in associational organizations (membership in religious
and community development associations, or associations to raise an issue). Several reasons
motivate citizens to turn to grassroots organization as the channel to contact their MPs. Few are
worth mentioning. In a context where citizens complain about being neglected and are weakly
attached to their political systems, unformal grassroots emancipate and empower citizens to convey
their concerns to their MPs. Indeed, political violence is still current and freedom of expression
very scarce in Africa. The Afrobarometer round 4 survey results show that 80% of Africans fear to
say what they wish (Online data analysis). In a such a circumstance, being a member of an unformal
grassroots association help to boost citizens’ courage to communicate with their representatives.
Also, unformal grassroots associations are known to offer a safer place where members air their
grievances (Warren, 2001). These social fora foster generalized trust and mutual trust, encouraging
members to share values and concerns (Paxton,2000, 2002). Furthermore, by putting together their
voices, members of these unformal grassroots associations get a sense of collective efficacy
(Olson,1982:32). Equally relevant is the fact that unformal grassroots’ safe place serves to educate
and empower their members. In these associations, citizens learn by being involved in the planning,
organizing and executing activities. Members internalize democratic values and increase their civic
skills (Fung 2003, 515-539). More importantly, membership in these unformal association is
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citizens’ springboard to reach out to their representative to the national legislative body(MP). To
test the causal impact of membership in unformal grassroots associations on the likelihood to
contact one’s MP, I generate the hypothesis below.

1.4.1

Hypothesis I: Membership in grassroots increases contact with MPs more than
individual politically relevant characteristics.

The second informal linkage institutions are the traditional rulers and religious leaders. It also
appears that informal leaders provide a sort of back-door channel through which citizens
communicate with their representatives. African traditional Authorities (ATA) and Religious leader
are the first point of contact mostly for their incontrovertible social utility. Traditional and religious
authorities are known for their social stewardship. In many areas, they are the primarily caregivers
in pandemic or routine health issues. According to Patterson (2015), these institutions provide 40%
of healthcare in Sub-Saharan Africa (175). ATA and religious leaders are also actively involved in
social peace maintenance in their communities. Survey results from the Afrobarometer round 1 and
2 indicate that citizens primarily choose these institutions over formal judicial process to resolve
their every conflict. Furthermore, these institutions play important administrative roles albeit
controversial in some countries. Nevertheless, the ATA and religious leaders enjoy a great deal of
legitimacy and serve as opinion leaders (Logan, 2000, 2008, 2011). Altogether, these functions
make ATA and religious leaders the most powerful predictor of contacts with MPs. The mechanism
goes as follows: citizens first meet and express their concerns to their religious and traditional
leaders who, in turn, convey citizens’ preferences to formal representatives, the MPs. To further
highlight the causal effect of ATA to contacting MP, I contrast it with the effect of parties as channel
of contact between citizens and their MP. The hypothesis below tests the empirical evidence of the
causal relationship between ATA and contact with MPs.
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1.4.2

Hypothesis II: In comparison to citizens’ contacts with formal institutions (party
officials), citizens’ contacts with informal institutions predict a greater likelihood of
contacting members to the parliament.

Yet my argument posits a third and more direct connection between citizens and their MPs. This
premise of my argument is evidenced by the experimental section. The premise suggests that the
MP’s direct reply or feedback to citizens have a powerful causal effect on citizens’ motivations to
interact with their MPs. From the above theory, I generate the seven following hypotheses.
Hypothesis III: In countries where citizens have low political efficacy, MPs’ attentiveness has a far
more causal effect on citizens’ initiative to contact than individual and country level factors (gdp
or electoral rules).
1.5
1.5.1

Research Design and Method
Data source.
The data used in this study comes from the Afrobarometer survey database. Although I draw

evidence from the Afrobarometer survey rounds 1 through 6, the bulk of the analyses are done from
the Afrobarometer round 3 and round 4. These surveys were taken between 2005 and 2006(round
3) and from 2008 to 2009 (round 4). For the round 3, the sample units consist of 18 Sub-Saharan
countries including: Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Lesotho,
Namibia, Mozambique, Uganda, Senegal South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The
Afrobarometer round 4 added two new countries, Liberia and Burkina Faso. In total, the scope of
the Afrobarometer round includes Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya,
Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South
Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The rationale behind the choice of
Afrobarometer rounds 3 and round 4 stems from the richness of these rounds in representative-
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constituent-related topics in Africa. In addition to the common questions about types of contacts,
this round allows the researcher to delve into the role expectations of both citizens and the members
to the parliaments across the continent. For instance, it asks questions about citizens’ expectations
about MPs’ roles, MPs’ visits, vote buying, MP’s ability to listen to their constituents. More
importantly, the timing of these surveys (2006 through 2009) gives the investigator the unique
opportunity to assess the extent to which the dyadic electoral connection between citizens and their
elected officials has taken root two decades after the seeds of democratization were sowed in Africa.
The Afrobarometer is a research-based organization that specializes on public opinion and attitude
in Africa. To my knowledge, it is the only research-based organization that records ordinary
people’s views on democracy, governance, political participation, institutional performance and
democratic accountability. The design of the research has citizens’ contact of Members of
parliament as the outcome variable and the MPs’ listening ability as the primary independent
variable. To these two key variables, I add numbers of alternative or control variables micro level,
meso level and macro level (gdp per capita and electoral rules).
1.5.2

Design and Operationalization

The subject matter of this dissertation is to understand condition under which citizens initiate
communication with their elected officials. The key dependent variable of the dissertation is contact
with Members of the Parliament (Contact MPs). The three independent variables of interest are
unformal grassroots associations, traditional and religious authorities, and citizens’ perception of
MPs’ listening ability. To get a good grasp of the study at hand, it helps to provide a clear definition
of key concepts used.
1.Contact

with MPs:

According to this dictionary, to contact is "to reach out to and establish a

communication with someone else in order to convey a significant signal” (Webster,2017).
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Accordingly, citizens reach out to MPs to expose an issue, ask help, or exchange views. In
comparison to other forms of participation, BSV argue that contacts are “information rich” acts;
they permit explicit statement of concerns or preferences.” (page). For instance, compared to both
vote and protests, contacts add more nuances and put a human face to an issue. In contrast, voting
is a blunt act, “poor information” and occasional (25). Additionally, contacts between
representatives and citizens are not only promoted but they are also enshrined in the US constitution
through the first Amendment. Finally, citizens' initiated contacts bear some policy implications,
mostly during MCs voting decisions. According to the Congressional Management Foundation,
citizens' contacts are likely to sway 48% of MCs who have not made up their mind yet (CMF,2017).
How is the variable contact measured? In the Afrobarometer, the variable contact of MPs is
captured by the following questionnaire: “During the past year, how often have you contacted any
of the following persons for help to solve a problem or to give them your views: A Member of
Parliament/National Assembly Representative?” Coded as an ordinal level variable, the dependent
variable Contact MP ranges from 0 to 3 according to responses given (with 0 meaning no contacts,
1 for only once; 2 for few times, and frequent contact is 3) (codebook Afrobarometer round3
through 6). A cursive look to the Afrobarometer shows that Liberia and Sierra Leone come neck a
neck ahead of all other countries in terms contacts of MPs with respectively 35%and 34% of citizens
contacting their MPs. To put in perspective, these figures are equal to the number of contacts of
elected officials in the United States, 34% according to Brady, Schlozman, and Verba, 1995: 34.)
The chart below shows contact MP levels in 36 countries.
Contact with Local leaders: They consist of group of citizens with a relatively higher social status
that influence local opinion and hold an elected or appointive office in the circumscribed area (Veit
et.al 2008: 26). Empirical evidence shows that the purview of their jurisdiction varies from one
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country to another. For instance, whereas local leaders’ mandate is strictly limited to local affairs
in Ghana, local leaders in South Africa, Malawi and Zimbabwe are allowed to intervene in local as
well as national issues. Whatever maybe the extent of their political power, these influential citizens
tend to be ordinary citizens’ first “go-to” persons. In the Afrobarometer, the variable contact of
Local Councilors is captured from the following questionnaire: “During the past year, how often
have you contacted any of the following persons for help to solve a problem or to give them your
views: A Local Government Councilor?” Coded as an ordinal level variable this variable Contact
of Local Councilors ranges from 0 to 3 according to responses given (with 0 meaning no contacts,
1 for only once; 2 for few times, and frequent contact is 3) (codebook Afrobarometer round3-6)
2.Contact Religious Leaders and Traditional Rulers:

Religious leaders and Traditional rulers are

seen as one of the hallmarks of the African social political landscape(Logan,2008). These local
notables get their influence from a customary or religious sources and hold a big sway in ordinary
citizens’ everyday lives. The range of their interventions goes anywhere from officiating marriages,
religious services, or settling disputes, to outright material assistance (medicinal, food, or money).
They can also serve political cue providers, whom national political figures often compete to get
their endorsement (Veit et.al 2008, 26). In the Afrobarometer, the variable contact of religious
leaders, traditional rulers are captured from the following questionnaire: “During the past year, how
often have you contacted any of the following persons for help to solve a problem or to give them
your views: A traditional ruler/ religious leaders” Coded as an ordinal level variable, this variable
ranges from 0 to 3 according to responses given (with 0 meaning no contacts,
1 for only once; 2 for few times, and frequent contact is 3) (codebook Afrobarometer round3. The
table below provide a picture of the descriptive statistics of types of contacts.
3. Membership to an association:

These associations are networks of citizens loosely or strongly
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interconnected through tribal, village or professional relationships. Informal and often unstructured,
these interconnections tie citizens of roughly similar social economic statuses, gender, the same age
cohort, or cross generational groups. Bratton (1994) argues that these associational organizations
play numerous roles including economic (tontine, where the group puts a set amount of money,
together and gives it to each its members at his or her turn). These associations may also be used as
spokes-organ for it members and workhorse for community development activities (Kraus,2002).
Afrobarometer captures this variable with the following questionnaire: “Now I am going to read
out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an
official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member: farmers association,
community developments, trade unions, business association, religious association?” Membership
to association is a variable coded as a dichotomous variable (Yes=1; no=0)
4. MPs Listening:

“How much of the time do think the following try their best to listen to what

people like you have to say: Members of Parliament/National Assembly Representatives?” External
Efficacy and internal Efficacy: Scholars define external efficacy as the belief citizens hold about
the responsiveness of government authorities to his or her demands (Niemi et.al 1991).
As for internal efficacy, it refers to the belief about one’s ability to understand and navigate and
participate effectively in politics (Niemi et.al.1991).
5. Electoral Rules and Gross Domestic Product Per Capita Electoral:

To complete the model, I control for three

contextual variables: electoral system, the economic level of each country (GDP per capita).
Following Kuenzi and Lambright’ footsteps, I code electoral system as a dichotomous variable
(Single Member District countries are coded as =1) and (Proportional Representation countries are
coded as =0). As for the GDP per capita, I log the value taken from the World Bank database. I run
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a series of logit regressions followed by a post estimation using marginal effect of listed variables
in individual countries' data.
1.5.3

Models used for the analyses

Because my primary outcome variable dichotomous level variable, I use a maximum likelihood
model of estimation MLE. Specifically, I use the logit and probit models and proceed to evaluate
the substantive meanings of regression results using the Marginal Effect post estimation. In the
fourth chapter, evaluate a possible reciprocal causal relationship between contacts and listening
using the Biprobit and the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions. The results are displayed in Chapter
II, III, and IV. Below is a brief summary of these empirical chapters.
1.6

Summaries of Empirical Chapters
My dissertation probes the bottom-up interactions between citizens and their

representatives. Specifically, it seeks to answer the following research question: Under what
conditions do citizens initiate a contact with their Member of Parliament?
The response to this question is the central argument of the dissertation. It states that because
MPs are not very attentive to ordinary people, these ordinary people use two intermediary informal
institutions to contact their representatives. These meso organizations consist of informal grassroots
organizations and the traditional and religious authorities. However, although these informal
organizations play this role, direct contacts between citizens and their representatives is the ideal
democratic channel. More importantly, this channel helps to strengthen the weak political
attachment ordinary citizens have with their political system in Africa (Barkan,2004). I show that
the causal factor of this direct contact is MP’s displaying a willingness to listen to their constituents.
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1.6.1

Contribution to the literature:
This dissertation makes three original contributions to the literature. First, it uncovers the

roles of informal institutions (informal grassroots organizations and traditional authorities) as
linking institutions that connect ordinary citizens to their Members of Parliament (MP)more than
do formal channels(parties). Second, the dissertation uses the strong constituent-representative
connection in the US as a benchmark to show that direct contacts initiated by citizens serve to build
a political bond that sadly lacks in Africa. The third contribution pertains to the determinants of
political participation. The findings demonstrate that contextual variables such as the MPs’
willingness to listen to their constituents is a powerful predictor of citizens’ participation.
Altogether, the dissertation answers to the following three sub-questions: first, what are
these grassroots associations and how do they connect citizens to MPs? Second, what are the
traditional authorities and how do they connect citizens to their MPs? And finally, under what
conditions would citizens initiate a direct contact with their representatives? The first empirical
chapter of the dissertation (Chapter II) uncovers the role of informal grassroots organizations. From
Tocqueville onward, civic associations have been considered as breeding grounds of democracy
(Putnam,2002; Skocpol,2003). However, when it comes to Africa, scholars diverge on
characteristics and democratic dividend of these organizations. The chapter two addresses this
debate, defines these organizations, describes them and explores their purposes. Building on the
American political behavioral and institutional literature, I develop a theory that explicates the
causal mechanism of how these informal organizations serve as linking institutions between citizens
and their MPs in Africa. Results from a quantitative analysis of Afrobarometer data support my
theoretical expectations. These findings cast a positive light on these otherwise pervasive yet hidden
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beneath academic radars. Communal and associational life are at the core of African social and
political daily life; they wield a substantial influence on individual and member’s behavior.
The second sub-question is about the second intermediary institution: Religious authorities
and traditional leaders. These institutions are integral to the African social political landscape. The
reaction to these structures have been multiple. Acknowledged or rejected, they cannot simply be
ignored. The chapter III takes on the debate that opposes the two camps on the role of these
institutions in the African democratic process. Acknowledging each side’s point, I argue that this
issue should not be an either-or matter. Framing it that way amounts to a false dichotomy, simply
because traditional authorities are parts and parcel of the African social political DNA. In the
meantime, these institutions in many places on the continent have had a tarnished legacy and
continue to be weaponized against their own very people. The middle-of-road argument I make is
to acknowledge them, train them and take advantage of their popular legitimacy to disseminate
democratic values. Mozambique has successfully attempted such an integration of traditional
authorities. My argument is substantiated by an empirical evidence from the Afrobarometer data.
It shows that African traditional authorities are the most powerful predictor of contact with MPs.
The third sub-question is about the direct contact between citizens and their representatives.
Using intermediary institutions such as grassroots and traditional authorities are necessary useful,
but they muddle the accountability connection. In order to develop a political bond between
ordinary citizens and their elected officials, the ideal solution is to have citizens directly contact
their representatives. Once again, when it comes to Africa, this relationship is subject to a heated
debate as well. At issue is the dyadic, face to face interactions between elected officials and ordinary
citizens. Two camps emerge from the literature. The first camp perceives the MP-citizen interaction
as fundamentally clientelistic because they declare it based on private good delivery. The second
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group rejects this position by affirming that MPs misconstrue their constituents’ needs. The chapter
takes the stand that dyadic relationship is the key to strengthening the weak attachment citizens
have to their political system in Africa. I use the strong citizens-congress members tie in the US as
a benchmark to develop the argument. The findings support the fact that clientelism has very little
to do with what motivate citizens to contact their representatives. Evidence show that MPs’
attentiveness is the most powerful motivating factor to contact MPs.

2

CHAPTER II: GRASSROOTS ASSOCIATIONS AS VECTOR OF CONTACT OF
MPS
This chapter is about the roles of membership in civic associations in the constituent-

representative relationship in Africa. It assesses the causal linkage between membership in civic
associations and contacts with members of national parliaments in Africa (MP). Specifically, the
chapter seeks to suggest an answer the following question: What are the theoretical and empirical
causal links between membership in these grassroots organizations and contacts with members
of parliament(MPs). Its approach is mainly quantitative.
2.1

Scope, Research Design, and Argument

The scope of the article is limited to the twenty countries covered in the Afrobarometer round 4
consisting of Benin, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali,
Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and
Zimbabwe. The research design explores the impact of informal civic and communal organizations
in facilitating contacts between members of these organizations and their members of parliaments.
The outcome variables are political contacts with formal political office holders (MPs, Government
agency, and Local Councilors) in these twenty countries. Although I test the effects of several
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alternative explanatory variables on contacts with MPs, Government Agencies, and Local
Councilors, I focus on the impact of the primary independent variable, grassroots associations of
civic voluntary and communal development across the twenty countries. Using a quantitative
method, I perform logistic regressions using each individual country’s data and the merged data to
substantiate the hypotheses. From these quantitative investigations, emerges the central claim of
the chapter. It argues that because direct contacts between individual citizens and their MPs are
scarce in countries surveyed by the Afrobarometer, citizens use informal grassroots associations in
forms of civic voluntary and communal development organizations as an intermediary institution to
reach out to their representatives.
2.1.1

So Why?
It is hard to overemphasize the importance and pervasiveness of communal life style in

Africa. African communal life, expressed in vibrant and informal grassroots associations,
remains one of the social and cultural hallmarks of the continent (Bratton,1994, 2005). Yet, to the
best of my knowledge, these organizations have rarely been object of a systematic and a rigorous
academic investigation. Two reasons are suggested to explain this lack of academic interest. First,
by law, these organizations are not required to register in such data base in
mature democracies as well as in nascent ones. For instance, according to Toepler (2003), in the
United States, these organizations are not covered by the Business Master File(BMF) database. The
BMF is the Internal Revenue Service database that collects information on associations with a
spending above five thousand dollars ($5,000) in gross receipts. Missing from this database are
faith-based institutions, cultural, and community-based organizations. In the United States, by law,
these informal and unincorporated organizations are not required to file the IRS form
900 (Toepler 2003, 245). The second reason is due to a methodological omission.

These
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organizations are not on the radar of social scientists because standard survey questions fail to
capture them. Case in point, the questions on membership in civic organizations in the General
Social Survey(GSS) have a set list of organizations that limits respondents’ options to add
grassroots associations. Paxton and Rap (2015) corroborate this fact and highlight the political
potential of these bottom up organizations (213). Fortunately, the Afrobarometer has opened-ended
questions about membership in associations, leaving to respondents to fill in whatever associations
they claim to be members. Consequently, an article that highlights the participatory dividend
of these widely common organizations in Africa is worthwhile. The central contribution of this
article is to rigorously investigate and cast a positive light on the communication role these
grassroots associations play in facilitating contacts between citizens and their MPs
This article is structured into three sections each of which answers a sub question. The first
section answers the following sub question: what types of associations (grassroots organizations)
are we talking about? This section achieves three goals: first it describes the types of associational
life captured by Afrobarometer. Second, it provides a conceptual clarification of this
multidimensional concept of association and highlights the types of associations relevant to the
present study. Third, the first section reports the scholarly debates on specificities of African
Associational life, whether it is “ ascriptive” or “non ascriptive ,“ pro democratic or antidemocratic. The second section answers the following sub question: What do we know about
grassroots organizations as causes of contacts between constituents and their representatives? The
answer to this question grounds the chapter in the political participation theoretical framework.
Finally, the third section replies to the sub question about empirical evidence that substantiates the
supposed causal links between membership in grassroots organizations and contacts with MPs.
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Here I assess the two hypotheses generated from the argument, present results, and I close the
chapter with insightful discussions
2.2

Section I: Associational Life In Africa
Beginning with Tocqueville onward, civic associations have been considered as a breeding

ground where democratic citizenship develops (de Tocqueville,1838, Skocpole, 2003). However,
the number of entities that takes on the terminology of associations are innumerable. Hence the
necessity to define what types of associations are germane to this study. Despite carrying multiple
meanings, associations in this study refer specifically to grassroots associations(GAs) that are more
or less informal webs of social interconnections outside the realm of family where citizens join
other citizens to achieve personal or common goals (Totensen et.al.2001,10). The object of the
present article consists of informal civic voluntary associations (community development
organizations) and religious association. Professional organizations and labor unions are beyond
the scope of the investigation. In addition to defining and describing informal civic associations,
this section sheds a light on how African associational is perceived in the literature. More to the
point, I report the existing debates about specific characteristics of African Associational life. I start
with the typology of memberships the Afrobarometer offers in its surveys.
2.2.1

Typology of Associational Life In Africa
The Afrobarometer Round 4 dataset captures four forms of associations: religious

associations, civic voluntary associations, labor and trade unions, and professional associations. Of
the four types of associations, the religious associations claim the lion’s share of membership. The
Afrobarometer round 4 reports on average, 73% of those surveyed are members of a religious
association group; 38.5% claim a membership in a community development or civic voluntary
association.
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2.2.1.1

Religious Group Associations.
Africa displays one of the highest percentage of membership in religious groups. On

average, 3 out of 4 Africans claim a membership in these organizations. This is higher than the
religious membership in the US, which is estimated at 55% (Mike Lee, 2016). Perhaps two reasons
explain the high number of membership in religious groups in Africa. First, the pervasiveness of
poverty and hardship; and second, the proliferation of charismatic churches and several other
syncretic movements (Bratton, 2005). The Afrobarometer enumerates a total of nine religious
groups. For convenience, I group these religious groups into two general categories: Christians and
Muslims. Geographically, Islam comes as the number one religious group in most northern and
western parts of the African continent; in the central and the southern Africa, Christianity comes
first. The size of membership in these religious groups varies across countries. Countries with the
highest rate of membership in religious groups include Liberia and Malawi each at 90%;
Ghana, 88%; Nigeria, 83%; and Uganda with 82.5% of respondents. On the other hand, Lesotho
and Cape Verde have relatively lower rates of membership in religious groups with 44% and 41 %
respectively.
Interactions between religious associations and the political elite also vary from one country
to the other on the continent. In Senegal and Ghana, faith-based organizations do not shy away from
political involvements. On the contrary, in Nigeria or in Cote d’Ivoire, religious leaders manage to
cultivate a neutral attitude toward the political issues, or they warn outright their flocks against any
political involvement. In Senegal, the most powerful religious organization is the Brotherhood of
the Morridiya. Cheick Gueye (2001, 109-122) considers this organization as an informal and fluid
network of people whose cohesion is rooted in Islamic and some ethnic morals. The linchpin
connecting members is a mixture of the Islamic brotherhood and African communal norms. This
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grassroots association permeates every aspect of the Senegalese social and economic life. Its social
network comes in play during important social events such as in weddings, in christenings, and in
burials. The Brotherhood network serves also as job provider.

It handles a large swath of

trade consisting of a chain of economic agents from micro-financers to producers and to street
venders. In addition to its economic role, the Brotherhood constitutes a powerful political tool of
mobilization due to its large and loyal members. In Senegal, aspiring politicians and actual political
officials from all religious obedience seek the endorsement and “blessings” from the Murid, the
head of the organization (Gueye 2001, 119). Similar to Senegal, religious groups in Ghana can
be active in local political life. In his comparative study of Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, McLean (2004,
589-717) suggests that churches wear multiple hats in Ghana: they provide spiritual as well as
material goods to their followers. Churchgoers are members in several other community
organizations. This multi-membership expands the chain of solidarity and corroborates the
conventional wisdom that overlapping memberships at local level fosters democratic
attitudes. More importantly, the religious groups are also connected to local governments in Ghana,
thus channeling their members’ preferences to the local elites. Conversely, in Nigeria, spiritual
needs take precedence and mega churches rather stay away from any political involvement. For
instance, according to Yomi Oruwari (2001, 77-89), the church of Port Harcourt graciously
provides it members with welfare, health care, and housing services, but it sternly forbids them
from any political activity. Another communality among mega churches in Nigeria is that they are
solid and profitable business ventures where believers are exalted to give generously because “God
loves cheerful givers” (Oruwari 2001, 87).
Religious groups show their vitality through gender-based organizations elsewhere beyond
the twenty countries covered in Afrobarometer Round 4. One illustration is the Swaziland
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Women’s Burial Society. According to Miranda Miles (2001, 62-75) Swazi women unite to
overcome their social and economic vulnerability. Having migrated from poverty stricken rural
areas, most of these women find themselves exposed to harsh living conditions in cities. To
overcome these hardships, members of the Burial society create church-based organizations with
multiple functions (62). Usually, these associations provide a social comfort, a religious training,
and more importantly a mutual material assistance when death strikes; hence their name of Burial
Society. But the functions these associations play go far beyond a mere burial assistance. For
instance, the Burial Society in Swaziland promotes rotating credits among its members. Also,
because the majority of these women are domestic workers, they take advantage of their work in
the houses of the political elite to convey the concerns of group members (Miles, 2001, 69). In
sum, religious groups play more than a spiritual role; they play also and more often social, economic
as well as political roles.
2.2.1.2.Civic Voluntary Groups.
Like religious groups, the size and rate of membership in these civic voluntary and
community development associations vary from one country to another on the continent. At the top
of the scale, Mali comes first with 64% of those surveyed claiming a membership in a civic
voluntary or community development association; Liberia comes in second with 57%, followed by
Kenya 54%, Senegal 48% and Malawi 44%. At the bottom of the scales are Zimbabwe (21%) and
Madagascar (18%) in the Afrobarometer round 4. Although Afrobarometer does not specify the
types and structural levels of these voluntary civic groups and community development groups,
conventional

wisdom

categorizes

them

as

mostly

informal

with

the

exceptions of cooperatives. Even so, most of these cooperatives were disbanded or incorporated
in the political parties (Landell Mill 1992,123). In addition, few if any of these cooperatives are
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registered. So, for practical purposes, these entities will be considered as structurally informal
grassroots associations.
The takeaway from these succinct descriptions of a widespread and some say vibrant
African associational life is as follows. First, these organizations are informal, autonomous, and
may or may not be hierarchical. Second, they are located in rural as well as urban areas with rural
areas having slightly more active members (16%) than do city dwellers (11%). Third, membership
in these associations vary. It can be inclusive or exclusive, favoring ethnic homogeneity (in Ghana)
or ethnic heterogeneity (in Cote d’Ivoire). Furthermore, these grassroots associations display a
considerable degree of overlapping membership. For instance, in the 36 countries surveyed in the
Afrobarometer round 6, on average, 35.9% of active members in community development
associations are actively involved in religious organizations; 25.8% of the leadership in community
development occupy official positions in Churches and Mosques( Afrobarometer online
analysis). Fourth and perhaps most importantly, these organizations provide a safe place for their
members to air grievances and are connected formally or informally to local and
national representatives (Boyte and Evans,1986)
Table2.1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF ASSOCIATIONAL MEMBERSHIP (Afrobarometer Round 4)
Statistics

Min

Average
Max

Types of Associations
Religious Associations

Civic Associations

42. (Cape Verde)

8.9 Zimbabwe

72.5

26
49.2

(Kenya)

32

2.2.2

Debate About Characteristics of Associational Life In Africa
To what extent the above grassroots associations serve as a breeding ground for democracy

in Africa? The answer to this question is subject of a heated scholarly debate pitting two sides
against each other. The first group claims that African associational life is incongruous to
democratic citizenship development because it is ascriptive (not voluntary) and stifled by the
African political context (Ekeh,1992). The second group rejects this pessimistic view of grassroots
associations on the ground that associational life in Africa is vibrant based on its autonomy, its free
membership, and its socio-economic functions (Bratton,1994, 2004; Totsenten et.al., 2001). Before
delving into the debate, it is worth noting that no consensus has been reached on the issue; the
jury is still out.
The first group contends that African grassroots associations weaken citizens’ democratic
attitudes because they are ascriptive and stifled by detrimental political environments (Ekeh,1992;
Jorgensen,1996). A membership is said to be ascriptive when it is made up and held together by
kinship and cultural norms instead of having members adhere freely. Citizens become members of
associations by force either because they are born into it or through their tribal
connections. Ekeh (1992) points to two negative consequences of such ascriptive membership for
democracy. First, ascriptive members in African associations divide people into "ingroup" and "out-group" members and harbor a negative perception toward out-group members. Put
otherwise, ascriptive membership devaluates those that are outside the close knitted kinship,
deeming them less morally worthy of connections(ibid). As a result, this type of associational
membership is detrimental to citizens’ democratic attitudes. Secondly, in limiting citizens’ freedom
of choice, ascriptive membership curtails citizen’s agency. This is in stark contradiction to
democratic fostering organizations as described by de Tocqueville and his followers. That is,
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in a Tocquevillian type of civic associations, individuals are acknowledged as worthy beyond their
group identity (Ekeh 1992, 187). What makes these Tocquevillian associations a breeding ground
for democracy is the universalism and equal treatment among members and demonstration of moral
empathy

to

each

other

(de

Tocqueville,1838;

Skocpole,2003).

In

other

words, Tocquevillian associations serve as bridges between several individuals from different
familial

or

kinship

backgrounds

(Putnam,1993).

Furthermore,

the

bridging

characteristic qualifies Tocquevillian associations as elements of the civil society because they are
outside the realm of the family and occupy the space between the family and the state. In
contrast, grassroots associations in Africa are a sort of a continuum of kinship (Ekeh 1992). As a
result, they fail to fill the void between the state and the family, causing these two entities to be
far from one another (Ekeh,1992). Ekeh (1992) concludes that because African GAs
display ascriptive membership, they are incongruous with democratic development. Therefore,
African associational life is moribund and apathetic( .
However, several scholars reject the argument above based on the definition of grassroots
associations and functions they play. Seen from the perspective of Smith (1997), one of the most
eminent scholars of grassroots, African associational life is dynamic. He defines grassroots
associations(GAs) as locally based grassroots that are autonomous and run on a voluntary basis
with an uncoerced membership (269). Eliasoph Nina (2009) complements Smith’s definition by
attributing the civic nature to these grassroots associations. Nina contends that GAs are civic
organizations as long as they allow people to “come together and act collectively in finding
solutions to common issues” (295). Toestensen et.al (2001) add that it is not only the level of
formalization of associations’ structures that makes them part of the civil society, but also the
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functional space they occupy between families and the state apparatus. They offer the following
definition of civil society that encompasses the above grassroots associations:
We define civil society as the public realm of organized social activity located
between the state and the private household (or family)—with the following additional
specifications. Civil society contains informal as well as formal elements; however, with
a modicum of organization. Loose networks qualify as civil society organizations, but
spontaneous activities do not (p.18).
In his article, Civil Society in Africa (1994), Bratton offers the most direct rebuttal to
scholars who describe African Associational life as solely ascriptive and moribund. He contends
that associational life in Africa is not restricted to kinship associations. There are numerous other
types of associations that play multiples social functions (4). He starts by conceding that from the
outside, African societies seem to have few intermediary institutions between the state and the
household. However, seen from within, African societies display dynamic social networks. These
networks may be based on age cohorts, sex, class, or professions (7). Bratton (1994) indicates that
because these grassroots associations play several functions, (expressing group identity, giving
sense of belonging to its members), they command a broad allegiance from both city dwellers and
folks in the villages. Moreover, he adds that associational phenomenon is universal; it is not limited
to a single type of society (8). As Nesbit (2010) puts it “the need for association springs from one
of the powerful of human nature, need for a clear sense of cultural purpose membership, status,
and continuity” (12). Furthermore, based on the criteria of social functions performed by these
grassroots organizations, it can be argued that associational life in Africa is vibrant. Supporting
this view, Wellman (1999) contends that grassroots associations in Africa are primarily used as
“survival strategy” in countries where the state continuously defaults on providing basics needs to
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its citizens (135). Couto (1999) takes this positive outlook to a new level. For him, not only
do GAs heal the wounds inflicted by an unfettered and rogue capitalism (and structural adjustment
in Africa), but also they convey a distinct political voice (36). The second point of contention
among

scholars

lies

on

whether

these

grassroots

associations

yield

a democratic dividend. Specifically, the issue centers on the extent to which these
organizations, stifled by detrimental political environments in Africa, have contributed
to the bettering of constituent- representative relationships. This debate also opposes two camps:
the first group contends that historical and political environment in Africa have continued to curtail
grassroots

and

citizens’

capacity

to

relate

to

the

state

and

its

representatives

(Mills,1992; Johnson & Kumburu,2016; Jalal, 1995; Schaffer,1998; Ekert,2007). These authors
ground their arguments on the checkered history of grassroots associations in Africa during
independence and post-independence eras, all marked by exacerbated authoritarianism. The second
group, although they do not reject entirely the conclusion of this historical argument, they prefer to
see the glass half full, emphasizing the incremental progresses achieved in African democratic
processes (Goetz,2005; Lindberg,2006; Manning,2002; Bratton,2004).
African grassroots organizations have had a checkered history that has reduced their ability
to connect citizens and state representatives. Landell Mills (1992: 543-567) laments that
unlike on every other continent where grassroots flourished, on the Africa continent, nationalist
leaders cut short the development of GAs after gaining independence from colonial powers. He
claims that these nationalist leaders in Africa used grassroots movements as a tool of mobilization
in their struggle for independence. Once they acceded to the power, the new nationalist leaders
turned against these grassroots movements. These nationalist leaders felt compelled to reject these
grassroots and replace them with an avalanche of social reforms, aiming at "modernizing" the
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African social structures and political culture. Across the continent, GAs knew variety of
misfortunes going from being incorporated into political structures to being completely banned. In
the same vein, Johnson & Kumburu (2016, p159-166) evoke the case of Julius Nyerere, the long
serving charismatic leader of Tanzania. According to Johnson & Kumburu (2016), Nyerere thought
to transform the vibrant and autonomous grassroots associations into a political machine with his
romantic concept of UJamaa. In Swahili, Ujamaa means a collective lifestyle where community
members share their proprieties (Johnson & Kumburu,2016). Despite strenuous oppositions from
villagers, Nyerere and his henchmen succeeded in slowly stifling these dynamic social and
economic structures and in turning them into a political instrument (166). Like Nyerere, several
Africans

first leaders thought that state building should start by disrupting social and cultural

organizations. Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia promoted his version of “Humanism” and the dictator
Mobutu in Zaire hailed “le retour a authenticite” (Mill 1992, 555). In Guinea, Sekou Toure waged
a war against the Loma culture of sacred forest, pretending to force these people into modernity
(Mc Govern, 2014). Each of these ill-conceived political and social reformations succeeded only in
disrupting a natural grassroots free involvement in the state building and alienating ordinary citizens
(Mill 1992; Johnson & Kumburu, 2016).
At individual level, five decades after independences, deleterious political environments
continue to imprint far reaching impacts on citizens’ democratic empowerment, further damaging
the constituent- representative relationship. Authors suggest that self-insurance or civic efficacy
needed to hold authority accountable is never to be taken as granted in a place where political apathy
has deep seated historical and cultural roots. For instance, Mulgan (2000) reports that it is not a
small matter for an average African citizen, irrespective of her socio-economic status, to be
assertive about her or political rights (34). For a rural woman to stand up in front of local officials
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and accuse them of lying is a gutsy move in a society still governed by male dominance (Mulgan,
2000). Similarly, Jalal (1995) makes a historical argument rooted in the path-dependency logic. He
contends that Africans fail to connect with their political leaders because such actions were
prohibited and costly during the colonial period. Furthermore, since subsequent political power
holders in Africa have imitated colonial practices, they have continued to openly repress individual
initiatives to reach out to the state and its representatives (Grossman et.al.2016).
In response to this picture, other scholars (Goetz, 2005; Lindberg, 2006; Manning, 2002)
put forward incremental progresses made in African political processes. Goetz (2005) suggests that
democratic transitions on the continent have liberated public willingness and its need for more
answerability from public officials. He contends that the third wave of democracy has brought in
its wake competitive electoral politics that promote constituent-representative relationship (149150). Drawing from Rustow’s1970 famous idea of habituation, authors such as Lindberg suggests
that repetitive democratic processes including frequent elections will end up improving citizens’
democratic attitudes as a byproduct. Along the same line, Manning (2002) reports the progress
made

toward

peace

by

former

warring

factions

in

Mozambique

through

the

habituation of political processes (Manning 2002, 63-84). For these authors, a complete transition
overnight would be illusory. As Bratton (1994) puts it, “History matters” (45). That is not to say
that history will forever grip African political development. Democracy is a way of life; it takes a
time to get used to it.
The above discussion has shed a light on different stances on African grassroots’
characteristics, nature, functions, and their purported causal link with democracy. Altogether, each
side

presents

convincing

arguments;

however,

all

things

being

equal,

empirical

observations tend to favor the side of a vibrant association life in Africa. Yet, the real question goes
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beyond settling a debate about the nature and typology of grassroots associations to ask about the
extent to which the body of knowledge in political science knows about the role
these grassroots associations play as cause of contact between citizens and their representatives. In
other words, what does the existing literature say about this question?

2.3
2.3.1

Theoretical Framework
Literature review
Couto (1999) states that grassroots associations play at least two important roles, one social-

economic and the other political (39). One way to evaluate grassroots associations’ political impact
is to assess the extent to which they promote or hinder their members’ political
participation. Specifically, how do they improve or restrict contact between citizens and members
of parliaments in countries surveyed by the Afrobarometer? Framing this question in terms of
factors known to influence political participation allows the existing literature to suggest some
answers. In the extant literature, conventional wisdom distinguishes at least two levels of variables
(Verba, Schlozman, and Brady,1995; Hansen and Rosenstone,1993). Aggregate level variables
include memberships in civic voluntary associations, membership in unions labor or trade. As for
individual level variables, they trace their lineage from the behavioral revolution’s approach to
social science. Here the emphasis is put on the individual characteristics (promoted notably by the
Michigan school, the strategic mobilization model by Hansen and Rosenstone,1993; and the civic
voluntarist model by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady,1995). The communality of these quantitative
schools is that they focus on politically relevant characteristics of individual citizens
such as education, interest in public affairs, resources, gender, residence, political activity. These
authors assume these characteristics to be driving forces of individual political participation).
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2.3.1.1 Individual level variables
One of the most well-known assumptions of these behavioral schools is that individual
educational attainment increases political participation. The earliest version of this claim is to be
found in the modernization theory. According to the modernization school of thought, education
empowers citizens to get involved in politics (Lipset, 1959; Huntington,1968). La Due and
Huckfeldt (1998) argue that the positive relationship between and political participation is “one of
the most reliable results in empirical social science” (567). In the same vein, Hillygus (2005) states
that the idea that education is the primary driver and increases political participation is largely
“uncontested” (22). Putnam (2000) posits that education is the best individual level predictor of
participation (157). There are, however, several problems with these law-like statements. For one,
the debate about education as "a cause" versus “education as a proxy” remains far from settled
(Berinsky and Hanz 2011). Secondly, contextual factors need to be taken into account in developing
countries. For instance, according to Crake et.al. (2015), in electoral authoritarianism, educated
voters do exactly the opposite of what education is supposed to promote. If education increases
citizens’ critical capacity, political awareness, educated citizens in authoritarian systems may
believe that participation in a sham political process is futile, and worst, it amounts to legitimating
the incumbent autocrats (3). Crake et.al. (2015) present the elite disengagement in politics in
Zimbabwe as evidence of the dampening effect of education on political participation (1-33).
Scholars have found also gender difference to influence political participation. For mature
democracies, gender differences in participation and in ideology, referred to as “gender gap,” have
had

substantial

implications

in

policy

representations.

For

instance,

Pippa

Norris

and Ingleheart (2003) find that women are more liberal than men in the western world. This gender
gap in developing world has taken the name of “traditional gap” due to the tendency of women to
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harbor more conservative stances (Bratton and Logan 2006, 1-22). They caution that ideological
and participatory implications of gender gap in western world may not travel well in Africa.
Whereas in mature democracies women are known to hold more liberal values in mature
democracies, in Africa, Bratton and Logan (2006, 9) find that women tend to take more
conservative stances on social issues. However, they report that any stark difference between men
and women would be deceptive because both genders agree on the majority of issues (2). In fact,
quantitative investigations have shown that women’s overwhelming response of “don’t knows” is
responsible for skewing their positions on several issues (6). Nonetheless, Bratton and Logan stress
that women express a clear choice for peaceful political process. Perhaps, this explains women’s
reserve about multiparty electoral competitions tinged with ethnic violence (25). Yet Gottlieb et.al.
(2015) find that gender differences albeit small on the average, still remain significant across
policy domain and across countries in Africa. Gotlieb and colleagues also point out that gender gaps
in policy preferences correlate with gender gaps in political participation and representation (21).
Political scientists have also pointed to resources as a key to political participation. The
resource model pioneered by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) contends that citizens’ time,
material possessions, and stockpile of skills accumulated throughout life their lifetime foster
participation. The strategic model, a related model to the resource, rooted in the rational choice
model, argues that even if citizens have all the resources, these resources are completed by the
motivation of the elite. Rosenstone and Hansen claim that citizens may well have resources, but
it is only when the elite provides more incentive that citizens get mobilized. The elite strategically
targets the most movable citizens to induce them to get involved in the political process (Hansen
and Rosenstone 1993). However, applied to an African context, the resource model has proven not
fitting. Dione et al. (2014) examine the impact of remittance on the “recipients’ willingness” to get
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involved in the political process. The authors find that remittance have nuanced effects on political
participation behavior of the recipients. Recipients of remittance are less likely to vote and
to contact MPs but more likely to demonstrate. Those receiving remittance take
part in demonstrations because they can afford to take time off as long as their involvement does
not incur physical repressions. Overall, remittance reduces the household’s reliance on
state patronage (13). Yet similar studies conducted in Mexico found remittance beneficiaries
lacking motivation to participate (Bravo, 2007). Other individual levels variables such as residence,
and politics interest are positively related with political participation. Urban dwellers are also said
to be more active and politically sophisticated than their rural counterparts, hence "urbanite" are
easier to mobilize than villagers.

Finally, the levels of interest in politics maybe

both a cause and an effect of individual efficacy to get involved in politics (Bratton, et.al., 2005).
2.3.1.2

Aggregate level variables
The second types of variables found to influence participation are group level variables,

otherwise known as the variable of membership in civic associations. The connection between
membership in grassroots associations and political participation has become an established
(de Toqueville,1838; Putnam,1993;Verba,Schlozman,and Brady,1995; Skocpole,2003; Couto,199
9; Bratton,2004; Smith,1998; Minkoff, 2016).

Mark E. Warren (2001) emphasizes the positive

impacts of these associations on their members. According to him, associations enhance citizens’
sense of self-worth, allowing them to acquire new civic skills and virtues. Secondly, civic
associations provide a physical arena for a peaceful deliberative process, where members safely
open up to each other without fear. Thirdly, acting as an intermediary institution, civic associations
give its members the opportunity to interact with state institutions (182-207). Along the same line,
Andrews and his colleagues (2010) draw from the American experience to illustrate the role of
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membership

as

an

incubator

of

social

movements.

Throughout

the

American

political history, membership in associations has been the driving force for political change. Some
landmark examples of association memberships that changed the political landscape include
members of Abolition Society whose members pushed for the end of slavery in the South; members
of the Sons of Temperance whose efforts played a major role into the adoption of
the Eighteenth Amendment; membership in numerous faith-based organizations that sustained the
Civil Rights Movements in the late 1950s and 1960s (Andrew et. al.2010).
Notwithstanding the foregoing examples, scholars continue to debate about the difference
between political and nonpolitical groups in terms of their participatory outputs. Leighley (1996)
defines political groups as the ones that seek to have their say in the decision-making process of
public policy (455). Morales (2009, 3-60) echoes Leighley's stance and adds the ways in which
these groups influence the shaping of public policy. According to him, political groups use two
tactics: direct and indirect forms of actions. For instance, when these political groups engage in
strikes and demonstrations to voice their concerns, they are using the direct form of action. On the
other hand, when they target elections by impacting positively or negatively the voting turnout rate,
political groups are using the indirect form of action. The second question raised by scholars
concerns the difference between active and passive membership in terms of their effects on political
participation. Distinguishing active and passive members, Skocpole (2003) refers to active
members as those who show up and meet other members face to face. In contrast, passive
membership includes all those members who are “extra-local and show their support through check
books rather than being physically present" (30).
The debate about the extent to which the kind of organizations (political or nonpolitical)
and types of memberships (active or passive) affect political participation covers a voluminous
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literature with contradictory findings. Fortunately, Debra Minkoff (2016) presents a comprehensive
investigation that results on more conciliatory findings.

She uses a counterfactual

method and draws two important conclusions. First, political organizations do score more political
activism than nonpolitical groups. But there is also a support for the argument that membership in
civic organization enhances political participation. As for the types of memberships, she maintains
that both active and passive membership increase political participation (425-68).
The preceding two sections (on associational life in Africa and the literature review) have
achieved two goals. First, the section on associational life has shed a light on debates about the
distinctiveness of African grassroots associations in so far as their democratic dividend is
concerned. Second, the literature review has shown contradictory findings between mature and
new democracies regarding driving factors of political participation. The most striking illustration
being the discrepancies about the effects of education in established democracies(Norway) versus
its effects in nascent democracy (Nigeria) or in an authoritarian regime (Zimbabwe). More
importantly, reviewing the literature has highlighted the fact that grassroots organizations in Africa
have not yet been object of a rigorous academic scrutiny in their roles as an intermediary institution
to contact MPs. This article fills that gap. In the following paragraphs, I delineate the argument and
the two hypotheses.
2.3.1. The argument
The central argument builds on previous theories about the democratic dividend of civic
groups (C. Gs) in mature democracies and on theories of political participation in Africa. In the
literature, C.Gs. have been branded as training grounds where citizens learn to hone their
democratic skills and build their civic virtues. These benefits come by through the intensity and
scope of membership. Intensity of involvement refers to the amount of social interactions that occur
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within civic groups. Several authors have demonstrated that during these face-tot-face interactions,
citizens develop their civic skills by actively engaging in the organization, the planning, and
execution of civic activities. Civic groups also offer safer areas that facilitate public deliberation
(Areto, 1994; Habermas,1996) and social interactions with positive democratic outcomes. During
these social interactions, C.Gs. have been found to improve citizens’ democratic attitudes and
behavior. Many scholars have shown that membership in civic group enhance interpersonal and
generalized trust. For instance, Paxton (2007), Putnam (1993) have found that sanctions upheld in
these organizations and shared norms among members increase generalized trust and reciprocity.
They also specify that this trusting relationship among members does not result from individuals’
proclivity to trust anyone, but it is generated from the social setting within which members interact
(Paxton 2007, 53). Yet this claim has been challenged in two comparative studies. First, Norris
(2000) and Widner and Mundt (1998) have found that membership in C.Gs in developing countries
dampens generalized trust. For instance, Widner and Mundt (1998) report that interpersonal trust
has a negative relationship with membership civic groups in Botswana and in Uganda. Kuenzi
(2008) attributes the negative relationship between generalized trust and civic membership to low
institutional trust. In her analysis, Kuenzi finds that institutional trust (i.e, political trust) is the
catalyst that connects membership in civic group to generalized trust. In other words, C.G member’s
interactions with formal and informal institutions also shape their attitudes. Secondly, Varshney
(2003) also questioned the benevolence of community-based organizations. In her study about
sources of ethnic violence in India, Varshney (2003) argues that formal organizations (such as
unions and professional associations) are better proximate cause to peace than communal
organizations on the ground that they have a cross-cutting membership. In contrast, communal
organizations are filled with ethnic –driven membership and overlapping cleavage factors
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(Varshney 2003, 23). Yet in a similar study of the relationship between violence and social capital
in Africa, Bhavnani and Backer (2007) report that Varshney (2003)'s theory is challenged in Africa.
Specifically, they show that membership in communal organizations are not driven by ethnicity. As
a matter of fact, members of majority ethnic groups scarcely claim to belong to a civic group in
Africa. It has also been established that membership in C.Gs contribute in shaping citizens’
behavior through the time-honored social influence. According to Huckfeldt and Prague (1995),
“an individual is imbedded within a particular context, the context structures interaction patterns
and political information is conveyed through social interactions and individual response is based
upon this information” (36). This observation was first revealed by the Columbia School, which
emphasized the idea that individuals are to be understood within the larger social aggregate of which
they are a part. Aggregate behavior is to be understood as more than a simple accumulation of
individual preferences.
Civic groups are mobilizing collective forces. Through social interactions, C. Gs become
tools to disseminate information and increase political salience of issues (Olsen,1982).
Furthermore, greater personal involvement due to collective decision making reduces the cost of
mobilization. By reducing the cost of mobilization, CGs lessen the free rider problem. Knoke (1986)
asserts that this is done through normative expectations of fairness among members (7). Similarity
of goals and shared values and norms reinforce psychological bonds among members, leading
individual members to yield to the group the direction of their behavior(Knoke,1986). As a result,
CGs increase collective efficacy and provide a channel to communicate members’ preferences. As
Olsen (1982, 32) explains it, collective efficacy is gained when members acquire info about relevant
public issue, they pool together their resources and channel their preferences.
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Still, several factors conspire to hander the positive impacts of CGs. As previously alluded
to, informal grassroots associations in Africa suffer from lack of academic interest, scarcity of data,
and their so-called ascriptive characteristics. For instance, Ekeh (1992) holds that grassroots in
Africa are incongruous with democratic tenets because of their kinship driven membership. Another
criticism leveled at CGs in Africa is the pervasive informal nature of these organizations. To this,
Rosenblum (1998) replies that the richness of CGs does not lie in their level of formalization. CG
may well be hierarchical in organization, exclusive in membership and still be able to foster selfrespect in their members and expose them to contrary views (1998). Bratton et.al 2005, 143-301)
go further than Rosenblum in their advocacy of informal organizations and actions of these
voluntary associations. They argue that because informality is what characterizes political
participation in Africa, specifically during the interelection period, scholars should make a space
for activities that are done in these conditions. They enumerate two main activities that they find
central to political participation on the continent: “communing” and “contacting.” Communing
include all activities done by the community such as attending community meeting. According to
Bratton et.al, (2005) communing is a distinctive aspect of political participation in Africa because
it carries some normative expectations in regard to social interactions. Civic groups in Africa are
first and foremost social venues where members come to socialize, share concerns, and set the
community’s agenda (301). In these associations, Africans expand their political resources and
deliberate in local arena about local and national issues. As for contacting, Bratton and his
colleagues acknowledge the fact that Africans enjoy more face-to face interactions than any other
forms of interactions (291). Perhaps the weakness of formal institutions has forced Africans to
prefer this form of direct democracy by engaging directly office holders. Yet, the abysmal rate of
contacts between citizens and MPs led Van De Wall (2003) to observe that only a small fraction –
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the haves- that actually gets to contact political figures. The majority of citizens is alienated from
the state and its representatives. In these cases, CG become the reliable medium through which
citizens contact their representatives in Africa.
I argue that citizens use grassroots associations as intermediary channel to contact their
members of parliament because their membership in these grassroots emancipates them from fear
of replications and makes it easier to mobilize them in conveying their voices to representatives.
Furthermore, grassroots associations offer safer social environment for its members to voice their
concern because GA membership increases interpersonal trust among its members (Putnam,1993;
Couto,1999; Paxon, 2002; Paxton, 2007). This increase in social trust is induced by widespread
known norms and shared interpretations of the world (Putnam,1993; Couto,1999; Warren,2001;
Paxton,2002). As a result, members’ sense of wee-ness increases, making every member's behavior
and expectations predictable. Additionally, the sense of wee-ness of members promotes positive
self-image, fosters openness toward other members and expends each member’s sphere
of influence (Warren,2001).
Membership in GAs also helps citizens overcome their fear and encourage them to
specifically contact their Members of parliament (Couto, 1999; Warren, 2001). One of the longlasting legacy of authoritarianism and colonialism in Africa is political violence and its eroding
effects on individual willingness to take political initiative (Grossman,2016). This has made GAs a
de facto intermediary channel to convey citizens’ preferences to their MPs. The grassroots
membership becomes a springboard to move out from their fear. Grassroots membership in GAs in
Africa can be assumed to mobilize easily their members in contacting their MPs because they
reduce transaction cost, provide psychological bonding, and contribute in building
civic skills (Fung 2003, 515-539). In societies where basic procedures are young and fragile, civic
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associations organize, emancipate an empower individual citizens to contact their MPs (Baiocchi,
2002). The following two hypotheses are generated from the above theory.

2.3.1.3 Hypotheses
Hypothesis I Membership in GAs emancipate citizens from their fear and prompt them to get more
involved in community affairs such as attending community meetings.
One can assume that getting together to raise an issue and discuss in a small setting refines the
formulation of members’ concerns. This attitude of “joiner” is perhaps stronger in a place where
community issues drive these “getting together” to raise issues (33% of active members contact
formal leaders for community problems versus 23% for personal problems). Additionally, in a
place where individuals rely on social interdependence to survive, social organizations spring
organically and form grassroots associations. These grassroots associations cultivate psychological
bonds among members, which enables them to open up and let the group serve as their
motivator.

Huckfeldt and Prague (1995) call this phenomenon “the effect of a time-honored

process of social influence”
Hypothesis II: Membership in grassroots increases contact with MPs more than individual
politically relevant characteristics. As Olson (1982) contends, with their similar preferences, GA
membership fosters conditions where members pool together their resources to generate more
potent collective influence greater than individual action:
Association membership broadens one's sphere of interests and concerns, so that public
affairs and political issues become more salient to the individual. (2) It brings one into contact with
many diverse people, and the resulting social relationships draw the individual into a wide range of
new activities, including politics. (3) It gives one training and experience in social interaction and
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leadership skills that are valuable in the political sphere. (4) It provides one with multiple channels
through which he or she can act to exert influence on politicians and the political system (p.32). In
short, membership in civic associations prompt citizens to attend community meeting and to
generate collective efficacy necessary to contact their MPs.
2.4

Section III: Research Design and Methodology

What evidence substantiates the supposed link between membership in grassroots organizations
and bottom up contacts between citizens and their MPs?
2.4.1 Data
Does membership in GAS better explain contacts with members of parliaments than individual
characteristic in Africa? Put simply, of individual level variables and community –level variables,
which ones better predict the likelihood of contacts between constituents and their representatives
in Africa? This question originates from the conventional wisdom that maintains that individual
level variables are the primary driving force behind political participation in mature democracies.
Yet a closer look at the extant literature shows that theories of political participation in these
established democracies may not be vindicated in nascent democracies (Gottlieb et.al. 2015; Dione
et al., 2014). To set the record straight, this section compares the effects of individual level variables
to community level variables. By community level variables, I mean the two informal associations
covered in Afrobarometer surveys:

community development or civic voluntary groups and

religious groups. Individual level variables are the social economic status and demographics
variables. All of the data and variables measurements are drawn from the Afrobarometer round 4
surveys The Afrobarometer is an independent group of academic and professional researchers who
run survey of public opinion and attitude in Africa. It started in 1999 with the round 1 covering 12
countries. Eighteen years later, the Afrobarometer has expanded the scope from 12 countries to 37
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countries on the African continent. The main topics covered consist of democracy, governance,
individual perceptions of corruption, horizontal and vertical accountability, state-society
relationship, democratic institutions, and basic living conditions. I justify my choice of the
Afrobarometer round 4 on the richness of this round on the two key topics of this
chapter:

constituents- MP relationship and associational life in Africa. The round 4 was

conducted between 2008-2009, nearly two decades after the end of the third wave of democracy
and at a time when African political regimes sought to consolidate their democratic changes. The
round 4 in particular, probes constituent- representative relationship, asking questions about the rate
of interactions between citizens and their members of parliaments(MPs), citizens’ perceptions of
their MPs’ roles, motivations, number of MP’s visits, reason for contacting MPs, the fulfillment of
MPs’ functions (legislative, representation, oversight, and), keeping campaign promises or lack
thereof, and the extent to which there exist a gap of expectations and reality.
2.4.1.1

Dependent Variable 1: Contacts with Formal Office Holders
Representative democracy is premised on the proposition that citizens, as the source of

the political authority, choose to entrust this power to representatives. For these "custodians" of
people’s power to act fully on the behalf of citizens, there must exist clear channels of
communication and constant interactions between constituents and their representatives. Political
scientists have dubbed such interactions political participation, a multidimensional concept that
takes on multiple meanings. This article focuses on Africans’ specific actions of reaching out to
their members of parliament (MPs). According to Bratton and colleagues (2005), contact is an
individual or group initiative to connect with office holders (143). Due to pervasive institutional
weakness in surveyed countries, direct contacts come as the primary way of conveying meaningful
message to representatives during the periods between elections. The same institutional weakness
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explains why most of these contacts involve face-to-face and oral rather than written interactions.
However, these private and intractable interactions raise the threat of clientelistic or paternalistic
behaviors. Admittedly, scholars have acknowledged that one of the particularity of political
participation in Africa is that the line between civic oriented and patron-client behavior are blurred
(Bratton et.al 2005,144). Altogether, the dearth of formal connections makes contacting of political
office holders (local or national) as the surest way to express their preferences (Bratton et.al.2005).
In a healthy democratic system, these contacts reflect the primacy of citizens in the state-society
relationship. In mature democracies contacts with representatives reveals one of the powerful ways
of expressing constituency potency. The United States provides the more telling example of this
dyadic relationship. According to the Congressional Management Foundation(CMF),
representatives’ decisions are 36% influenced by contact from constituents (CMF,2015,12).
The Afrobarometer enumerates 5 types of contacts: Contacts with members of parliament,
members of government agency, members of local government council, traditional rulers, religious
leaders and party officials. This chapter concentrates on the three formal office holders: members
of parliament, members of government agents, and members of local government
council. These variables are captured with the following generic question: “During the past year,
how often have you contacted any of the following persons about some important problem or to
give them your views:”“Members of parliament;” “Government agency;” “Local
councilor.” The answers are captured on an ordinal scale with the following values: never=0; only
once=1; a few times= 2; often = 3 don’t know = 9. For convenience, I recode these variables into
dichotomous variables by collapsing values from 1,2 and 3 into yes =1 and never = 0.
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2.4.1.2

Dependent Variable2: Attending Community Meetings
It has long been established that political participation is a multidimensional concept. This

multidimensionality has opened the door to ongoing scholarly debates about whether participation
hurts or promotes positive democratic attitudes and a debate about what activities constitute
conventional as opposed to unconventional activities of participation. These debates bear
heightened implications when applied to the specific settings of African politics. One specific
question that comes to mind is: should communal activities be considered as political participatory
activities? I side with Bratton et.al. (2005) who advocate for the inclusion of such acts. For Bratton
and colleagues, it is important to broaden the definition of political participation in Africa because
politics follows two tracks: the formal and informal ways. This makes attending community
meeting specifically a key aspect of participation in Africa. Community meeting mostly happen in
grassroots associations. By participating in these grassroots activities, citizens gain in democratic
attitude dividend. Liz and Zhang (2017) contend that such communal activities promote individual
emancipation. In this communal setting, citizens acquire civic mindedness, personal transformation
that helps them overcome their fear (12). Communal participation is both instrumental and
psychological when it leads to self-realization(UNPD). In the Afrobarometer round 4 datasets, this
variable is captured by the following wording: “Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take
as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things
during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance: Attended a community
meeting?” The responses are distributed in four ascending order categories: no=0, but would do if
I had the chance=1; yes, once or twice=2; yes, several times=3; and yes, often=4. I recode this
variable into a dichotomous variable by aggregating the value from 1 to 4 into 1.
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2.4.2

Operationalization of the Independent variables

From the existing literature, I enumerate below the independent variables assumed to motivate
citizens to contact their MPs. I divide these variables into two groups depending on whether they
are individual level variables or aggregate level variables. The first group or individual level
variables include politically relevant characteristics assumed to prompt individuals in contacting
their representatives. They consist of individual citizens’ age, education, gender, income, party id,
and residence. The second group comprise of aggregate level or associational variables, including
membership in community development group and civic voluntary group, membership
Age: Extant literature shows that age has a reverse-U-shape (hyperbolic) relationship with
political participation (Verba, Scholzman, Brady,1995). This means that both younger and older
citizens care less about getting involved in politics. In the Afrobarometer, age is recorded as a
continuous variable, starting from 18 to 90 and plus. For this study, I categorize age into four
groups: young adults (18-39; adults (40-60); senior (60-79) and older citizens 80 and plus.
Education: Education is widely seen as the most reliable indicator of political participation. The
underlying assumption of this perception is that education allows citizens to climb the social and
economic ladder; it is the quintessential tool for social mobility and the cognitive empowerment
necessary for getting involved in public affairs. The modernization theorist Lipset (1960) and
new behaviorists (Nie et.1996; Norris,1999) articulate the causal mechanism with the
following three paths: the “positional path”, “the socialization path”, and “the cognitive path”
(quoted from Mattes and Mughogho,2009 p.2). "The positional path" links the educated persons
with others through networks established during their schooling times. Through the "socialization
path," educated people internalize societal values and code of conduct to achieve their goals.
Finally, the "cognitive path" endows educated people with a stockpile of skills, including practical
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abilities, understanding, and critical thinking, that boost their internal efficacy and allows them to
navigate and participate in the political process (Mattes and Mughogho 2009, 2-23).

In

the Afrobarometer surveys, education is recorded as a continuous variable categorized into 12
groups. To better capture the distinct effect of different levels of education or lack thereof, I recode
education as a thrichotomous variable: The level one is coded 0 and captures all citizens with no
formal education; the level two is coded 1 for those having some secondary education, or graduated
from high school; and level tree, coded as 2, regroups post high school education attainment,
including college and post graduate.
Gender: Gender is traditionally coded as dichotomous variable with female=0 and male =1.
I follow the same convention. Compared to the established wisdom about gender and participation
in mature democracies, the relationship between gender and political involvement in nascent
democracies has also been found to be counter-intuitive. In mature democracies, political scientists
revealed a gender gap prior to the feminist revolution of 1970s and early 1980s. However,
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) show in their voluminous survey that although
men participate more than women, this difference is small and meaningless statistically (153). On
the other hand, Norris (2003) found a difference in partisanship and ideological stances between
men and women. Their study shows women leaning toward the democratic parties with more liberal
values than men. Yet Bratton and Logan (2006) find that these results do not hold in Africa. This
inconsistency in findings warrants a new investigation specifically targeting women contact with
their MP in Africa.
Income and residence are two variables assumed to prompt citizens to contact their MPs. Because
low level of income is common in Africa, I choose the variable gone without food to capture the
variance in income level that would lead citizens to contact or not their members of parliament.
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Residence area. The existing literature attributes great level of political participation to urban
dwellers. In Africa and in elsewhere, urbanites are seen as more politically sophisticated
citizens compared to their rural counterparts. In the Afrobarometer round 4 surveys, this variable
is coded as dichotomous variable with 1 rural folks and 0 for urban dwellers. I complete individual
level variable with respondents' party identification. The Michigan school of social psychology of
political participation dubbed the party id as the “unmoved mover.” In other words, the party id is
the centripetal force that crystalizes all motivations to participate in politics. The Afrobarometer
seizes this variable by asking respondents to indicate their closeness to political parties. The answers
are recorded as dichotomous variable with 0= no closeness and 1= close to party.
Aggregate or Community level variables-Associational variables and contextual variables.
Membership in community development or civic voluntary groups and membership in religious
groups. From de Tocqueville, onward (Putnam,2000; Skocpole,2003 Verba et.al.1995) and other
political behaviorists have long maintained that associational membership boosts the likelihood of
political involvement. However, concerning Africa, other scholars have questioned whether
association in Africa stems or promotes political participation. From their description, one expects
to see a negative relationship between the so-called “ascriptive membership” and contact of
MP. The Afrobarometer codes associational membership as nominal variable. I recode it as a
dichotomous variable with 1 for members and 0 for nonmembers. To complete the model, I control
for three contextual variables: electoral system, the economic level of each country (GDP per
capita). Following Kuenzi and Lambright’ footsteps, I code electoral system as a dichotomous
variable (Single Member District countries are coded as =1) and (Proportional Representation
countries are coded as =0). As for the GDP per capita, I log the value taken from the World Bank
database. I run a series of logit regressions followed by a post estimation using marginal effect of
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listed variables in individual countries' data. I complement these individual regressions by using
merged data where I control for electoral systems and countries' economic levels (GDP per capita).

Table 2.2: Results of individual country data regressions
CGs on Local

CGs on MPs

CGs on ATCM

CGs on agency

ATCM on MPs

Gender on MPs

Country

Coef.

Country

Country

Country

Coef

Country

Coef

Country

UG

0.88 KEN

0.61 GH

0.34 KEN

0.75

LIB

0.41 NIG

-0.19

LIB

0.85 UGA

0.57 NIG

0.24 BTW

0.66

KEN

0.06 SEN

-0.09

BTW

0.8

0.56 BN

0.23 LIB

0.38

BTW

0.05 GH

-0.08

KEN

0.65 LIB

0.43 ZAMB

0.22 NIG

0.07

UGA

0.03 LES

-0.06

ZIMB

0.11 BK

0.38 BK

0.21 SEN

0.04

SEN

0.03 MALI

-0.05

BK

0.1

GH

0.33 BTW

0.15 ZAMB

0.04

GH

0.02 ZAMB

-0.05

ZAMB

0.08 SA

0.04 NAM

0.15 SA

0.03

BK

0.02 Benin

-0.04

Benin

0.08 NIG

0.04 SA

0.14 ZIMB

0.03

CV

0.02 BK

-0.04

NIG

0.07 MALA

0.03 LIB

0.14 CV

0.02

NIG

0.01 TAN

-0.04

TAN

0.07 MALI

0.02 MOZ

0.11 MAL

0.003 SA

0.01 LIB

-0.01

MALI

0.05 TAN

0.02 TAN

0.09

LES

0.05 Benin

0.02 UG

0.88

SEN

0.04 SEN

0.02 LES

0.08

MOZ

0.03 MOZ

0.02 MAL

0.06

MAD

0.02

Coef

MALI

0.02

BTW

Coef

0.61 SEN

Coef

0.02

Coef
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2.5

Discussion of the Results
The primary goal of this investigation is to assess the impact of grassroots associations on

contacting members of parliament. It emerges from the analysis that civic groups produce the
greatest effects on local elected officials followed by contact with members of parliament and
contact with government agency. Membership in civic groups causes the highest rate of contact of
local councilors in Uganda (0.88), Liberia (0.84), Botswana (0.8), Kenya (0.655) Zimbabwe (0.11)
and Burkina Faso (0.105). But not all countries covered in the Afrobarometer 4 provide a fertile
ground for civic groups. For instance, Namibia, Lesotho, and Madagascar have a very low
membership rate in civic groups. In these countries, membership in civic groups has no effects on
the likelihood of contacting local officials.

Impact of CGs on Contacts with Local Councilors.
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
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0

Figure 2.1 Impact of Civic Groups on Contact with Local Councilors
The second highest effect of civic groups is in causing their members to contact government
agencies. Yet this type of contacts raises the red flag of patron-client relationships (Bratton
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et.al.2005). It is limited and present only in 9 out of 20 countries. Among the twenty countries,
Liberians that are members of civic groups seem to contact more government agencies (.38),
Nigerians come in second with the particular fact that highly educated citizens in Nigeria contact
more their government agency than their MPs (.073 >0.04). Equally, members of civic groups
contact more government agencies than their MPs in Botswana (0.066> to .056), almost twice more
contact of government agencies than MPs in Senegal (0.043 > 0.025).
More importantly, being member of a CG carries a substantive predictive power to contact
MPs. This effect is consistent and almost general; fourteen countries out of twenty show that being
a member of a civic group prompts one to have a contact with MPs. The effect of civic membership
is highest in Kenya (0.61) followed by Uganda (0.57), Botswana (0.56) Liberia (0.43) and Burkina
Faso (.38). For instance, being a member of a civic group increases one’s chance by 61% of reaching
out to ones’ member of the national parliament in Kenya, and by 57% in Uganda and 43% in
Liberia. This relationship holds even in countries with a civil war legacy. Although this coefficient
is higher in countries with the Single Member District electoral system(SMD), some countries with
Proportional Representation (P.R) system have considerable effect (Burkina Faso, South Africa).
On the other hand, other countries such as Malawi with SMD electoral system, display virtually no
contact with MPs.
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Figure 2.2 Effects of Civic Groups on Contacts with Members of Parliament
Other indicators that consistently predict contact with MPs albeit with relatively much smaller
coefficients include residence and age. In the Afrobarometer, residence is coded as a dichotomous
variable with the following values: 0= urban and 1 =rural. From this coding, it can be inferred that
the results of the statistical analyses contradict the tenets of modernization theory on the relationship
between participation and urbanization. According to the modernization theory, urban dwellers
participate more in politics than their rural counterparts, because they are more informed, better
educated, and sophisticated. However, when it comes to political contacts, this claim is clearly
unsupported in the twenty countries analyzed here. To the contrary, it appears that villagers
participate more than city dwellers.
Across the twenty countries of Afrobarometer round 4, age has proven to be a reliable and
consistent variable with a positive effect on contacting members of parliament. The investigation
finds political contacts is more the actions of older citizens than the youth. The result suggests that
citizens above 35 years and beyond are those who contact more their political representatives. This
result is similar to the findings of Bratton et.al. (2005). Finally, being a member of a civic voluntary
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group can predict the likelihood of attending community meeting. This is more observable in Ghana
(0.34), Nigeria (0.24), Benin (0.23) and in Zambia (0.22) and Burkina Faso (0.21). Two
observations are worth noting about the relationship between CGs membership and attending
community meeting. First, compared to political contacts coefficients (contacts with local
councilor, Government agency, and MPs), the predictive power of CGs membership on the
likelihood of attending community meeting is relatively smaller. This suggests that the attendees in
community meetings do not necessarily claim a membership in grassroots associations. The second
observation, perhaps the most important, is that being member of CGs has a positive effect on
attending community meetings in 95% of countries examined, with the exception of Zimbabwe.
These meetings are informal and usually held in public arenas, where citizens air grievances and
collective concerns are talked about. It appears from the statistical analysis that these meetings
motivate citizens to contact their MPs. Of the countries examined, attending a community meeting
is more impactful in Liberia (.41), Kenya (.006), Botswana (.005), Uganda (.003) and Senegal (.003.
On the other hand, attending community meeting carries no impact in Zimbabwe, Lesotho, and
Namibia.
As for the educational attainment level, the effect is inconsistent across the 20 countries and
at the three levels of political contacts. One major contribution of this article is that it nuances the
prevailing wisdom about the impact of educational attainment reported recently by many African
scholars. This article maintains that it would be a mistake to generalize the depressing effects of
education on political participation in every single African country. With a scope of twenty
countries, three salient observations are to be made. First, the conventional wisdom about the
dampening effect of education on political participation is vindicated in Lesotho (-.061 contact with
MP), Mozambique (-.023 contact with MP), Nigeria (-.012 contact with MP), Zimbabwe (-.011
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contact with MP), South Africa (0.21 attend community meeting), Benin (-0.17 attend community
meeting). The second noteworthy observation is that education has a positive influence at three
levels of political contacts in Kenya, Liberia, Cape Verde, and Zambia. Unlike earlier analyses that
captured participation as a unidimensional act, I disaggregate political contacts into three forms.
Unpacking political contacts and using individual country data have allowed us to observe these
positive impacts of education. With respect to national representatives, Liberia comes first with a
coefficient of (0.17) seconded by Kenya (.027), and Cape Verde (0.013). In Zambia, the higher
citizens' level of educational attainment, the more they contact local councilors (0.014). The level
of educational attainment impacts also initiative to contact government agencies in Nigeria (.073).
Religious membership is not as effective as it could have been expected. In general, it
emerges from the present analysis that the majority of the twenty countries, religious membership
is not a springboard for political participation. Among the 20 countries surveyed, Mali displays the
highest negative coefficient (-.098), followed by Nigeria (-0.013). On the other hand, in Liberia,
Kenya, Uganda, South Africa, and notably in Zimbabwe, membership in religious group positively
correlates with the likelihood of contacting their MPs. In Cape Verde, membership in religious
groups has a neutral effect on political participation. Compared to civic member groups,
partisanship has a much smaller coefficient and behaves inconsistently in the twenty countries with
respect to contacting MPs and attending community meetings. Three scenarios are observed. In the
first scenario, the variable partisanship complements civic groups to boost contact with MPs in four
countries Mozambique (0.098), Uganda (0.093), Kenya (0.086), and Tanzania (0.084). The second
scenario is present where citizens’ closeness to a party becomes the sole vehicle that leads them to
contact their MPs. The scenario is found in Lesotho (0.099), Namibia (0.095), Zimbabwe (0.075),
and Madagascar (0.064). The third scenario involves countries in which partisanship has no effect
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on citizens’ willingness to contact their MPs or attend community meetings. In Burkina Faso, Mali,
and Ghana, partisanship has no effect on contact with MPs; the vibrancy of civic groups remains
the primary engine that mobilizes citizens to contact their members of parliament or to attend
community meetings.
Gender: Following the convention, I code the variable gender as a dichotomous
variable (0=female;1=male). The analysis corroborates the existing common knowledge about the
gender gap in political participation in Africa. The results of the statistical analysis show that
gender impacts negatively political contact variables and that of attending community meetings.
The gap of participation between men and women is visible and statistically significant in 18 out
of 20 countries, the two exceptions being Cape Verde and Madagascar. Unlike in elsewhere on the
continent where being a woman consistently affects negatively political participation, in these two
countries, the findings show that the variable gender has no statistical significance. However, the
rates of membership in these two countries suggests two opposites explanations. In Cape Verde,
the comparatively high rate of civic membership and political contacts suggests that both men and
women equally participate at virtually same level. Consequently, the difference between the two
levels of participations (men and women) is statistically meaningless. In contrast, in Madagascar,
the lack of significance is due to the equal non-participation of both men and women in contacting
MPs. Among the other 18 countries where gender impacts negatively contact with MP and
attending community meetings, West African countries are the standard bearers with Nigeria (.197), Senegal (-.094), Ghana (-.08), Mali (-0.054), Benin (-0.045). Among the west African
countries, Liberia fares better with a relatively smaller negative impact of women’s participation (.0.01). In addition, the gender gap worsens as one moves from national representatives to local
councilors everywhere in Africa. Rural women, mostly uneducated, seem to be totally excluded
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from local political activities in Mali (-.123), Senegal (-.08). Burkina Faso is the exception when
it comes to the gender gap in political participation with a coefficient of -.0001. This suggests that
men and women participate at a virtually equal rate in Burkina Faso. Perhaps this small negative
impact reflects Thomas’ Sanakara’s national program of women’ emancipation in the mid
1980s. As for the Eastern African countries, they display similar general pattern albeit with smaller
coefficients of gender gap in political contacts and political and communal activities. The average
coefficient in the Eastern countries is (-0.03). Yet, among the countries in this region, women are
excluded from politics in Lesotho (-.11) and Zambia (-.09) as much as they are in most West African
countries. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) found that married women with young children
work on average six hours a day more than men (274). It is common in Africa to see women wear
multiple hats; they are in several cases the first bread winner, they take care of children and
household chores. All these factors put together can explain why women are less active in political
arena especially in rural areas. Like gender, it appears that political fear still hampers political
participation in Liberia and Uganda, countries that have gone through civil wars.
At the outset of this article, I set out to explore the causal linkage between membership in
informal grassroots associations in forms of civic voluntary and community development groups
and contacts with members of parliament in Africa. Despite the pervasiveness of these
organizations, there had not been a systematic study to examine the intermediary role they play in
state society relationship in Africa. Authors such Eke (1992) believes that these African grassroots
associations are not precursor of democracy. As for their role as vehicle of participation, scholars
in mature democracies have established that individual characteristics are the primary drivers of
political participation. Against these two backdrops, the present investigation has shown that
grassroots in Africa are the stepping stone toward restoring the state-society relationship.
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Specifically, it has demonstrated that membership in grassroots associations in forms of civic
groups is more consistent and powerful indicator of contact with MP in the 20 countries surveyed
than individual level variables. In so doing, the evidence supports the central argument that
membership in these GAs offer a safer space for political expression, and motivate their member to
get involved in communal activities. These results are in line with the findings in Bratton et.al
(2005). More importantly, the GAs serve as a medium to reach out to MPs. Admittedly, these
findings do not eliminate the clientelistic suspicions hanging over direct contacts between citizens
and office holders in Africa. Instead, this investigation stresses the primordial roles of these
numerous and organic organizations in Africa in building civic efficacy and civic involvement
during the interelection periods. A future research agenda should envision undertaking a field
experiment to assess these participatory impacts on the ground.
Control for contextual variables.
In order to test the validity of the aforementioned argument, I use the merged data for the
20 countries and add two macro-level contextual variables: electoral systems and countries gdp per
capita. Following Kuenzi and Lambright, I code electoral system as a dichotomous variable
whereby countries with the single member district electoral system are coded as 1 and the rest
(Proportional Representation and various modes of mixed systems) are coded as 0. As for the
countries’ economic level, I logged the gdp per capita.

Table 2.3. Results of the merged data from the 20 countries.

Variables

Coefficients and standard error

Member civic group

0.289***(.001)

Age

.026***(.002)
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Interest in public affair

.018***(.002)

Electoral system

.018***(.003)

Discuss politics

012***(001)

Education

.007***(.000)

Member Religious group

.005*(.002)

Party id

-.049**(.004)

Gender

-.032***(004)

Gdp per capita

-.014***(.002)

Number of obs

=

22324

LR chi2(14)

=

1310.88

Prob > chi2

=

0.0000

Log likelihood =

-6952.539

Pseudo R2

0.0862

=

The results displayed in table 2 show that membership in civic groups is the primary
independent variable that motivate citizens to reach out to their MPs across all countries. Education
is surprisingly positive in the merged data, suggesting the inconsistent behavior of this variable. As
for the closeness to political party, the statistical analysis highlight the pervasiveness weakness of
these institutions across the twenty countries. Gender and residence maintain the same pattern as in
the individual country data. Interestingly, the size of the negative coefficient of party id suggests
however that this variable would have been the indisputable factor of contact between citizens and
their MPs had political parties played their linking role. Overall, both individual country data and
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merged data regressions confirm the importance of civic organizations as peaceful and reliable
intermediary institutions that link citizens to their representatives.
3

CHAP III: AFRICAN TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES AND RELIGIOUS
INSTITUTIONS AS INTERMEDIARY INSTITUTIONS TO CONTACT MPS

3.1

Introduction
The central argument of this dissertation states that citizens in Africa scarcely reach out to

their representatives directly. Instead, they contact members of parliaments from their districts
through two intermediary institutions. The first intermediary institution that facilitates the bottom
up contacts consists of informal grassroots organizations (often called civic and communal
development groups in the Afrobarometer surveys). The second mediating informal institutions are
the African traditional authorities and religious institutions. While the chapter two dealt with
informal grassroots organizations and how these grassroots organizations help groups of citizens
garner collective efficacy to contact their MPs, this chapter three zooms in on religious institutions
and traditional authorities in their roles as linking institutions between citizens and their members
to the national parliament (MP).
3.1.1

Research questions
The goal of the chapter is to answer the following questions: To what extent are religious

institutions and traditional authorities useful for the constituent-representative relationship in
African democratic process? Answering appropriately this question requires taking a closer look at
the debate in the literature about whether or not traditional institutions are necessary for African
democratic consolidation. More acrimonious, this debate pits two camps against each other
“Modernists” versus “Traditionalists.” Traditionalists posit that African traditional authorities,
organic emanations of the ordinary citizens, are the true representatives of the people, and as such,
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these informal institutions constitute the stepping stone of any successful democratic transition in
Africa (Ayittey,1995; Lawson, 2002; Keulder,1998). In a stark opposition, modernists, led by
Mamdani (1996), one of their most vocal proponents, counter that these traditional authorities are
nothing but vestiges of a colonial despotism, and they are antithetical to any democratic
development in Africa (Mamdani 1996:18). As a result, traditional authorities and democratic
institutions cannot coexist. A successful democratic reform in Africa ought to get rid of these
institutions.
3.1.2

The Argument
This chapter takes the middle ground position and argues that traditional institutions are

useful for democracy because they serve as a channel of communication between citizens and their
representatives. The existence of traditional authorities facilitates the two-track political
participation of citizens in Africa. This side-by-side use of the two modes of political participation
is the use of the informal channels to reach out to formal institutions to increase citizens’ input in
their political communities. Specifically, when compared to other factors that are purported to
facilitating contacts between citizens and their representatives, the combine effect of these two
institutions stands out as the most powerful predictor of contacting Members to the Parliament. The
idea of side- by- side or low and high road of participation is akin to that of the two-track political
process in Africa. Amply explained by Manning (2002) in her analysis of the Mozambican peace
process, the concept of two-track practice is a realistic description of political practices in Africa
where informal institutions (often ignored or dismissed) complement formal ones. Similar to
Manning’s 2002 argument of the two-track implementation of the peace agreement in Mozambique,
the two-track participation argument sheds a light on a common practice yet benighted by the lack
of academic interest.
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To demonstrate this argument, I devise the following design. My primary dependent
variable is citizens’ contact of their members of parliament in Africa. My two primary independent
variables are contacts of religious institutions and contacts of traditional authorities. I contrast the
effects of these two primary independent variables (informal institutions) against the effects of the
alternative hypothesis variables: contacts of party officials, voting, and citizens’ partisanship,
controlling for individual level variables (demographic and socioeconomic) and country-level
variables (electoral systems and country gross domestic product per capita). I also control for a
potential selection bias caused by highly opinioned individuals who might contact both traditional
authorities and MPs, rendering the causal connection between traditional authorities and MPs
spurious. Following the examples of public opinion studies in American politics, I control for
citizens with strong opinions by including the variable closeness to party that captures individuals’
ideological strength. The approach is strictly quantitative and the data comes from the
Afrobarometer Round 4. Post estimations of the probit regression results support the hypothesized
relationships that, together, citizens contacting these institutions a marginal effect of 4.3% more
likely to contact their MP than citizens who do not contact their religious or traditional authorities.
Even taken individually, contacts of religious institutions and traditional authorities remain
remarkable indicator (albeit reduced) of contact of MPs (contacting religious institutions, 2.3% and
contacting traditional authorities, 2%). In contrast, those who contact party officials are only 0.5%
more likely to contact their MP. Unsurprisingly, weak party attachment is reflected by a negative
coefficient of the variable party closeness on contact with MP (-2.4%). The finding on party
closeness also resolves the potential treat of a selection bias and confirms the causal effects of these
institutions. Another all-too-common finding in African behavioral politics is the quasi exclusion
of women; the coefficient of gender is predictably negative and highly significant ( -2.%). These
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findings are echoed in Afrobarometer surveys. On average, forty percent of ordinary citizens
contact directly their religious leaders and twenty nine percent their traditional authorities on a daily
basis. In contrast, very few ordinary citizens initiate a direct contact with their elected legislative
officials from their districts. Practically, less than two out of ten ordinary citizens ever initiate such
a contact with their representatives. An overwhelming eighty seven percent of the population lives
in a total isolation from their representatives. A quick computation shows that the rates of contacts
between citizens and their informal institutions is twelve-fold higher than that of the citizens-MP
contacts. Obviously, these rates of contacts vary across countries, with some countries displaying a
higher rate of contacts such as Botswana (20%), Kenya (19%), Liberia (18%) and others showing
abysmal rates of contacts between citizens and their MPs including Madagascar (1%), Namibia
(2%) Nigeria (4%). These figures indicate that informal institutions are more connected to ordinary
citizens than the formal ones.
3.1.3

The Scope of the chapter three
This article covers only the twenty countries from the Afrobarometer Round 4, including

Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia
and Zimbabwe. The rationale behind the choice of Afrobarometer round four stems from the
richness of this round in representative-constituent-related topics in Africa. In addition to the
common questions about types of contacts, this round allows the researcher to delve into the role
expectations of both citizens and the members of parliament across the continent. More importantly,
the timing of the survey (2009) gives the investigator the unique opportunity to assess the extent to
which the dyadic electoral connection between citizens and their elected officials has taken root
two decades after the seeds of democratization were sowed in Africa.
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Limitations: The main focus of the chapter is on the combined effects of the two informal
institutions, African traditional authorities and religious actors, as they facilitate contacts between
citizens and their MPs. Although the subject matter deals with religious institutions and their
relationships to political participation, it does not attempt to differentiate the distinct effects of each
religious denomination on participatory activities. In other words, I skirt the debate about the
comparative effects of mainline religious denomination “old missions” versus that of new
Pentecostal or new charismatic churches, or the debate about contrasting Christian versus Muslim
regarding their respective effects on political participation. The article treats these informal
institutions as non-state actors that perform the role of “linkage institutions” between the state and
the society.
This article makes an original contribution to the legislative-constituent relationship in
Africa by showing that the existence of formal channels of articulation of citizens’ preference does
not render obsolete the channels of informal institutions. Secondly, the article contributes to the
theory of participation by identifying these institutions as mode of political participation. Otherwise
put, I am suggesting that these institutions may serve to convey citizens’ demands of accountability
of their elected officials. Consequently, their fate needs not be confined in a false and rigid
dichotomist relationship with democratic consolidation in Africa.
I divide the chapter into three parts. The introductory section frames the article. The second
section elaborates on the theoretical framework of this chapter and comprises two subsections. The
first subsection evaluates the existing literature on the political relevance of these institutions.
Specifically, it critically examines supporting and opposing arguments in the academic debate about
traditional authorities and religious institutions as they relate to the building of democracy in Africa.
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The second subsection presents my argument as a middle course position between traditionalists
and modernists. The third section consists of the empirical evidence that substantiates my argument.
3.2
3.2.1

Theoretical Framework
Literature Review
The present literature review has three subsections. The first subsection sheds a light on

historical backgrounds and the debate about the resurgence of traditional authorities. The second
subsection examines the different scholarly approaches used to analyze political relevance of
religious institutions. The third subsection is more germane to the research question. It reviews the
state of the scholarly debate about whether or not traditional institutions fit in the picture of Africa’s
democratic development. I close these critical evaluations by pointing to gaps in the literature and
the way to fill them.
3.2.1.1 Extant theories about resurgence of Religious and Traditional Institutions
In this subsection, I report an empirical observation about the recent revival of religious and
traditional institutions and the existing speculations about the causes of this resurgence. Although
the issues of resurgence of these institutions deal only tangentially with the research question of
this chapter, extant theories about resurgence provide a historical background that helps better
contextualize the debate between “Modernists” and “Traditionalists.” If anything, this resurgence
speaks to the resilience of these institutions and their omnipresence in ordinary people' (Logan
2008,2011). Reports from various surveys lend credence to this widespread phenomenon of
resurgence of religious and traditional institutions in Africa. There is no a uniform pattern of
development that fits all countries. In countries covered, these institutions have been at times
tolerated, coopted, incorporated into the state apparatus, or completely banned. Despite having a
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diversity of fortunes, the African traditional authorities and religious institutions have witnessed a
rebirth.
Resurgence of religious and traditional authorities has been well documented in surveys.
Public opinion and attitude surveys give the strongest evidence to this observation. According to
the world Value Survey(WVS), Africa is the most religious continent in the world. Patterson (2015)
reports that religious organizations take up the lion share of non-state actors in every single country
on the continent (43). Membership in religious groups has consistently soared, giving to religious
actors and institutions a vast array of networks, resources and time to increase their relevance
politically, economically and socially (40). The primacy of religiosity is shown through the everswelling rate of memberships and the importance given to religious practices by members.
According to the Afrobarometer, on average, 73.2% claim to be members of a religious group and
80% claim that religion is very important. Of these members, nearly 75% are either active members
or occupy a leadership position. Only a one out of four of those surveyed declare not being affiliated
with any religious group ( Afrobarometer Round 4 ,online analysis). Overall, the two monotheistic
religions (Christians and Muslim) dominate the religious landscape. These two major religious
groups themselves comprise of several subdivisions. For instance, among Christian religions, the
Afrobarometer lists 23 subgroups including Apostolic Faith, Baptist, Calvinist, Church of Christ,
Christian Church, Coptic, Dutch reform, Dutch Reformed, Evangelical, Independent, Jehovah
Witness, Last Church, Lutheran, Mennonite, Methodist, Moravian, Mormon, Orthodox,
Pentecostal, Presbyterian, Quaker, Seventh Day Adventist, Zionist, and Zionist. The other mainline
religious group, the Muslim, is divided in two major subgroups: Sunni and Shia. Each of these
subgroups include multiple brotherhoods including, Hamadiya, Ismaeli, Izala, Layenes, Mouridiya,
Qadiriya, Sidiya, Tijania, Trabiya, Wahhabiya (Afrobarometer round 4). Like religious
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organizations, though less in magnitude, African traditional authorities have known a resurgence
across the continent. Altogether, scholars and democratic activists have enumerated five potential
factors as causal explanations undergirding the upsurge of these institutions: state-centric theories,
pre-colonial social organization, colonial legacy, the extent of countries’ democratic consolidation,
and the influence of international actors.
The nature of a pre-existing social structure prior to colonial penetration is presumed to be
source of resurgence of parallel institutions such as traditional and religious institutions in Africa.
A group of African scholars categorized African precolonial political structures into two main types
based on the extent of power concentration: the centralized and decentralized forms of governance
(Onyejekwe et.al 2004). In the centralized type, power structure is hierarchical whereby the
monarch or chief, at the top, dominated with an absolute power in the decision-making process.
The centralized system displayed a sense of collective resistance in Uganda, (the Buganda empire)
in Lesotho, Botswana, in Ghana (the Ashanti). In contrast, in the decentralized type, power structure
was collegial and all decisions were taken on a consensual basis. The decentralized systems
consisted of groups of age-sets, a conglomerate of small villages loosely tight together (Onyejekwe
et.al 2004: 12). To illustrate, the decentralized types are roughly similar to the Delian League of the
Greek city-state association in 478 BC with a weak enforcement power. Following the power
structure, this argument infers that in places where power was highly centralized, traditional
authorities resisted more to colonial powers and to new African states than in places where they
were decentralized. With their hierarchical structure, these social organizations resisted total
annulment often by going underground. These concealed organizations gained strength any time
the formal structure failed to exert its functions. Similarly, colonial legacy is seen by many as a
source of resurgence of traditional authorities (Englebert 2002). It comes as no surprise that
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resurgence has happened more in Anglophone Africa than in Francophone or Lusophone parts of
the continent. This institutionalist argument suggests that the British colonial model of indirect rule
nurtured local powers. As a consequence, in ex-British colonies, existing local and traditional
institutions grew and were strengthened by the post 1990s winds of Africa’s liberalization.
Empirical observations show that despite caustic criticisms leveled at the British style of indirect
ruling, traditional rulers have remained more politically relevant in ancient British colonies than in
anywhere else in Africa. Still, it is fair to point out that the difference in colonial legacy mattered
more at the early ages of the independence of these countries (Lee and Paine, 2016). After 1990s’
decade, virtually all African countries have witnessed a surge in the activities of these institutions,
irrespective of the formal colonial power’s style of administration (direct or indirect rule). The
Afrobarometer’s surveys show no difference in rates of ordinary citizens’ contacts of religious and
traditional leaders among ex-colonies in Africa. For instance, from Afrobarometer Round 4,
contacts of traditional and religious leaders average 27.6% in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda,
(all ex- British colonies). The rate of contacts of traditional authorities average 30% in Benin,
Burkina Faso, Mali, and Senegal (all former French colonies). This could mean that even in direct
form of colonial rule, where notably the French brutally erased precolonial power structures, these
institutions did not cease to exist; they merely went underground and resurfaced under the auspice
of democratic transition. Below, table 1 summarizes briefly the style of pre-colonial political
organization, colonial rule and the status of recognitions of these institutions post 1990. By
recognition, scholars mean the official acknowledgement of the existence of traditional authorities
and the purview of their jurisdictions. These recognitions are usually couched in legal terms in
countries’ founding documents (constitutions or decrees). For instance, in Mozambique, the 2002
constitution not only acknowledges the existence of traditional authorities, but also it defines their
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jurisdiction. In contrast, the latest Nigerian constitution of 1999 openly chooses to ignore traditional
institutions (Peter,2014: 136).
Table 3.1 Status of Recognition of Traditional Authorities in the 20 countries

76

Countries

Regions

Pre-colonial

Colonial

Pre-1990s

Benin

Francophone

Centralized

direct rule

Banned

yes

Botswana

Anglophone

Centralized

Indirect rule

curbed

yes

Burkina F

Francophone

Centralized

Direct rule

banned

yes

Cape Verde

Lusophone

Unknown

Direct rule

unknown

unknown

Ghana

Anglophone

Centralized

Indirect rule

curbed

yes

Kenya

Anglophone

Centralized

Indirect rule

banned

no

Lesotho

Anglophone

Centralized

Indirect rule

authorized

yes

Liberia

American

Decentralized

authorized

yes

Madagascar

Francophone

Centralized

Direct rule

banned

yes

Malawi

Anglophone

Centralized

Indirect rule

authorized

yes

Mali

Francophone

Centralized

Direct rule

banned

yes

Mozambique

Lusophone

Centralized

Direct rule

banned

yes

Namibia

Anglophone

Centralized

Indirect rule

authorized

yes

Nigeria

Anglophone

Centralized

Indirect rule

banned

no

Senegal

Francophone

Decentralized

Direct rule

authorized

yes

South Africa

Anglophone

Centralized

Indirect rule

authorized

yes

Tanzania

Anglophone

Decentralized

Indirect rule

banned

yes

Uganda

Anglophone

Centralized

Indirect rule

banned

yes

Zambia

Anglophone

Centralized

Indirect rule

banned

yes

Zimbabwe

Anglophone

Centralized

Indirect rule

authorized

yes

-

Recognized?

Furthermore, authors have gone beyond the precolonial and colonial political structure to
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focus on the adaptability of these social structure to the newly independent African states’
organization. The most known proponent of this contention is David Apter (1960) who divides
traditional authorities into two categories: “instrumental” traditional authorities and
“consummatory” ones. He defines instrumental traditional authorities as those who adapted swiftly
to the new state’s organizations and remained alert to signals of state failure and seized upon those
failures to reassert their existence. He cites the Buganda Empire as an illustration of instrumental
traditional authorities. According to Apter (1960), despite adhering to the Idi Amin’ administration
and living in low profile, the Bugadan traditional authorities took advantage of the collapse of this
regime to reassert itself. In contrast, “consummatory” traditional authorities easily gave in to the
attractions of the new state’s perks of power and let itself be completely captured by the states with
the consequence of the dismantlement of its core structure (Apter 1960:45-68).
The fourth school of thought attributes causes of the resurgence of traditional authorities
and religious institutions to failed state in Africa (Ekeh,1975; Migdal,1998; Sklar,1999; Baker,
2000; Herbst, 2000; Ubink, 2008). The underlying assumption is that a badly dysfunctional state
leaves a void of services that these institutions fill right-away. According to Bruce Baker (2000),
state failure exhorts rival social organizations like tribal authorities to seize the opportunity and to
exert their “social control” (26). This assumption would make us believe that war torn countries are
fertile grounds for traditional authorities to thrive. A variant of state weakness premise is put
forward by Herbst (2000). He contends that the failure of the state to project its power (due to
countries’ geography and weak demographic density) opens up opportunities for remote local and
regional power centers to rally around one or several unifying dimensions of their identity, be it
ethnicity, language, or history (124). Ubink (2008) adds that states have given the opportunity for
traditional authorities to expand for state-centric interests (23). State motivations are self-serving
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when they attempt to associate traditional authorities; they aim at gaining electoral legitimacy at
local level. States are also pragmatic actors in letting these institutions flourish. Ribot (2002) writes
that states have learned that sidelining traditions authorities often antagonizes them and may amount
to failure of state-sponsored projects at local level (16). More importantly, the state associates
traditional authorities in order to use them as linkage institution to reach individual citizens. Taken
to its logical conclusion, this state-centric argument suggests that traditional authorities would be
silenced in strong states. Once again, the reality on the ground shows that the majority of countries
that have formally acknowledged these institutions are all relatively strong states. Examples include
South Africa, Ghana, Botswana, Burkina Faso and two previous countries torn by civil wars,
Mozambique and Uganda. Furthermore, on the face of it, the state-centric logic comes intuitively.
However, realities on the ground leave this assumption unsubstantiated. For instance, this
assumption would make war torn countries a fertile ground for traditional authorities to thrive. Yet,
as Englebert (2002:118-151) stresses, civil wars did not make traditional authorities emerge in
Liberia, Zaire, Angola, or Cote D’Ivoire (The exception being in Sierra Leone where the elders
controlled the local civil defense units, the Kamajors during the Sierra Leonean civil war.
Number of scholars have attributed resurgence to international actors (USAID and
international financial institutions (Ribot,2002; Englebert, 2002; Ubink 2008; Kyed,2007) and
Bratton and Logan (2011,2008). The idea is that resurgence is an outcome of the applications of
conditions attached to the aid package from external actors (usually the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank). Conditions for getting these development packages include stripping
African states’ budgets, encouraging decentralization and local governance. These Bretton Woods’
institutions have expanded their partnership beyond state actors to include traditional and local
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authorities. For instance, Ubink (2008) reports a partnership between the Asanteeman and the
Abuakwa and the World bank in funding a 5million dollars local projects in Ghana (11).
3.2.1.2 Resurgence as a signal of a failed national identity building
Rejecting all the above speculations, a group of scholars see the resurgence from a totally
different vantage point, that of national unity (Bustin,1999;2000; Chabal 1994). For these scholars,
rather than indicating a thriving civil society, resurgence of traditional authorities expresses a failure
in the making of a unifying national identity. Bustin (1999) first pointed this out by comparing
Republic Democratic of Congo to Uganda, regarding how citizens in the two countries showed their
attachment to their national identity. In Uganda, Bustin (1999) noticed that despite boasting a
dynamic civil society and an uptick in the activities of traditional and religious institutions, the
country remains bitterly polarized between major traditional authorities. In addition to these
divisions along tribal or ethnic lines in Uganda, ordinary citizens display stronger allegiance to their
tribal groups than to their national identity. Citizens primarily identify themselves as Buganda,
Banyankole, Basoga, Langi, or as part of one the 37 other ethnic groups. Bustin opposes Uganda to
Democratic Republic of Congo(DRC). He observes that the DRC, a virtually collapsing state, a
country that has gone through cyclical civil wars since its independence, citizens shows more
national pride than tribal loyalty (83). Bustin (1999) hypothesizes that when the project of nation
building is on the right track, all communities inclusively feel less threatened and express less the
need to be acknowledged (86). Corroborating this stance, Chabal (1994) adds that national identity
building has more or less succeeded in countries where the ethnic makeup is less lopsided (64). In
other words, wherever one or two ethnic groups claim the status of ethnic majority, ethnic
dimension of citizens’ identity becomes more salient such as in Kenya, in Rwanda, or in Ethiopia.
In contrast, when country’s ethnic makeup is fairly evenly distributed, constructing national identity

80

is more successful because the emphasis is less on ethnic dimension than on national identity;
example includes Togo, Cameroon, Tanzania, Guinea (68).
At this juncture, one can retain that resurgence of these institutions is a multi-causal, context
dependent and undeniable phenomenon. Each of listed causes above is a contributing factor. What
is constant is the causal connection between the advent of democratic change and resurgence on the
continent. Although no statistical inference can be drawn from such a small sample of 20 countries,
the temporal precedence of the advent of democracy and the subsequent formal recognitions of
these institutions is irrefutable. Many countries have formally mentioned and acknowledged the
rights of traditional and religious institutions in countries’ funding documents. For instance,
Botswana formally acknowledged traditional and religious institutions in 1960s, Senegal in 1978;
Liberia in 1986, Burkina in 1987, Ghana in 1992, Lesotho (revamped constitution 1993), South
Africa in 1994, Namibia (Act of 2000); Zambia, Zimbabwe in 2013. Since resurgence seems to
have gained strength on the wake of the democratic transition in Africa, one is poised to ask these
two questions: how scholars have approached the political relevance of these institutions, and to
what extent traditional and religious institutions contribute positively or negatively to the
consolidation of democracy in Africa?
How have scholars approached this topic? Overwhelmingly in the existing literature the
political relevance of religious and traditional authority has been approached from a macro-level
perspective. At national and local levels, scholars have primarily focused on leaders’ behavior and
their interactions with the state. An illustration is the roles religious leaders played in the 1990s
during National Conferences in Africa. Haynes (1995) cites the role of many bishops as presiding
officers of national conferences (102). These leaders were priests, pastors and bishops (for
Christians) and Ulemas and Sheikdom (for Muslims). Because of these roles, many observant
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perceive these leaders as democracy advocate. However, Haynes (1995:89-107) levels a vitriolic
criticism at religious leaders, accusing them of being part of the hyper class that exploits the
uneducated gullible poor in Africa (90). His analysis, rooted in Marxist theory of class struggle,
ascribes leaders’ involvement in the national conferences to a subterfuge to maintain the status quo.
He denounces the unholy connection between the political and religious elites to create a hegemonic
coalition that “milk” the proletariat (95). In short, for Haynes (1995), religious leaders cannot be
actors of democratic change in Africa.
A second theoretical criticism of the elite-focused approach targets its main underlying
assumptions, which implies that differences in religious denominations lead to differences in
political behavior. This approach traces back its roots to Max Weber (1930) who hypothesized the
strong relationship between democracy, capitalism, and protestant ethics. In the recent years, both
Gifford (1998) and Meyer (2004) have seen “older missions” as highly supportive of democracy.
However, the relationship between democracy and religious denominations remains an unsettled
debate. Cooper (1976) attributes pervasive anti-democratic sentiments among Catholics to the
strong hierarchical structure of their denomination that mirrors Authoritarian regimes (75).
Similarly, Reid and McClendon (2016) write about some religious leaders that have used their
sermons to preach political apathy or political indifference (1045). Examples include Sufism (an
extreme branch of Sunni Islam) and Black Protestants in the United States (Frazier and
Lincoln,1974).
Do these institutions play a role in political participation in Africa? Several classical
studies have investigated the role religious and traditional institutions play in political participation
in and outside Africa. Verba, Schlozman, Brady (1995) McCauley and Boadi, 2009) Manglos and
Weinreb (2012); Cooke et.al 2015; Patterson,2015 Reid and McClendon (2015). Approaching this
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question from a micro level perspective, Manglos and Weinreb find that there is no difference
among religious traditions when it comes to their effects on political interest (216). Manglos and
Weinreb’s findings contradict the prevailing conventional wisdom that makes some religious
traditions superior to other traditions in fostering democratic attitudes. They argue that when
education is accounted for and coupled with religious memberships, together this interaction
variable increases significantly citizens’ political interest in every single religious tradition (214).
McClendon and Reid (2015) tackle the impact of religion on political participation in Africa from
psychological vantage point. They conduct an experiment in Nairobi in which they expose church
goers to religious messages. They find that Pentecostal self-affirming religious message act as
stimulant that motivates religious people to get involved in some otherwise intimidating political
activities. Related to psychological perspective is Ellis and Haar (1998)’s article. They seek the
reasons behind the pervasiveness of religious discourses and its ability to speak to power in Africa.
For them, religious discourse in Africa can be seen as a countervailing power that attempts to
remedy social injustices in the community (185). By claiming an access to the invisible world,
religious experts serve as intermediary at several levels in Africa. They convey people’s
preoccupations to both the invisible spirits and to political leaders. Since ordinary Africans believe
in the interconnection between the visible and invisible worlds, citizens understand why every
leader (as well as every family) has his or her own spiritual expert (marabout or medicine men).
Anecdotic examples expound the disproportionate power these private marabouts have weighing in
African presidents’ national or personal decisions (189).
In addition to classical studies, participatory outputs of traditional and religious authorities
are said to result from their interactions with the state as well. Scholars agree that these interactions
are strategic in the sense that each entity seeks to assert itself while trying to influence the other.
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Furthermore, the state-society relationship involving these intermediary institutions and the state is
dynamic (Cooke et.al 2015; Patterson,2015; Lawson, 2002). Overall, the general pattern of these
interactions results into one, or the combination of these four outcomes: cooperation, cooptationcapture, confrontation, and fragmentation of these institutions. When interactions result into
cooperation, both the state and traditional or religious institutions seek to accommodate each other
and the level of political participation is said to be high (Cooke et.al 2015: 8). The state and the
non-state actors respect the limits of their respective spheres of influence and accept to compromise
for the sake of stability (Cooke et.al 2015:1-126). The telltale example is the cohabitation of the
Sunni Brotherhood and the state in Senegal (Cooke 2015:10).
In contrast, when interactions between state and these intermediary institutions result into
a capture and (or) co-optation of the intermediary institutions, the state displays an unmitigated
objective to incorporate them into its structure. Various methods are employed to achieve the goal
of capture including bureaucratization, appointment to a national office to control these alternative
loci of power (Downie in Cooke et.al 2015: 18). Empirical observation shows that co-optation is
the most common outcome of interactions between the state and the traditional and religious actors
and institutions in Africa. Usually, traditional authorities that have allied themselves with the
reining power have fallen in disgrace in the eyes of their fellow citizens. Cases of capture are more
pronounced in South Africa where public distaste for chiefs who collaborated with the Apartheid
remains still strong (Mamdani,1996; Ntsebezola,2002). The participatory output in the case of coopted intermediary institutions is reduced. Similar to co-optation, disintegration dampens the
participatory dividend of religious institution as a block. In the beginning, religious institutions
faced the state as unified block that pushed for a democratic change (Throup in Cooke et.al, 2015:
20). As the state embarked on the track of democratic transition, this shift unleashed individual
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ambitions, and differences political interest appeared. Competing ambitions from distinct ethnic or
regional backgrounds open up divisions within and among religious institutions. Political
competitions with a strong ethnic undertone have lead religious groups to disintegrate along ethnic
lines. This has diluted religious groups’ influence on political participation (Throup in Cooke et.al,
2015:29).
Confrontation is the most extreme outcome of these interactions. Clashes between state and
traditional and religious institutions were common during the early stage of democratic transition
in Africa in the 1990s. When these institutions involved themselves into the struggle for democratic
change, mostly through National Sovereign Conferences, they faced ruthless authoritarian rulers
who dread the ballot poll and would do anything to protect their entrenched interests
(Diamond,1992). Head-butts over values and governance were frequent everywhere on the
continent, most notably in Kenya, Zambia, and in Guinea. In Kenya, leaders of all Christian
denominations churches and their congregations were in the forefront to demand democratic
change. In Zambia, the catholic Archbishop faced off with Hasting after issuing a scathing criticism
against ongoing human rights abuses in Zambian. His criticism sparked widespread outcry and
contributed to the collapse of dictatorship in Zambia (Patterson, 2015). In Guinea, Mgr. Robert
Sarah, the youngest bishop at his consecration (34 years), boldly and repeatedly confronted the
Guinean dictator Sekou Toure for his Kangaroo courts and Gulag-type of prisons in Guinea For
this, his name was on a blacklist of people to be executed, only to be spared by the death of Sekou
Toure (Christophe Le Bec, Jeune Afrique, 2014). All in all, when the outcome of the interactions
between the state and these intermediary institutions is confrontation, the participatory output is
understandably cut short.
Do traditional and religious institutions promote or proscribe democracy in Africa?
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The debate about whether traditional authorities fit in the African democratic development
is a fifty-year-old dispute that has come to the fore with the advent social transformation in Africa
(Logan, 2008, 2011). Commonly framed as traditionalists against modernists, the essential question
asks about what to do with African social organizations in the building of a genuine democracy?
Broadly, the first group of scholars led by Mamdani (1996) and dubbed “modernists” contends that
these institutions are nothing but remnants of colonial power structure (18). And that they have
reversed the democratic accountability pathway in Africa. Instead of reinforcing the downward
accountability, they reinvigorate the upward accountability. In addition, these institutions were used
as instrument to implement colonial policies. As a result, these institutions need to be rid of and
replaced by citizen-inspired institutions (Mamdani 1996:18.) The second group, known as
“traditionalists” ( Ayittey, 1991,1995; Keulder 1998; Lawson,2002;), counter that traditional
institutions are the true representation of ordinary people, and that democracy and its institutions
are not foreign to Africa. At the heart of the debate, specifically, modernists and traditionalist
disagree on three essential features of democracy: the mode of participation, the mechanisms of
accountability, and the source of democratic legitimacy.
Traditionalist and modernists diverge on how traditional authorities foster universal
participation. Because by definition democracy implies universal participation, traditionalists such
as Keulder (1998) posits that African tradition of community-wide- gatherings are quintessential
expression of a genuine democracy. He maintains that this type of gatherings is simple, costless,
direct, and accessible to everyone. Not only does everyone is welcome to participate to it, but these
community-wide-gatherings offer safe areas where ordinary people express freely their concerns.
Communications are simple, direct, and mostly done face- to face. In this sense, they are kin to both
the American time-honored tradition of Town Hall meetings and the original Athenian direct
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democracy. Regarding the manner in which the demos expresses its will, Ayittey (1995), a
consummate traditionalist, claims that popular will can be expressed in two ways: majority will and
unanimity. Whereas Westerners use majority rule to determine popular will, Africans voice their
popular will by way of unanimity reached in community-wide-gatherings (1184). One benefit of
the consensual decision making is its permanent use of persuasion to ultimately assuage the
dissenting party. In contrast, the majority rule often crushes the losing minority. More importantly,
the unanimity decision-making process involves everyone because only consensual decisions carry
the day. In essence, while traditionalists welcome modernity, they claim that “modernization does
not mean westernization” (Ayittey,1995: 1204).
Modernists such as Molustse (2004) and Mattes (1997) reject the premise of communitywide-gatherings as an authentic and all- inclusive participatory mode. According to them neither
the participatory mode in these fora nor the decision-making process is democratic. Rather, these
community-wide-gatherings are restrictive, exclusive, and their decision-making process is far from
consensual. Using the example of the Botswanan version of the community-wide gathering, the
Kgotla, Molustse (2004) denounces this male-dominated gatherings of tribal leaders that
discriminate against women and the youth (162). As for the decision-making process, Mattes (1997)
counters that decisions that are taken in these gatherings are not made through free contentment of
attendees. On the contrary, these decisions are arbitrary and are reached by way of “coerced
consensus,” whereby obsequious deference deters the slightest opposition. Substantively, these
decisions make individual preferences yield to the so-called community interest (5). He concludes
that traditional authorities stand for values that are at best antithetical to democracy and, at worst,
they represent a non-democratic form of government” (6).
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The second point of disagreement is on the extent to which African traditional authorities
are accountable to their people. For the modernist Mamdani (1996), the most telling characteristics
of traditional leaders is their despotism. He claims that the institution of traditional leaders reverses
the direction of democratic accountability: accountability of these chiefs is upheld upwardly and
inexistent downwardly, turning them into unfettered despotic leaders (18). However, traditionalists
have vigorously disputed this claim, asserting that African political systems have had its built-in
mechanisms of checks and balances that even the mighty colonial power could not uproot
(Ayittey,1995; Keulder,1998). Like unanimity, institutions of accountability, transparency, and
checks and balances have long been practiced in Africa. Ayittey (1995) writes that in Africa’s
precolonial political systems, no power was unlimited: “Kings and chiefs’ behavior were ritually
controlled; their movements were hemmed in taboos to curtail discretionary use of power” (1210).
Additionally, although Africans lack written constitutions, they had multiple tools to curb any
despotic behavior. Gluckman (1965) gives the example of the Barotse in Central Africa and
McGovern, (2014) cites the case of Kokologui of Loma in Guinea and Liberia. These checks and
balances allowed a mechanism to divest culprit monarchs, or chiefs using a distinct channel of
communication. For instance, the Serere in Senegal played a unique tune in drumbeat to signal
impeachment and revocation of their leaders (Ayittey,1991).
The third area of dispute is the source of legitimacy of these institutions. Modernists contend
that African traditional authorities lack popular legitimacy because they soiled their hands by
allying themselves with the dominating power. Traditional authorities have always been tool of
reinforcement in the hands of the oppressor be it the colonial rulers or the newly independent state’s
representatives (Mamdani,1996; West and Klock,1999; Nteseberia; 2004). In his book Subjects and
Citizens, Mamdani (1996) takes an aim at these institutions and brilliantly analyzes their power
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dynamic intertwined between the colonial rulers and their local representatives. Mamdani (1996)
maintains that the ultimate goal of the alliance between colonial power and traditional leaders was
to segregate and exploit rural dwellers. For instance, the author details how tribal leaders in South
Africa sided with colonial powers and the Apartheid regime against their own people. These chiefs
and tribal leaders were straw-men who reinforced arbitrary laws and received perks for their actions
(28). In the same vein, West and Klock (1999) accuse these traditional leaders for being self-serving
agents who shift allegiance depending on who is in power (460). Power-starved traditional leaders’
duplicity is exposed in their dealings with both their people and formal leaders. Lawson (2002) sees
them as nowadays “vote brokers” in villages (quoted in Logan 2011). Nteseberia (2004) views
traditional leaders as more feared than respected, like the proverbial Machiavellian prince.
Traditionalists reject the above description.
For traditionalists, along with providing stability in a rapidly changing world, African
traditional authorities draw their legitimacy from the well of stewardship and adaptability. They
deserve respect and trust because they provide a vast array of socio economic and cultural services.
In response to the accusation of traditional authorities as disloyal to their own, Williams (2010)
responds that modernists mistake African traditional authorities’ adaptability to duplicity.
According to him, this adaptability serves both traditional leaders and their communities because it
allows the latter to “straddle easily two worlds” as they become the face of the nation at the local
level and the face of their locality on the national stage (121). This has led Owosu (1996) to argue
that in Ghana, traditional authorities have had a constructive relationship with formal leaders and
are credited to bringing development projects in their communities (312). Finally, traditionalists
claim that African traditional authorities serve as moral reference that anchors society into a solid
moral ground and provides a sense of stability in a rapidly changing world.
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Not all scholars see these two loci of power as competitors with a zero-sum outcome. A
growing number of scholars have taken a middle ground and claims that these two entities are
complementary (Kyed, 2007; Logan, 2008,2011; Anyanwru, 2005; Ubink, 2008; de Sousa Santos,
2006). While acknowledging that traditional authorities still bear some non-democratic features and
flaws, they contend that framing this debate into two starkly opposing side is misguiding. In a study
conducted in Limpopo Province, Anyanwru (2005) explores the complementarity between formal
and informal institutions. Using a qualitative strategy, he draws from a case study the evidence that
rural folks do not necessarily oppose formal and informal institutions. The author concludes that
ordinary people in rural areas desire to see the two forms of authorities work hands in hands (97).
And this collaborative working relationship becomes fruitful when traditional authorities are
recognized and associated to government sponsored projects in villages. As a matter of fact, failure
to associate traditional authorities to government-led health antagonizes them and results into a
debacle of these projects (Trinitapoli and Weinreb, 2012). Although using a different methodology,
Logan draws a similar conclusion. Her studies focus on causes of resilience of traditional authorities
and their complementarity with formal institutions in Africa. Using a large dataset and a quantitative
method, Logan (2008, 2011) finds that both formal and informal authorities draw their legitimacy
from the same fountain. What is more, citizens perceive concomitantly these two entities as the two
faces of the same currency. Citizens’ attitudes toward chiefs are nurtured by that of their attitudes
of formal authorities and vice-versa (4). Logan concludes that the two provinces of authorities
cohabitate harmoniously and there exists a symbiotic relationship between them. In her view,
society effortlessly integrates the two (2). The integration of informal institutions into the state’s
structure is concrete in Mozambique. According to Kyed (2007), this integration has proven very
benefic for the state, traditional leaders, and their customers. The decree of December 15 2000
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acknowledged traditional authorities and integrated them by revamping their mission and
christening them as “community authority” (8). The result has been a dynamic and continual
reshaping of the state-traditional authorities whereby this productive tension increases their
respective accessibility (Kyed,2007: 25). de Sousa Santos (2006) reports “the growing activism” of
these informal institutions likening them to burgeoning interest groups phenomenon in Africa (64).
Taking a more realist approach to the roles of traditional authorities, Ubink and Kyed (2008:14)
warn that traditional authorities need not be compared to others linkage institutions (interest groups)
or given lofty goals as in matured democracies. In the investigation of their desirability in African
democracy, one must take contextual reality into account. They claim that the primary goal ought
to be the improvement of local governance (14).
Collectively, the proposed answers to the above questions have made considerable
contribution to our knowledge. Elite approach (i.e, the macro-level) analysis has uncovered the
intricacies of state-society interactions and different outcomes. For instance, it has helped put a
finger on the roles played by religious leaders during the democratic change in the 1990s. However,
the elite approach misses the other aspect of the story- arguably the most important- namely, the
actions and attitudes of ordinary citizens on a daily basis. In the heavily elite-driven approach,
commoners are left out. While such academic negligence was understandable prior to the advent of
the Afrobarometer, the availability of fresh, reliable, and individual-level data on public opinion
and attitudes in Africa gives researchers the opportunity to analyze how and why do ordinary
citizens relate or not to their democratic institutions. After all, as Bratton says, ordinary people are
those who breathe life into democratic institutions (Bratton, 2010:6). Another advantage of the
individual level analysis is to test how theories on micro-foundation of political participation in
mature democracies travel in an African setting. For instance, existing theories examined above on
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channels of participation are limited to formal venues such as contacting your local party official,
or basing your action on your partisan identity. Finally, in the debate between modernists and
traditionalists, although those who choose the middle ground adopt a pragmatic posture, their
position begs the questions about the democratic utility of the complementarity between formal and
informal institutions. Pragmatists leave unanswered the following question: To what democratic
end do informal and formal work together? The present article fills these gaps
3.2.2

Theory
Why do intermediary institutions, traditional authorities and religious institutions, serve as

conduits to connect citizens to their elected officials? I argue that these institutions serve as linking
institution between citizens and their MPs because of their incontrovertible social utility which
allows the two-track political participation. The concept of two-track participation in this article
means the coexistence of formal (less used) and the informal (more used) routes for citizens to
convey their preferences. Informal channels of participation become the first conduits of citizens
concerns when other linkage institutions and the state suffer from pervasive weakness. Widespread
institutional weakness of formal channels compounded by lack of genuine electoral connection
between representatives and their constituencies give no other choice to citizens to voice their
concerns but to use what they are more familiar with, the closer traditional and religious institutions
(Bratton et. al 2005:134). In addition, traditional and religious institutions are not only proximate
but also, they are highly visible in rural as well as urban areas. No matter how small or isolated
communities are in Africa, edifices that house religious and traditional authorities are noticeable
and present everywhere (Patterson, 2015:183). As actors with a perceived legitimacy in the African
society, religious and African traditional authorities provide an array of services, including
socioeconomic, political, and administrative
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Traditional and religious institutions serve as intermediary between citizens and their PMs
because of their social stewardship in providing socioeconomic welfare (Patterson,2015: 175;
Ubink, 2008: 23; Chikadibia, 2005: 97). In absence of a publically funded welfare system, religious
organizations serve as the primary caregivers in virtually all sub-Saharan African countries. This
basic healthcare provision covers benign illnesses as well as deadliest pandemics such as HIV AIDS
(Patterson, 2015: 178). Trinitapoli and Weinreb (2012) report that the key to understanding the
decrease of HIV prevalence lies in getting traditional and religious institutions on the board of
public health campaigns (4). Patterson (2015) adds that faith-based organizations provide roughly
forty percent (40%) of all healthcare services and help solve other societal problems for which the
state has little or no response in Sub-Saharan Africa (177). Beyond tragic pandemic diseases,
religious actors and African traditional authorities help coordinate and mobilize communities to
implement routine health projects or immunization in rural and urban areas. These actors also
motivate rural folks in participating in local development projects such as building roads, communal
areas (McCauley and Boadi,2009:8).
Religious and traditional institutions are conduits to reach out to MP because they are
instrumental in the building and maintaining of social peace in the community. The involvement of
these institutions in peace-making activities are done at two levels in countries: First, in countries
on verge of social turmoil, traditional and religious institutions intervene to mend crumbling
national unity by organizing National Days of Prayer. However, Cooke (2015) notices that some
religious or traditional institutions can abuse their position to muffle a legitimate claim in the name
of a purported national unity (Cooke et.al 2015: 5). Second, in post-civil war situations, traditional
and religious institutions are frequently called upon at the negotiation table to serve in many
capacities: as simple witness, active participants, or a neutral third party and moral guarantee of
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good faith in drafting peace settlements (Cooke et.al, Patterson, 2015). The roles of traditional and
religious institutions play in resolving conflicts are not limited to peacebuilding at a nation level.
In fact, it is at a community-level that these local authorities are routinely more trusted and
impactful. In the Afrobarometer round 1 and 2, nearly 28% of Africans rely on traditional and
religious institutions to settle disputes among different communities. This is three times higher than
the 6.4% of those who choose the local courts to resolve conflicts. The recourse to traditional and
religious authorities is more manifest in Botswana, where customary law and courts adjudicate
nearly 80% of low levels criminal and civil cases (Shawn, 1998). Perhaps the trustworthiness of
these institution contributes to holding them with in high esteem as well. In comparison to formal
institutions, informal institutions (traditional and religious institutions) are perceived as more
reliable and less corrupted.
The social utility of these institutions includes their administrative and political roles at local
level as well. Whether formal state institutions exist or not at local level, it is here that traditional
and religious institutions exert the most influence (Logan 2008, 2011; Ubink 2008). The
involvement of traditional and religious institutions in local administration is more impactful in
countries where this involvement is formally acknowledged like in South Africa, Lesotho,
Botswana, and in Ghana. The extent of their power depends on contextual realities. Nonetheless,
traditional authorities are known to complete the following tasks. They control local resources, land
allocation, and environmental protections (Ubink,2008; Logan, 2002, 2008,2011; Ribot, 2000;
Williams 2010). Scholars surmise that the devolution of these powers to local authorities are not
benevolent. The state, or its representatives, purposefully leaves the micro-management of these
complicated hot issues to traditional leaders at local level. The reason behind this concession is to
let traditional leaders inevitably tarnish their reputations (Williams, 2010). Notwithstanding their
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involvement in local administration, these institutions play crucial political roles locally as gobetween and rallying force. As opinion leaders, traditional leaders are powerful tool of mobilization.
For instance, religious actors led their flocks be at the forefront of democratic struggles in the 1990s
in Kenya. They achieve this role because they galvanized masses and got their message recycled
by their followers (Pauline Chang 2016). In short, the mechanism can be summarized as the picture
below shows. A three-step causal process that starts with citizens, then the intermediary institutions
and the MP at the end. I generate the following hypothesis from the above theory.

Intermediary
Institutions
Citizens

Religious
Traditional

MPs

Instittions

Figure 3.1 Causal Mechanism linking citizens, intermediary institutions and MPs
Hypothesis: In comparison to citizens’ contacts with formal institutions (party officials),
citizens’ contacts with informal institutions predict a greater likelihood of contacting members to
the parliament.
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3.3
3.3.1

Research Design and Methodology
Data source
The data used to probe the causal relationship is specifically drawn from the Afrobarometer

round 4. The Afrobarometer is a non-profit organization that conducts research on public opinion
and attitudes of ordinary citizens in Africa. It records how ordinary people relate to democratic
institutions in different countries. Its main themes include democracy, governance, rule of law,
attitudes and behavior, and accountability.
3.3.2

Operationalization and variables

3.3.2.1 Dependent Variable: Contact with Members to Parliament.
The consistent presence of the question about contacts with one’s MP in every single round
is a sign of the importance Afrobarometer surveyors attach to the constituent-representative
relationship in Africa. In mature democracies, like the United States, direct contacts between
citizens and their members of congress is in itself an enduring institution enshrined in the founding
documents of the republic. The sheer volume of these contacts bears witness to citizens’ reliance
on this venue to connect directly to their government despite the existence of alternative “linking
institutions” (party, interest groups). According to Jacob R Strauss and Matthew Glassman (2016)
of the Congressional Research Services, since 2011, nearly four hundred million of emails and
twenty-two million of postal mails are sent every year to Congress (5). On the other hand, in every
single country under investigation in this article, the rate of contact initiated by citizens to reach out
to their legislative representative is very low. Less than two out of ten ordinary citizens ever initiate
such a contact. The majority of these contacts are done face –to face. Although the question about
writing to a representative is not asked in the Afrobarometer’s surveys, one can surmise from the
very small size (0.1%) of the surveyed that write to a newspaper that no one writes to her MP.
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3.3.2.2 Independent Variables: Contacts of Religious and traditional institutions
Contacting religious leaders is probably the most widespread human interactions Africans
get involved in outside the realm of the family. The pervasive religiosity could be assumed to be a
cause of the high rate of contact of religious leaders. In the survey, the Afrobarometer enumerates
nearly 23 religious denominations. Countries vary in types of religious denominational
predominance. For instance, Christians form a large majority in Botswana, Benin, Kenya, Liberia,
Malawi, Namibia, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In Ghana, Burkina Faso,
and Nigeria the number of Christians and Muslims roughly distributed evenly. Because the goal of
the article is not to gauge the individual effect of each religious denomination on political
participation, no attempt will be made to engage in such endeavor. The goal instead is to evaluate
the impact of contacting any religious institution on the likelihood of contacting members to the
parliament. In the Afrobarometer, contact of religious institution takes on four ordinal values
(Never = 0; only once=1; few times=2; often=3). For convenience, I recode this variable as a
dichotomous variable by collapsing its values from 1 to 3 into 1. Another aspect related to religious
affiliations is that 62% of those who claim a membership are actively involved in religious
organizations either as leaders or active members. A cross tabulation reveals that 39% of these
active members in religious institutions declare having contacted their MPs.
Contact with traditional authorities: Chikadibia Stanley (2005) defines traditional
authorities as “individuals occupying communal and political leadership positions sanctified by
cultural norms and values, and enjoying the legitimacy of particular communities to direct their
affairs” (2). They can be seen as the most important agents of socialization in rural and urban areas
(Ubink,2008:12). They occupy the space between families and the state and wield an impressive
social control through the observance of customs- rules. They wear two hats: civil and religious.
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The importance of these institutions is captured by Afrobarometer through the number of citizens
who contact them on a daily basis. It is safe to assume that the presence of this question in every
single of Afrobarometer’s surveys highlights the importance this social relationship in African
communities. Responses are captured as an ordinal level variable measured in five crescendo scales
from (0) to (4). Varying from one country to the other, responses rates reach the highest level in
Lesotho (58%) and the lowest in Cape Verde (0%). Over the years, the contact of traditional leaders
across the twenty countries remains at 30%. I transform this ordinal variable into a dichotomous
variable by collapsing the three values of any contact (only once, a few times, and often) into one
value (1), and I keep the value of never as (0).
Voting: Vote is par excellence the most direct connection between citizens and their elected
officials. It gives the constituent the inherent right not only to contact but also to hold the elected
official accountable. In addition, voting for a candidate gives citizens an added reason to contact
those who hold an office. Despite being the less-information rich act, voting for or against an elected
official signals a trust in the democratic process. In addition, voting for a candidate gives citizens
an added reason to contact those who hold an office. In the Afrobarometer, the variable voted takes
on seven nominal values. These values encapsulate a complex reality including citizens’ status
about their voters’ registration, other structural barriers preventing them from voting, and their
attitudes toward the vary act of voting. I transform the seven scale values into a dichotomous
variable with 1=voted and 0= not voted all other options.
Contact of party officials: As voting is the par excellence the most direct individual dyadic
connector between elected officials and citizens, party is the collective channel through which
citizens with similar policy goals and ideology get together to achieve these goals. Schattschneider
(1946) stated that modern democracy would not be conceivable without political parties. More than

98

any other linkage institutions, formal as well as informal, political parties theoretically are the best
tool to aggregate and articulate citizens’ preferences. Furthermore, structurally, party should
connect citizens directly to their members of parliament and the latter to their support base. As such,
party should be the greatest predictor of contact with MPs.
Control variables: To establish a clear causal linkage between intermediary institutions and
contact with MPs, I control for two sets of variables. The first set of controlled variables consists
of individual level (demographic and socioeconomic) variables. The specified model includes
education, age, residence, gender, and party identification. Because of the pervasiveness of low
level of income, I capture individual economic situation with the variable gone without food. The
second set of controlled variables comprises country-level variables (countries’ electoral systems
and their gross domestic product per capita). I simplify the variable electoral system by
transforming it into a dichotomous variable whereby 1= countries using single member district
(SMD) system; and 0= all other electoral systems that are not SMD.
3.4

Results and Discussion
The goal of this chapter is to assess the extent to which intermediary institutions (traditional

authorities and religious actors) conjointly and individually serve as linkage institutions that
connects citizens to their members to parliament. The relationship to be measured is the
simultaneous comparison of the strength of the linkages between formal institutions and MPs on
one hand, and on the other hand, the strength of connection between the two informal institutions
and MPs. I perform a multiple logistic regression in which I contrast the effects of contacting the
two intermediary institutions on contacting MPs against that of contacting party officials,
partisanship, and voting. These results hold after controlling for individual level variables
(socioeconomic and demographic) as well as country levels variables (electoral system and gdp per
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capita). In the table 2, the combined effect of the two primary independent variables, contact of
religious institutions and contact of traditional authorities display a greater coefficient (4.31%).
Substantively, nearly 4% of ordinary people who contact either one of these institutions are more
likely to contact their MPs.
Table 3.2 Results of the logistic regression
Independent Variables
Dependent Variable: Contact MP
Combined effects ATA +RI

0.431***

Contact Religious institutions

.0231***

.001

Contact Traditional Authority

.0201***

.001

Contact Party Officials

.0057***

.001

.0227**

.003

Electoral rules
Party id (closeness to party)
Education
gender
GDP-capita

-.0246***
.001*
-.0208***
.0139***

.003
.000
.003
002

Legend
ATA= African Traditional Authorities. RI= Religious Institutions.
N= 21519. Log likelihood = -5694.6521. LR chi2(13) = 3113.23
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000.
Pseudo R2
= 0.2269 (***) = P-value
= (000).
Contact of religious institutions. In this analysis, contacting religious institutions is a strong
predictor of contacting MP (.0231) with a highly statistical significance (P-value=000 at 95%
confidence interval). This means that those who contact their religious institutions are nearly 2.3%
more likely to reach to their representatives than those who don’t. This finding is important when
seen from the perspective of the high rate of contacts of religious institutions in Africa (on average
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50%). While contacting religious institutions comes out as a consistent indicator of contact of MPs,
religious affiliations does not. This is understandable. Religious affiliations that captures the
diversity or number of religious denominations is highly context-dependent. Membership in
religious groups is not significative. This result echoes the findings of Manglos and Weinreb (2013)
who found no individual difference in terms of participation among denominational groups (212).
The present results also support Reid (2017) idea that contextual factors including local and national
factors help shape the political behavior of religious members. She points to the difference in
residence (rural or urban) as the driver of the difference in members’ political behavior. For
instance, rural folks that are catholic behave differently from the urban catholic in Kenya and in
Uganda (944). These heavily context-dependent factors explain why differences within and across
denominations cancel out the impacts on participation, lending credence to the statistical result of
no significance.
As theorized, contact of traditional authorities do serve as a mediating institution for
citizens to contact their MPs. The results displayed in the table 2 show that this variable has a
positive and statistically significant (0.201 with a P-value=000 at 95% confidence interval).
Essentially, this means that citizens who frequently contact traditional authority have 2% more
chance to reach out to their MPs than those who don’t. The relatively smaller coefficient of
traditional authorities in comparison to religious institutions reflects their checkered history across
the African continent. In a final analysis, it is perhaps important to point out that despite showing
an attachment to these institutions, Africans do not request the clock of African political
development to be turned back. Overwhelmingly, Africans reject a system of government
conducted by traditional or religious rulers, one party rule, or military rule. Afrobarometer round 2
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and 3 report that 89% prefer the democratic form of governance and reject all alternative forms of
government that would supplant the democratic ones.
The inclusion of country-level variables yields two important findings. Firstly, as theorized
by many scholars, electoral systems do impact representative-constituents relationship. In the table
2, the variable electoral rule (a dichotomous variable) impacts positively the contact with MPs
(.022). In country with the electoral system of single member district, ordinary citizens have 2.27%
chance to contact their MP than in countries with any other electoral system. Secondly, unlike the
electoral system that has a positive coefficient, the country-level economic variable, the gross
domestic product per capita impacts negatively contact with MPs (-013). This result too
substantiates the conventional wisdom that low level of economic development hampers political
participation. Unlike informal institutions that clearly impact positively bottom up communication
from citizens to their representatives, formal institutions display different pictures. Starting with
contact with party official, the coefficient is small but positive. This result is rather heartwarming
for hopeful about democrats in Africa (scholars, citizens, and activists). Conversely, party id has a
negative and statistically significant coefficient (-.024). Those who claim a partisanship are 2.4%
less likely to contact their MPs). This result is alarming in the sense that it signals a disconnect
between ordinary citizens affiliated to political parties and their awareness that parties exist to
facilitate bottom up communication, among other functions. Unsurprisingly, neither voting nor
residence has a bearing on whether or not citizens would contact their MPs.
In conclusion, democratic waves in Africa have brought in their wakes the rebirth of the
most familiar and closest social organization ordinary Africans know: religious institutions and
traditional authorities. For the last two decades, traditional authorities and religious institutions have
known a revival across the continent. The Afrobarometer captures the importance of these
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institutions by measuring how many ordinary citizens contact them. As shown in table 1 page 10
above, resurgence has occurred in virtually every single country irrespective of their colonial past.
One can no longer dismiss these institutions as epiphenomena. If anything, their resurgence speaks
volume about their socioeconomic relevance in ordinary people’s daily lives. Still, these institutions
bear inherent non-democratic features such as the mode of selection, and sometimes their ruling
principles shrouded in mysteries(Mattes,1997). Furthermore, in many places these institutions carry
a tarnished reputation for having collaborated with successive extra local powers (Mamdani 1996).
Thus, resurgence of these institutions raises a more pressing question about their fitness in
the African democratic landscape. In response to this question, two camps have emerged.
Recognizing the merits of each side, I have advocated a middle ground position like other eminent
scholars (Bratton and Logan, Logan 2008,2011). Yet, in this article, I go beyond mere speculation
about the linkage role traditional authorities play in connecting ordinary people to formal institution
to provide hard evidence about their role in constituent- representative relationship. Despite
showing this tangible evidence, this investigation has some limitations. As mentioned previously,
the scope of the present is limited to the 20 countries in the Afrobarometer. Another limitation is
that the lack of data (qualitative and quantitative) on both African traditional authorities and
religious institutions cut short a more exhaustive comparative among countries under investigation.
Specifically, except in a limited number of countries where the status of institutions is clearly
defined and formally recognized (Botswana, Burkina, Ghana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Malawi,
South Africa, Uganda, Zimbabwe), in many of them, the status is unclear (Benin, Cape Verde,
Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Zambia). Future research would make a great
theoretical contribution by focusing solely on each of these institutions and comparing them across
countries.
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4
4.1

CHAPTER IV: DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN CITIZENS AND THEIR MPS.
Introduction
While the preceding chapters dealt with intermediary institutions (grassroots informal

organizations and traditional authorities) that help citizens contact their Member of Parliament
(MP), the current chapter focuses on direct contacts between individual citizens and their
representatives. More specifically, it seeks to answer the following question: Under what conditions
do citizens initiate a direct contact with their Member of Parliament(MP) in Africa? It argues that
the key for citizens to directly contact their representatives lies in the attentiveness of the latter to
their constituents. Attentiveness in this context refers to MP’s ability to listen to constituents’
concerns, opinions, and views. Specifically, attentiveness encompasses the perception that citizens
have of their representative’s willingness to listen to their opinions, concerns, and preferences. In
other words, citizens await a signal from their representative that she will respond to their initiative
to contact. Put simply, citizens want their representative to display some levels of responsiveness.
But the concept of responsiveness is a multidimensional one. For instance, there are policy
responsiveness, responsive government, responsive party…etc. Each of these kinds of
responsiveness is different one from the other and each is captured differently (Barabas, 2007:128). Fortunately, the conventional wisdom uses the concept of “listening to citizens” to capture
responsiveness in its most basic meaning. In public opinion surveys, (Afrobarometer and American
National Election Studies (ANES)), the instrument “representative listen” measures citizens’
perception that their government, or its representative, is responsive to them (Bratton et.al. 2005;
Barabas, 2007, Shapiro and Page 2002, Wlezer and Soroka, 2010, Shapiro, 2011). Similarly, in this
article, citizens’ perception of MPs’ listening ability will be used to capture constituents’ sense of
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MP’s responsiveness. This responsiveness is hypothesized to motivate direct contact between
citizens and their MPs.
However, the very topic of direct, person to person, contacts between elected officials and
constituents in Africa is subject of heated debates among scholars. Two particular debates are
germane to the research question above. The first disagreement is about whether individual
characteristics are the leading causes of political participation before contextual variables. The
second dispute has to do with factors that motivate citizens to initiate direct contacts with their
elected officials. Are citizens motivated to initiate these direct contacts (dyadic) for clientelistic
reasons, or they are motivated by a need to have a genuine political connection with their
government?
The debate about the motivations of dyadic relationships between MP-and citizens divide
scholars into two camps. On the one hand, Lindberg (2003), Morrison and Lindberg (2009) describe
the person to person interactions between MPs and voters as essentially clientelistic (101). Taking
their cues from African MPs’ perceptions of their constituents’ demands, these authors characterize
the dyadic MP-constituent relationships as the ones in which MPs provide private goods in order
to buy out voters’ political support (124). On the other hand, Barkan (1974,1978, 2009), Mattes,
Mozzaffar, and Barkan (2014), Mattes and Mozzaffar (2016), and Young (2009), reject this onesided characterization. For Barkan and colleagues, any description of constituent-representative
relationships in Africa needs to take into account the views of constituents as well. In multiple
studies, Mattes, Mozzaffar (2016) and others show that MPs misconstrue the needs of their
constituents. According to these authors, citizens expect more their MPs to listen to them and to
provide collective goods than private goods (202). Where does this investigation stand on these
issues?
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First, the nature of direct interactions between elected officials and their constituents, I
contend that direct dyadic relationships are not driven by clientelistic reasons. Rather, contacts
emanating from citizens toward their representatives are caused by MPs’ ability to listen to their
constituents. Underneath this observable causal relationship between citizens’ perception of their
MPs’ ability to listen and their motivation to contact lies citizens’ political efficacy. Political
efficacy behaves as an intervening variable in the causal connection between citizens’ perception
of their MP’s listening ability and their initiative to reach out to her. An intervening variable is
defined as a variable that influences the causal relationship explored but external to both the
independent and the dependent variables (Tolman,1938; Kaur, 2013:37). As an intervening
variable, a citizen’s political efficacy serves as a catalyst for citizens to directly contact their MP.
In other words, due to the pervasiveness of political apathy in nascent democracies, elected officials
have to make the first move and send a signal to each individual constituent that her efforts to
contact her representative will not be vain. Because Afrobarometer surveys capture the variable
political efficacy separately, I include it as distinct variable in the model specified. Furthermore, I
maintain that dyadic contacts between citizens and their MPs serve the fundamental role of building
a political bond that so sadly lacks between the state and the society in Africa (Migdal,1988; Herbst,
2000; Bratton et.al., 2005; Barkan, 2014). Relatedly, on the second debate, I argue that among
causes that are purported to motivate citizens to contact their representative, MPs listening ability
(an exogenous factor) carries a greater predictive power than individual level variables or country
level variables. That is, citizens would contact their MPs only if they have the perception that their
MPs would listen to them. I substantiate these claims quantitatively using data from the
Afrobarometer Round 3. A preliminary quantitative exploration supports my arguments. Using
probit regressions, the results show that the effect of the variable MPs listening has a far greater
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marginal effect than that of education, party closeness, and even electoral participation (voting).
The positive coefficient is highly statistically significant with a magnitude of .209. As theorized,
political efficacy makes a consistent show; its coefficient is positive and highly statistically
significant (.105). These results are in line with several studies on political participation in Africa
where the conventional variables such as social economic status variables and demographics
variables consistently make a poor show (Bratton et al. 2005; Logan, 2002, 2008, 2011; Croke
et.al.2015).
4.1.1

The Research Design

The main outcome variable is the rate of contacts emanating from citizens to their member of
parliament (MP). The primary explanatory variable is citizen’s perception of MPs’ ability to listen
to them. Although the approach is primarily quantitative, part of the argument is substantiated by
the narrative (qualitative) from both the American politics literature and the African politics
literature. The scope of the chapter covers the 18 Sub Saharan countries that are listed in the
Afrobarometer Round 3 including: Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho,
Madagascar, Mali, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Senegal, Tanzania,
Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Although some findings from the analysis can be applied to the
Sub Saharan Africa region, (level of education, low political efficacy and low level of contacts
between ordinary citizens and their MPs), theoretical and empirical inferences from the results are
strictly limited to countries covered by the survey.
This article makes at least two important contributions to the literature. First, the article
contributes to the debate of whether or not dyadic, direct contacts between citizens and their MPs
are motivated uniquely by private goods delivery (clientelism). It shows that clientelistic inclination
is not the primary motivating factor to get in touch with ones’ MP. The investigation suggests that
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in countries with a history of political repression, dyadic relationships help to build a bond that
makes citizens take ownership in their political system. It argues that such a bond must be initiated
by the elite toward ordinary citizens. In the constituent-representative relationship in new
democracy, the onus of contacts from ordinary citizens to their representatives rests on the MPs.
This may sound counterintuitive in the sense that the conventional wisdom expects citizens to
pressure their governing bodies in order to obtain responses (Wlezer and Soroka, 2010;
Easton,1965; Verba, Schlozman, Brady, 1995). In mature democracies, government responsiveness
is reactive to public demands; in burgeoning democracies, due to a legacy or ongoing repressions
of civil and political rights, governing bodies must send a signal that they are willing to hear
citizens’ demand before citizens get involved. The second contribution is to add to the theory of
participation that contextual factors are not to be neglected. Especially, when citizens are weakly
attached to their government through formal institutions, contextual exogenous factors such as an
MP’s listening can help energize citizens to initiate contact with their representative. To conduct
the investigation of this topic, I structure the article in four sections. The first section has introduced
the article and has framed it. In the second section, I present briefly the two opposing positions. The
third section draws from the two literatures (American politics and African Politics) to build the
central argument of the article. The fourth section outlines the methodological approach, provides
results, and discusses the evidence that supports the theory.
4.2

Theoretical Debates About Dyadic Relationships in Africa
In this section, I briefly present the arguments on both sides of the issue on the nature of

dyadic political interactions in Africa. The person to person or face-to face dyadic political
interactions in Africa between citizens and their representatives are seen from two opposite
perspectives. The first perspective is that dyadic, person to person political interactions, specifically
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between MPs and their constituents, are clientelistic in Africa (Lindberg, 2003,2006,2009,2010;
Lindberg and Morrisson,2009). These authors see MP-citizens’ interaction as the mirror of patron
client relationships. The second perspective posits that the MPs misconstrue the demands of their
constituents (Young, 2009; Barkan,1974,1978; Bratton et.al., 2005; Mozzaffar and Mattes, 2016).
Contacts are not clientelistic in the sense that when citizens initiate contacts to with their
representatives, they do so not for private good provision but for collective goods. In addition,
dyadic interactions between citizens and their representatives contribute to the building of normal
political bond between citizens and their government through their representatives (Young, 2009;
Barkan,1974,1978; Bratton, Mozzaffar and Mattes 2016).
4.2.1

Dyadic, Person to Person, Interactions Between Citizens and MPs are essentially
Clientelistic
Lindberg’s scholarly work on MP-constituent clientelistic relationship covers several

aspects of this relationship. Spanning over nearly two decades, the work focuses on clientelistic
behavior at personal and institutional levels. For instance, in his 2010 piece, Lindberg examines
sources of pressure on elected officials, specificities of African institutional features that make them
vulnerable to clientelistic behavior, and vote buying. Through interviews of MPs in Ghana and
serious data gathering processes, Lindberg enumerates four sources of pressures that force MPs into
clientelistic interactions with their constituents. MPs disclose to Lindberg that personal assistance
comes first followed by family issues, traditional, and religious leaders’ demands for a favor. Civil
society networks exert the least pressure (117-142). Lindberg notices that, although the institution
of which MPs are a part is relatively a strong institution in Ghana, some of its features and its
societal perceptions nurture MPs’ clientelistic linkage to citizens. Lindberg uncovers that a
combination of African political history and the way Ghanaian people perceive their MPs expose
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MPs to clientelistic interactions with their constituents. For instance, MPs tell Lindberg that they
are seen in their districts as the wealthiest people whose fortune has accrued with their political
positions. A case in point is that MPs are considered as the proverbial “head of family” who are
expected to resolve everyone’s personal problems (127). MPs explain to Lindberg that these
societal perceptions raise citizens’ expectations about MPs’ capability to provide private goods
(123). According to MPs, these expectations soar during electoral periods. Such first-hand
testimonies have led Lindsberg (2003) to write “patron-client relations are primarily about
providing material resources in exchange for personal loyalty, whereby elected officials (the
patrons) deliver private goods in forms of assistance for school fees, electricity and water bills,
funeral and wedding expenses; or distributing cutlasses and other tools for agriculture, or even
handing of `chop-money' (small cash sums) to constituents” (123-4). Several non-qualitative
sources have come to the same conclusions in developing countries. However, other scholars reject
the description above.
4.2.2

MPs Misconstrue their Constituents’ Demands in Africa
Focusing specifically on the MP-constituent’s relationships, a group of scholars challenge

the characterization of the dyadic contacts between citizens and their MPs as fundamentally
clientelistic. They do so on the ground that this claim does not take into consideration the views of
ordinary citizens. First, these scholars question the depiction of MP-constituent relationship as
clientelistic because MPs misinterpret the need of their constituents. For Barkan and Okumu 1974,
Barkan and Mattes (2014), Mattes and Mozzaffar (2016), MPs’ picture of citizens’ expectation is
inaccurate. Therefore, any portrayal of the MP-constituent relationship that is solely based on MPs’
perspectives projects an incomplete painting (5). Barkan and Mattes (2014) observe that MPs’ are
right for the wrong reason. For instance, MPs agree with citizens that constituency services are a
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key factor in the representative–constituent relationship. However, they misunderstand what kind
of constituency services citizens need. While citizens prioritize collective goods in forms of
community development, MPs wrongly assume that citizens are requesting primarily personal
assistance (10). According to Barkan and Mattes (2014), Mattes and Mozzaffar (2016), MPs
misjudge constituents’ demands when it comes to the nature of goods (whether they need private
or collective goods). Most MPs in the interviews with Lindberg declare that citizens prefer private
goods. However, in the African Legislative Project and in successive Afrobarometer surveys,
citizens state just the opposite. For instance, in the Afrobarometer round 4, more than half of citizens
(53%) declare that they prefer collective goods (204). This preference for collective goods is
reinforced by the reasons for which they contact their MPs. According to the Afrobarometer Round
3, only 29% of those who dare to meet their MPs do it for private or personal reasons
(Afrobarometer online analysis, www.Afrobarometer.org August 14, 2018). The overwhelming
majority contact their elected officials for community reasons. In the same vein, when asked about
their preference among the four legislative functions of their MPs (oversight, law making,
constituency services, and representatives), citizens rank the representative roles of their MPs as
their number one choice. Ordinary people expect their MPs to fulfill their representative roles more
than any other roles (Mattes Mozzaffar (2016:205). These representative roles involve MPs’ linking
functions, including staying in touch with voters, visiting the district as much as possible, and, more
importantly, listening to their constituents. For instance, in the Afrobarometer Round 4 survey, 45%
of citizens consider listening and conveying their views to the national stage as the most important
role of MPs (Barkan and Mattes, 2014:11). Young (2009) corroborates these facts in his study on
voting behavior in Kenya and Zambia. He finds that MPs’ linking function is more important than
a political role in the eyes of the constituents. Keeping in touch with constituents meet their social
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needs and make constituents feel worthy socially (12). When voters feel that they matter, this can
trigger a legitimate political support. Young (2009) demonstrates that it is the MPs’ visits in their
districts that cause electoral support in Kenya and in Zambia; not private goods delivery (5). Young
(2009)’s results echo citizens’ frustration that their MPs are too busy with their own issues to care
about ordinary people (6). In sum, the dispute about whether dyadic interactions between citizens
and their members of Parliaments is at a standstill. An appropriate way to further the debate is to
provide theoretical and empirical evidence that direct interactions between individual citizens and
their MP are more nuanced than they appear. In the following section, I make my contribution to
the debate by taking a stance on the present debate.
4.3

Theorey
Under what conditions would citizens’ initiative direct contacts with their MPs? I argue that

direct contacts between citizens and their MPs are caused by MP’s ability to listen (attentiveness)
than by citizens’ individual characteristics or by clientelistic enticements. Social economic status,
civic voluntarism, and other state level variables are not sufficient causes for participation. Due to
a low political efficacy, the motivation to participate originates from an exogenous factor, but that
exogenous factor is definitely not private goods delivery. It is the MPs’ ability to be attentive to
their constituents, to listen to them. This argument consists of two sub-arguments. First, contact is
not motivated by clientelism; second, contact is primarily caused by an exogenous factor: MPs’
ability to listen. I substantiate each sub-argument in two steps. In the first steps, I draw from the
existing literature to build the narrative that supports the claim. The second step uses a quantitative
approach to evaluate the stated hypothesis generated from the theory.
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4.3.1

Dyadic contacts serve to build a political bond between representatives and constituents.
Before going any farther, it is important to acknowledge that the topic of clientelism is broad

and multifaceted. Its conceptual definition continues to spike controversies among scholars. These
controversies will be avoided here. What matters to the present article is that at its core, clientelism
is an abnormal political linkage between office holders and citizens. It involves an exchange
between a politician and a citizen whereby the former provides a material benefit for a political
support from the latter (Kitschelt 2000, 2002, 2007). Transparency International, a credible
organization, demonstrates that clientelism, bribery, corruption, and their variants are pervasive in
the sector of public administration in new democracies, especially in Africa. In addition, it is
undeniable that African political development has gone through steps from authoritarianism, single
party hegemony, and electoral democracy that favor such abnormal democratic linkages. For
instance, van de Wall (2001) shows that in Africa, political authority is not based on interactions
between equal citizens or on the agent and principle relationship whereby the governors are the
agents and citizens are the principles. It is the other way around wherein the governors dominate
the governed based on patron client-client relationships: “political authority in Africa is based on
the giving and granting of favors, in an endless series of dyadic exchanges that go from the village
level to the highest reaches of the central state” (van de Walle 2001: 51). Furthermore, the limitation
of resources play a catalyst role. As Young and Turner (1985) note, the limited access to resources
leads power holders to cultivate an environment where they reward insiders: “As authoritarian
rulers controlled access to office, neo-patrimonialism [is] a system where politicians are given jobs
in exchange for service to the ruler” (25). In short, from the perspective of everyday bribery in
public service sector and public administration, Lindberg (2010)’s description is accurate.
However, Bratton and van de Walle have shown also that clientelism is limited to the upper rungs
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of elite and their entourage (Bratton et.al 2005: 303). The overwhelming majority of the ordinary
people are not involved in it. In the same token, the claim made here centers on interactions between
ordinary people (constituents) and their MPs. Specifically, it is about what motivates ordinary
citizens to contact their elected officials, not public administration workers or service providers. To
further demonstrate that clientelism is not what motivates citizens to contact their MPs, I compare
citizens’ expectations and representatives’ responses in the United States and in Africa. In this
analogy, I use the strong connection between representatives and their constituents in the United
States as the benchmark to show that dyadic contact is a key in representative–constituent
relationship: it continues to be at the heart of political communication; it serves to strengthen the
political bond between representatives and their constituents; it is one of the yardsticks constituents
use to measure representative performance; and it defines representation styles.
Direct dyadic contacts are at the heart of political communication in old as well as
in new democracies. In the United States of America, direct contacts between Members of
Congress (MC) and their constituents are embedded in the founding documents and in the
American political culture. Taking its origin from the Magna Carta, contacts between legislators
and their constituents are so important to the American political process that they are
constitutionally protected rights. These political interactions are captured by the right to petition
the government. As one of the five parts of the First Amendment, the petition clause, as it is called,
stipulates that “people have the right to appeal to the government in favor of or against policies
that affect them or on which they feel strongly” (Quoted from Elisia Hahnenberg Copley First
Amendment Center). This clause gives citizens the right to contact their government without fear
and for any reasons they deem worthy. They do so either through person-to-person or through
intermediary institutions (interest groups, political parties, civil society organizations). Contact
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between citizens and their representatives is also stressed in Federalist Paper #51 (1788), another
founding document of the Republic. Madison explains that the very rational of the shorter term for
the members of the House of the Representatives is to keep them (MC) connected to their
constituencies. (The term of members of the House of Representatives to the US Congress is two
years. This term is shorter than senators’ six-year term). Promoting contacts from individual
citizens to their representatives is an article of faith to which all members of congress pledge
(Kurtz,1997). According to Straus and Glassman (2016), representatives have kept such pledge by
encouraging citizens to reach out to them through franking since the late 1600s (3). Franking is the
right to send or receive a written communication from or to the constituency. To this day, it is one
of the best tools to keep the two-way communication (2). Lipinski (2002) quotes Thomas Jefferson
as having said that “Members of Congress have both a right and a duty to communicate with their
constituents” (38). Another way to look at the importance of contacts is through the weight of
participation in the American political process highlighted by Jefferson: “We in America do not
have a government by majority. We have a government by the majority of those who participate
[i.e, those who contact their governing bodies]. In short, continual interactions between citizens
and their government are the core of the American political culture.
Permanent contacts between Members of Congress and their constituents have created and
strengthened the social and political bond throughout the different stages of the US political
development. From the early years of the Republic to the latest 21 centuries, different stake holders
(MC and constituents) have strived to stay connected through dyadic contacts. In the beginning,
MC made tour of their district on a horseback chatting and garnering opinions, complaints, or just
bringing in some news to faraway constituents (Davidson et al. 2014:28). As the district population
increased, members of Congress kept the pace with the growth of the population from 1800s to the
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early 1920s. One way Congress kept the pace with the growth of the population was to increase the
number of Congressional seats. For instance, in 1776 congress started with 65 seats. This number
of seats steadily grew until 1911, when it was set at its current number of 435 (Davidson et .al
2014:34; Eckman and Petersen, 2017: 5). Moreover, the increase of the district population has never
been the same everywhere. It has varied widely. An illustration of these variations is the comparison
of Las Vegas (the largest Congressional district with more than 1.3 million of constituents) with the
one seat district in Wyoming with barely 500.000 voters (Davidson et al. 2014:28).
Permanent contacts between Members of Congress and their constituents have created and
strengthened the social and political bond throughout the different stages of the US political
development. From the early years of the Republic to the latest 21 centuries, different stake holders
(MC and constituents) have strived to stay connected through dyadic contacts. In the beginning,
MC made tour of their district on a horseback chatting and garnering opinions, complaints, or just
bringing in some news to faraway constituents (Davidson et al. 2014:28). As the district population
increased, members of Congress kept the pace with the growth of the population from 1800s to the
early 1920s. One way Congress kept the pace with the growth of the population was to increase the
number of Congressional seats. For instance, in 1776 congress started with 65 seats. This number
of seats steadily grew until 1911, when it was set at its current number of 435 (Davidson et .al
2014:34; Eckman and Petersen, 2017: 5). Moreover, the increase of the district population has never
been the same everywhere. It has varied widely. An illustration of these variations is the comparison
of Las Vegas (the largest Congressional district with more than 1.3 million of constituents) with the
one seat district in Wyoming with barely 500.000 voters (Davidson et al. 2014:28). More
importantly, the point of this historical anecdote is to highlight the fact that despite this population
growth, citizens and their representatives have stayed connected through continuous contacts.
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Members of Congress have expanded their manpower in their home districts to strengthen this bond
with their constituents. For instance, members of the House of Representatives are allowed 18 fulltime and 4 part-time congressional assistants. Senators have no limitations on the number they can
hire. Currently, the numbers vary from 13 to 71 congressional assistants (Davidson, et.al 2014:147).
New technology has helped also enrich this bond. A case in point is the volume of email emanating
from citizens to their member of congress. According to the Congressional Management
Foundation (2011) members of Congress and their staffers respond to all the 400,000,000 emails
citizens send to Congress on a yearly basis (15). They respond to each and every single message
with at most a delay of two-weeks (15). Such permanent constituent-representative contacts have
made individual citizens have a stronger connection with their representatives.
Although less systematized in Africa, dyadic contacts remain ordinary citizens’ preferred
vehicle of interaction for a number of reasons. First, the majority of ordinary citizens favor direct
democracy (Bratton et.al 2005: 244). Although less systematized in Africa, dyadic contacts remain
ordinary citizens’ preferred vehicle of interaction for a number of reasons. First, the majority of
ordinary citizens favor direct democracy (Bratton et.al 2005: 244). They view democratic process
primarily as continuous and normal person to person interactions whereby everyone gets to express
their views unlike the one they live in, where they only get to interact passively and sporadically
with government (Bratton et.al.2005). The abysmal rate of political participation during
interelection periods in Africa confirm these observations (Bratton et.al 2005: 151). Secondly, high
levels of illiteracy make face-to face, dyadic interactions the most likely method of communication.
The majority of ordinary citizens (65%) in Africa continue to live in rural areas and have no access
to formal education (Grossman et.al 2014: 34). According to African library project, nearly one out
of every two Africans suffer from illiteracy (www.Africanlibraryproject.org). In such a context,
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face-to face interactions become the surest way to convey one’s views and concerns. Thirdly,
dyadic contact is also rooted in African tradition. Bratton indicates “people seem to expect face to
face relationship with their representatives in which they can make oral demands in person” (303).
Whether literate or not, African oral tradition makes the face-to face interaction the primary channel
of interpersonal communication.
Contact is also one of the most used yardsticks citizens use to measure representative’s
performance in the USA as in Africa. When asked about what they would like to see their
representatives most do, constituents everywhere favor proximity of and the accessibility to their
elected officials (Fenno, 1978; Rosner, 2007; Barkan, 1974, 1978; Mattes and Mozzaffar, 2016). In
the US, permanent contacts between representatives and constituents have built a strong political
bond to the point that citizens refer to their member of Congress as “my representative so and so.”
(Davidson et.al. 2014; Ansolabehere and. Jones, 2012:295-314). This bond has different name by
different political scientists. While Mayhew (1974) calls, this bond the “Electoral connection”,
Fenno (1978) names it “Home Style” (2). Fenno defines home style as the way members of Congress
go by to achieve their three main goals: “presentation of self, explanation of Washington activities,
and resources allocation” (15). The purpose of the “Home Style” is to build a trust relationship
between the representative and the different circles of his constituencies. At the heart of the home
style Fenno points to “the presentation of self” (54). This is the moment where the member of
Congress conveys to her constituents that “I am one of you” (58). She achieves this presentation of
self by opening wide her arms and becoming accessible to every single one of her constituents.
Fenno maintains that the way members of congress have cultivated this bond has created two types
of Home Styles: The Home Style that is “person-intensive” and the Home Style that is “policyoriented” (34). In his book, Congress at Grassroots, Fenno (2003) writes that person to person
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home style consists of interacting and knowing constituents at personal level, spending times with
them, sharing their identity, and most importantly, being fully accessible to them (13). While Jack
Flynt of Georgia’s 7 Congressional district exemplifies the person-intensified home style, Mc
th

Collins of Georgia’s 8 Congressional district epitomizes the policy-focused style. Fenno (2003)
th

explains that in policy-oriented home style, members of Congress do no cultivate a person-toperson bond, but instead share strong policy views with their constituents. It is important to point
out that some members of Congress (MCs) combine the two styles in order to win the trust and the
votes of their constituents. In final analysis, whether policy-focused or person-focused, dyadic
contacts is the consistent vehicle of connection between members of congress and their constituents
(Fenno, 1978, 2000, 2003).
Similarly, in Africa, person-to-person interactions are constituents’ preferred way to
communicate with their MPs. Voters in Africa prize proximity and accessibility like their
counterparts in the United States. Africans like Americans desire attentiveness from their
representatives. In reality, though, citizens are left wanting the attentiveness of their representatives
in Africa. For instance, 85% of citizens surveyed in Afrobarometer Round3 complain that no one
pays attention to them between election. To the chagrin of ordinary Africans, the only time someone
pays attention to them is during campaigns and electoral periods. Frustrated, a citizen in Tanzania
complains that “politicians treat us like matchstick, once they light their cigarettes, they throw us
like a garbage” (Bratton et.al 2005:138). On the other hand, constituents give higher performance
ratings to any representative who puts in the effort to be accessible or visits her constituents. Also,
citizens prefer representatives who live in the same local area to carpet baggers (candidates without
local attachment who are imposed upon local residents from the capital cities). Bratton et.al 2005
explain that ordinary African resent particularly such pervasive practices because they feel
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disrespected and exploited for electoral reasons (Bratton et.al 2005: 241). Ordinary people in Africa
“value a share sense of identity based on a common place of origin for it is widely felt that only
residents have an authentic appreciation for the problems of the hometown” (Bratton et.al
2005:243). In a sense, African constituents yearn to see their MPs showcase what Fenno calls “I
am one of you” (Fenno 1978:55) as MC in the US do.
More concretely, direct contacts are the channel through which constituency service is done.
Representatives everywhere rank constituency service as the most gratifying aspect of their role. In
the United States, constituency service is termed “casework” (Davidson et.al 2014:143). In the
Congressional Research Service’s article, Eckman and Petersen (2017) define casework as “the
responses or services that members of Congress provide to constituents who request their
assistance” (2). According to the authors, casework is a tradition that traces its roots to the early
years of the Republic practices (12). This tradition is so crucial in the constituent-representative
relationship that it was codified in the legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (Davidson et al 2014:
150). The codification made “de facto hiring of casework manager in Congress members’ offices”
(reference). This codification has allowed citizens to expand the reasons for which citizens initiate
direct contacts with their MC in their home districts or in Washington DC. Davidson et al. (2014:
131-155) report that a survey of 80% of Congress members reveal that when citizens reach out to
their MC, they usually make contact for one or several of the following reasons: to express views
or obtain information on a pending or already decided legislative issue; to obtain a job; regarding
social security benefits, unemployment compensation or veteran benefits; regarding military cases(
e.g., transfers, discharges, personal hardship); regarding tax issues; regarding legal immigration; to
obtain government publications; or regarding flags that have flown on the Capital Hill(143). Yet
not everyone appreciates casework. Some think that it has taken the bulk of the most precious
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resource a MC has: time. Those who object to the preponderance of casework call it “constituent
errand running” (Davidson et. al 2014: 32). Nevertheless, like in the US, ordinary Africans yearn
for an effective constituency service delivered by their MPs. When asked in opinion surveys about
the most important duty of a representative, ordinary citizens rank MP responsibility as follows:
eighty to ninety percent want their representative to listen to them. Ordinary citizens perceive MPs’s
willingness to listen to them as concrete manifestation of MPs’ efforts to meet citizens’ expectations
(Afrobarometer Round 3 and Round 4). According to Mattes and Mozzaffar (2016), a breakdown
of these expectations indicates that “27% of ordinary citizens want representatives to bring
development assistance in the district, 26% for infrastructure development, educational and health
issues, 25% job related help 15% agriculture and food assistance covers less than 10%. Remarkably,
only 8% ask for personal assistance” (207).
4.3.2

MPs’ ability to Listen, an Exogenous factor, is the driver of Citizen-MP Contacts
The claim in the preceding sub-argument is that clientelistic motivation has little to do with

the reason behind citizens’ initiative to contact their MP. What then prompts citizens to do so? I
argue that in the particular African context, MP’s listening (responsiveness) has a greater effect on
causing people to contact their representatives than all other known individual factors of political
participation including social economic characteristics and system level variables. Put another way,
in Africa , although the conventional wisdom suggests participation is based on SES, civic
voluntarism and cognitive abilities, the way to increase citizens’ direct contacts with their MPs is
to have their MPs reach out first to their constituents. MPs’ ability to listen motivates citizens to
contact their elected officials because their attentiveness boosts citizens’ sense of political efficacy,
which enhances political participation.
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I maintain that MPs listening is the driving force of citizens’ contact because it signals to
constituents that their efforts to contact their representative will not be vain. Once they get the
impression that they will be heeded, citizens become motivated to initiate contact. This argument
sounds counterintuitive. In the normal course of actions, one would assume that individual
characteristics would be the leading causal factors to contact MPs. However, that is not the case in
the bourgeoning democracies where political violence, abuse of power and low system
responsiveness have fostered low political efficacy and skepticism toward the state (Bratton and
Logan 2006; Grossman et.al, 2014; Coleman, 1991). The argument posits that in the African
political context, it is only when the authority literally extends welcoming arms that citizens will
feel safe and invited to initiate a contact. Thus, the causal mechanism of the central argument
consists of two logical steps. First, when MPs open up, they send a signal to citizens that they are
welcome to be contacted in the future. In short, MPs’ listening ability boosts citizens’ political
efficacy. Several scholars have shown this well-established relationship in the literature (Cho, 2010;
Bratton, Grossman et.al 2014, 2016). The second step is that once they feel welcomed, this makes
citizens believe that their voice matters and subsequently motivates them to initiate a contact with
their elected officials. Put simply, their sense of being listened to (political efficacy) triggers their
participation (Clarke and Ackoc,1989 Finkel,1985; Mohler, 2004; Brady Verba, Scholzman,1995;
Bratton et.al 2005).
MPs’ opening up boosts citizens’ political efficacy because constituents rate MP’s
performance by the way the MP shows genuine interest in them. Davis and Coleman (1976) found
this relationship in a study conducted among Blacks in the United States. They concluded that
citizens’ perception of government responsiveness tends to depend on the extent to which the
government allows citizens to have their input in the policy process (David and Coleman,1976:
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234). Similarly, in Africa, ordinary people evaluate their worth in the eyes of the political system
by the way government officials allow them to have their say. In ranking their MPs’ role
expectations, 45% of ordinary people put MPs’ listening to them as the number one expectation
(Afrobarometer Round 4). Moreover, MPs’ listening ability boosts citizens’ sense of efficacy
because constituents assess their representative performance rating based on MPs’ ability to listen
to constituents (Bratton et.al 2005: 303). Across the eighteen countries surveyed in this article,
citizens connect representatives’ performance to how their MP shows her interest in their wellbeing. Citizens who think that MPs are “interested in what happens to you” and “are hearing what
people like you think” are very much more likely to approve of their MP’s performance. Bratton
et.al 2005 point out, “because responsive representative gain higher performance evaluation, it
seems that MPs can gain considerable credit by simply making themselves available to lend an ear
to their constituents” (244). Grossman et.al confirm this boosting effect of political efficacy by
MPs’ availability to pay attention to citizens. In Grossman et.al.2016’s experimental study, the
treatment effect is the phone calls MPs place to citizens named individually. Grossman et al. find
that these calls boost citizens’ self-worth and drive substantial increase in their participation rate.
They interpret these results as a vivid expression of the action of an exogenous factor on political
participation in a low political efficacy context (Grossman et.al 2014, 2016). As Bratton et al. 2005
conclude, “a little bit of responsiveness goes a long way in Africa in closing the gap between MPs
and their constituents” (243). In other words, MPs attentiveness would increase citizens’ political
efficacy, which prompts her to get involved.
Of the many indicators of general political attitudes developed in the 1950s, sense of
political efficacy is the one indicator that is the most theoretically important and frequently used.
Political efficacy was initially defined as “the feeling that individual political action does have or
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can have an impact on the political process” (Craig and Maggiato,1982:86). Following Lane in
1959, scholars in 1970s came to recognize that political efficacy contains at least two separate
components: internal and external efficacy. Internal efficacy refers to citizens’ beliefs about their
personal competence to understand and participate effectively in politics (Finkel 1985). It is an
attitude, a perception that one possesses what it takes, the necessary wherewithal, resources and
skills to influence a political representative or a political process. Internal political efficacy is a
cognitive trait that connects attitude to behavior. It precedes behavior and justifies it (Clarke and
Ackock, 1991). Furthermore, psychologists have found it to be highly context dependent and tied
to political socialization. Hence ordinary people having undergone a series of political abuses
internalize a negative outlook of their political system. The external efficacy is more outwardly
oriented. It is the perception that representative or the system is responsive to one’s effort to exert
influence (Miller, Miller and Schneider, 1980, 273). Although there is an analytical distinction
between external and internal efficacy, scholars agree that the two attitudes are closely related and
feed into each other (Finkel 1989: 83). As Grossman et. al. (2016) put it, “at its heart, the concept
of political efficacy assumes that “an extrinsic motivation underlies a decision to engage the
political system” (1331). For this reason, internal and external efficacy will be combined to express
citizens’ belief in herself to get response from government.
Political efficacy is inherently low in the eighteen African countries covered in this article
due to their patterns of political socialization. Shapiro (2004) attribute the low level of basic
democratic orientation to internalization of the pervasive non-democratic values during citizens’
formative years: “Many citizens in emerging democracies have been socialized into non-democratic
values and they are hardly able to develop basic orientations and practices in those who are in the
formative years” (Novy and Katrinak 2015:2). Grossman et al. (2016) corroborate this. They claim
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that general political context and practices also contribute in lowering citizens’ beliefs that it is
worth getting involved or contacting a political figure.: “In many developing countries, low
competitions, widespread corruption and political abuse have turned citizens into political skeptics
(1331). They have learned that their actions make no difference (Lieberman, Posner and Tsai, 2014;
Novy and Katinak, 2015: 3). Furthermore, a host of contextual factors have damaged ordinary
citizens’ sense of political efficacy in these countries. The history of authoritarianism, legacy of
colonial practices, followed by decades of single party rules and military dictatorships, civil wars,
and rigged elections take their toll on citizens’ positive belief in their political systems. Scholars
have also demonstrated that if and when government chooses to be responsive, those at the helm
are selective in that they only reward “insiders” and ignore their critics and other outsiders (Bratton
et.al.2005: 304). At individual level, the widespread low level of literacy combined with the
deliberate disengagement of the highly-educated contribute to lowering political efficacy (Croke
et.al 2015). The accumulation of all the above reasons sheds a light on the causes of a low level of
political efficacy causing ordinary citizens to feel rather estranged from their own political
community. As a result, in order to boost participation, African citizens need an exogenous and
somehow an instrumental factor. From the above theory, I generate the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis I: In countries where citizens have a low sense of political efficacy, MPs’
attentiveness has a far more causal effect on citizens’ initiative to contact them than individual or
and country level factors (e.g., GDP or electoral rules).

4.4

Research Design and Methodology
Establishing clear causal paths between social phenomena is the overarching goal of social

science investigations. Social scientists use four approaches to identify causal determinants:
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quantitative, qualitative, experimental, and formal theory. The present article uses the quantitative
approach to provide empirical evidence for the central argument, which states that MPs’ listening
ability has a greater predictive power than any individual or country level variables purported to
motivate citizens to contact their MPs. I adopt a two-step analytical strategy to conduct this
investigation. In the first step, I list the variables involved and elaborate on how they are measured
(operationalization). The second step consists of the model specification, statistical procedures and
the results.
4.4.1

Data source
The data used in this study comes from the Afrobarometer survey database. Specifically, I

use the Afrobarometer survey round 3 that was taken between 2005 and 2006. The sample units
consist of 18 Sub-Saharan countries including: Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya,
Malawi, Mali, Lesotho, Namibia, Mozambique, Uganda, Senegal South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia
and Zimbabwe. The rationale of choosing this dataset lies in the fact that it is arguably one of the
most prominent topics related to the constituent-representative relationship. In addition to having
commonly asked behavioral questions, the Afrobarometer round 3 touches on topics specific to
citizens-representative connections that are highly relevant to the relationship explored in this
article. For instance, it asks questions about citizens’ expectations regarding MPs’ roles, MPs’
visits, vote buying, and MP’s ability to listen to their constituents. The Afrobarometer is a researchbased organization that focusses on public opinion and attitude in Africa. To my knowledge, it is
the only research-based organization that records ordinary people’s views on democracy,
governance, political participation, institutional performance and democratic accountability. In this
research design, citizens’ contact of Members of parliament is the outcome variable and the MPs’
listening ability is the primary independent variable. To these two key variables, I add a number of
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alternative or control variables at the micro level, meso level and macro level (e.g., gdp per capita
and electoral rules).
4.4.2

Operationalization
Dependent Variables: Citizens ’contacts of their Member of Parliament (contact MP). The

act of contacting an elected official or government agency, local or national, (contact MP) is one
of the four broad types of conventional political participation listed by Brady, Schlozman, and
Verba in their book Voice and Equality (1995:.88). The other three participatory types are electoral
activities (campaign work, giving money, and voting), protest (local and national), and community
activities (membership and activity in informal organizations as well as formal organizations such
as Parent-Teacher Association). According to the authors, contact is the most informative
participatory act that serves to communicate citizens’ views and needs to government (55). As such,
the rates of contacts between citizens and their representatives become one of the yardsticks to
measure the levels of state-society interactions. In mature democracies, these rates are directly
governed by countries’ electoral rules and party systems. The rates of contacts between constituents
and representatives is higher in countries where members to the country’s legislative body are
elected by a single member district (SMD) rule such as the United States or the United Kingdom.
Under these electoral rules, the attribution of the legislative seats rests on constituents’ choices; not
that of the party bosses (Cho, 2010:184). For instance, in the United States, constituentrepresentative interactions are one of the highest in the world, with an average of 34% of the
population (Brady, Schlozman, and Verba, 1995: 81). In contrast, these rates decrease in countries
where representatives get their seats by the rule of proportional representation (PR); i.e., party
bosses decide who gets what. Netherlands and Israel are examples of where contact rates are very
low, ostensibly because members to the parliament are elected by the proportional representation
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rule (Davidson et.al.2014: 5). Whereas the rates of contacts between constituents and their
representatives are contingent upon the electoral rules and party systems in mature democracies,
the lower rates of constituent-representative contact seem to have little to do with electoral rules in
new democracies in Africa (Bratton et.al.2005: 152). In most Sub-Saharan African countries,
contact rates are notoriously low irrespective of the electoral rules or party systems. For example,
contact rates are higher in Tanzania (17%), a country that uses a mixture of SMD and PR as electoral
rule, than in Nigeria (7.9%), where MPs are elected from a strict SMD electoral rule. According to
the survey results from the Afrobarometer round3, the average rate of contacts for the 18 countries
is 10%. This means that on average, only one out of ten people contact their MPs at most once per
year. An overwhelming 90% of ordinary Africans never contact their MPs. Although this figure
varies from one country to the other, the highest rate of contacts (17%) is recorded in only one
country (Tanzania). The remaining countries show contact rates ranging between 4.5%
(Madagascar) to 15% ( Botswana). In the Afrobarometer surveys, the variable contact MP is an
ordinal level variable with values ranging from “Never=0, 1=Only one time, 2=Often, to
3=Always” (Afrobarometer round3 codebook p.23). Because I am primarily interested in whether
or not citizens contact (at least one time) their MPs, I transform this ordinal variable into a
dichotomous variable. To do so, I collapse the value from 1 to 3 into Yes=1, and keep 0 as it is.
Below is the pie chart of raw survey results of direct contacts from citizens to their MPs in the 18
countries (merged data).
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MP CONTACT
At least once
10%

never
90%

Figure 4.1 Pie Chart of MP contacts Rate in the 18 countries Sub-Saharan Countries
Independent variables: For the last seventy years, political scientists have worked to find
the causes of political participation such as contact of political officials. They have listed three main
categories of determinants that drive political participation: individual characteristics (e.g., social
economic status and demographics), meso-level variables (e.g., membership in organization), and
macro-level variables (e.g., country GDP, electoral rules). Particularly, four main schools of
thought have had major contributions. The Columbian school, which stresses social networks
(meso-level), have been complemented by the Michigan school, which emphasizes a combination
of social demographics and attitudinal factors centered around the party identity, called “the
unmoved mover” by Campbell (1960) The rationalist school of thought highlights the role of self
interest in political participation (Downs,1957; Page and Shapiro,1972; 2003, to name just a few).
The civic voluntarist school of thought puts forward the interplay between resources, network, and
motivation as sources of political participation (Verba, Schlozman, Brady,1995). Although, each
school of thought emphasizes a particular group of variables, the consensus has been that individual
characteristics remain the driving force of political participation. A worthy academic exercise

129

would be to assess how these theories contextually apply to less mature democracies. For the
present investigation, I contrast MPs listening ability with the above individual characteristics (age,
income, education, partisanship, religion, residence, and country-level variables) to assess the
predictive power of each indicator. I add the variable of clientelism to test the claim that private
good delivery is the essence of MP-constituent interaction.
4.4.2.1 MP listening.
In almost every Afrobarometer survey, when asked about their perception of their MPs,
ordinary citizens point first to the lack of MPs’ listening in Africa. The instrument of listening is a
broad measure of governing bodies’ responsiveness in the literature and in surveys (Bratton et.al
2005; Shapiro,2011; Wlezer and Soroka,2010; Gilens, 2008). But the concept of responsiveness is
itself a multifaceted one. It takes on at least two meanings in the literature. In its first meaning,
responsiveness is viewed as a unidimensional category. In the second meaning, it is used as a
multidimensional concept. For convenience, this article treats responsiveness as a unidimensional
concept. That is, responsiveness corresponds to a simple reactive behavior (Mores and
Taskey,2006). Here it is referred to as simple response to a stimulus. Schumaker and Russel (1977)
offer a succinct definition of this induced reaction of responsiveness. They write “responsiveness
occurs when actors react positively to an external stimulus” (247). Unresponsiveness occurs when
actors fail to react in the way desired by those providing the stimulus. Thus, the concept of
responsiveness is concerned with the degree of linkage or congruence between stimulus variables
and response variables (248). Applied to the MP-constituent relationship, it is safe to assume that
listening refers to frequent visits, social interactions, and the need to see their representative pay a
little attention to them and what they have to say. From the results of the surveys, it appears that
very few ordinary citizens think that their MPs listen to them. A time series analysis of the variable
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from Afrobarometer round 1(1999) to round 7 (2018) shows that the percentage of people who
think that MPs do not listen rises year after year. It went from 35% to 42% (Afrobarometer online
analysis). Once more, there is variance between countries, with a high of 59.5 % of those surveyed
in Nigeria and 59.3% in Malawi deeming representatives dismissive. Similarly, the rates of ordinary
people who have never contacted a MP in the 18 countries under investigation has increased from
87% in Afrobarometer Round 2 (2002) to 89% in Afrobarometer round 7(2016). One way to
interpret the measure of citizens’ demand for MPs listening ability is to compare the extent to which
citizens expect MPs to spend time with their constituents, and the actual time these MPs spend. The
gap is wide. Only 2 percent deems these visits not necessary. An overwhelming 98 percent of
citizens want their MP to visit at least once a month. On average, only 17 percent of the MPs visit
their constituency on monthly basis. And this figure too varies. For instance, whereas, only 5
percent of the MPs visit their constituency once a month in Benin, this number grows to 25% in
Botswana, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda (Afrobarometer round3). In the Afrobarometer, the
variable listening is captured by the following survey question: “In your opinion, how likely is it
that you could get together with others and make: Your Member of Parliament listen to your
concerns about a matter of importance to the community? (Afrobarometer round 4 2009, codebook
p.15).” The responses are measured as an ordinal level variable, with values between 0 and 3 (0=
Not likely; 1= Not very likely, 2= Somewhat likely, 3=Very likely). I recode this variable as a
dichotomous variable by combining the values of 0 and 1(Not likely and not very likely) into 0;
and 2 and 3(Somewhat likely and Very likely) into 1. Below is the pie chart of citizens’ assessment
of their MPs’ listening ability.
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MP LISTENING
At least once
25%

Never
75%

Figure 4.2 Citizens’ Rating of MPs’ Listening Ability.
4.4.2.2 Clientelism.
The conceptual definition of clientelism, which has drawn and continues to draw controversy, will
be avoided here. The key aspect of the clientelistic linkage relevant to this chapter, and that is at
issue, is its person-to-person political interaction. The consensus is that at its core, clientelistic
linkage involves an exchange between a politician and a citizen whereby the former provides a
material benefit or side payment for a political support from the latter. To better grasp the point of
contention, a quick review of typology of political linkages is in order. Individual and collective
interactions between government and governed have always preoccupied political scientists,
leading them to continuously investigate the five types of linkage institutions. These include
political parties, elections and campaigns, the media, interest groups, and the representativeconstituent relationships (American Civic book 2017). However, of the five ways of connecting
state and society, arguably more ink has been spent on party and constituent-representative
relationship than on the remaining three. The voluminous literature both in American and in
comparative politics, attest to this continual interest in collective and individual connections of
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citizens to their government. Looking at parties as a linkage institution in the postindustrial
societies, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) point to the programmatic linkage as the bond that ties voters
to their parties. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) see this type of policy agreement (program) between the
elite of the party and the majority of its members as the unique viable linkage. Subsequent studies
will demonstrate that parties have more than one strategy to connect with voters. Sartori (1986)
shows the existence of catchall parties (1986: 55). Most importantly, Kitschelt adds clientelistic and
charismatic linkages to Lipset and Rokkan’s programmatic linkage. Building on Madsen and
Snow’s 1991 work, Kitschelt (2002,2007) defines charismatic linkage as a connection between a
citizen and a representative solely based on the representative personal characteristics. These may
include but are not limited to representatives’ particular charisma, their proven or perceived skills.
Here, individual constituents are convinced of their leaders’ personal capacity to resolve their
problems and to promise a brighter future (Kitschelt,2002.2007p.) Still, Kitschelt’s landmark work
has been on clientelism in its various forms. In this article, clientelism will be treated as it is captured
in Afrobarometer surveys. In these surveys, the variable clientelism is captured with the following
question: “And during the [20xx] election, how often (if ever) did a candidate or someone from a
political party offer you something, like food or a gift, in return for your vote?” The responses
range from 0 =never; 1= once or twice; 2= few times; 3= often. I transform this ordinal variable
into a dichotomous by combining 1 to 3 into 1 and keep 0 as it is. Below is the pie chart of the
results on clientelism in the 18 countries from the merged data.
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CLIENTELISM
No experience
15%
Often
11%

A few times
7%

Never
67%

Figure 4.3 Citizens’ witnessing or experiencing MPs’ clientelistic behavior
To the above primary independent variables, I add three more variables (voted at the last
elections, political efficacy, and ascribing the responsibility of MPs’ job) to apprise the causal
weight of four variables in triggering contact between citizens and their MPs.
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Variables

Observation

Mean

Std. Dev

Min
0

Max

Contact MP

24206

0.2

0.6

2

MP Listen

22695

0.7

1.3

0

3

Clientelism

25114

1.5

6.7

0

3

Ascribing Responsibility

22889

1.9

0.8

1

3

Election Turnover

22187

2 0.5

1

3

In Table 1, are displayed the descriptive statistics of the variables specified in the model.
The large size of the observations speaks to the merging of individual country data. The relatively

134

low means for Contact MP and MP listen indicate that very few people contact their MPs or think
that their MPs listen. For ascribing responsibility to MP and election turnover, the respondents’
average scores (1.9 and 2) lies near the maximum (3). This translates the fact that the majority of
ordinary people know what the responsibility of their MP should be and that an election
theoretically has the power to remove or keep them in office.
Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics of some variables from raw survey results
Variables
Contact MP
Country

Min
4.50%

10.50%

Madagascar

MP listening

44.9

Country

Malawi

Clientelism

13.30%

Country

18 countries Average

64.10%

33.40%

Political Efficacy

19%

Benin

Party closeness

35.80%

Country

Benin

Careful what you say

48.40%
Madagascar

53.30%

Country

81.80%
Botswana

Botswana

11%

17%
Tanzania

Gone without food

Voted at the last election

Max

23.70%

39.70%
Zambia

61.20%

82.10%
Mozambique

83.30%

Ascribing to MPs their

Voters

Other institutions

Responsibility

26.10%

72.70%

94.20%

2

Below in Table 2 are summarized few raw survey results about the variables. In the first column of
Table 2 are the variables of interest: Contact MP, MP listen, Clientelism, Gone without food,
Political efficacy, ascribing to MP their responsibility, voting in the last election, party closeness,
and careful about what you say. The second column comprises of the lowest values of these
variables across the 18 countries. For instance, the variable Contact MP has the lowest rate in
Madagascar (4.5%) and the highest value in Tanzania in the Afrobarometer Round 3.
4.5

Results and Discussion
Table 4.3 The results of the Biprobit regression are summarized in the table 4 below.
Variables

Individual models
M1=Contact

MP Contact
MP Listen
Internal Efficacy
Clientelism
Voted
Ascribing

SURE

M2=MP Listen
.050(0.005) ***

0.0203(0.002) ***

-

0.105

0.180(0.004) ***

-

0.005(0.001) **

-0.009(0.001) ***
-

0.019(0.004)

Responsibility
Electoral turnover
Party

-

0.37(0.006) ***

-0.011(0.001) ***

-

0.005(0.001) ***

-

closeness
Education
Gender

-

Electoral

0.0034(0.006) ***

0.26(0.008) **

Gdp/per

-0.0023(0.003) **

0.041(0.004) ***

system

capita

M1=Contact

M2=MP Listen
.983(.013) ***

.656(.009) ***

3

N

13504

13438

Log likelihood

-7088.8459

-5039.3507

Pseudo R2

=

0.0953

Prob > chi2

Athrho P-value

=0.0000

0.957

0.0541

Table 4. 4. Individual country regressions
Countries

Listening

Party
closeness

Botswana

Vote

Kenya

Lesotho

0.35(0.009)**

.0350(0.010)
**

-0.024

0.462(0.009)
**

-0.018(0.005)
***

Madagascar

0.0081(0.002
)
0.017(0.005)
***

Malawi

-0.014(0.005)

215.2736
9

0.019(0.006
)

-

229.0084
2
445.8433
3

403.0531
5

210.3514
7

-

-0.020(0.005)

358.3624
7

-

0.21(0.005)
**

Namibi

215.2736
9

-0.013(0.005)
**

a
Nigeria

0.014(0.005)
**

Senegal

0.012(0.004)
**

.140(0.034)**
*

Zambia

Log

0.019(0.002
)
0.016(0.006
)

-0.0191(0.006)
*

Mozambique

South Africa
Tanzania

Clientelis
m

-0.295 (0.004)

Cape Verde
Ghana

Education

d

0.012(0.004)
**

0.018(0.004)**
*

295.2133
7
415.0022
4
342.3291
4

4

I use a probit model to conduct this analysis. The equation of the causal relationship takes
the following form: Y= BX+Y0, where Y= is the dependent variable captured by dichotomous
values (Yes=1 at least one contact with the MP and No=0 never contacted a MP). ß is the coefficient
of the primary independent variable (MP listening). The coefficient of the first output of a probit
statistical procedure cannot be interpreted straightforwardly like the coefficient of an Ordinary
Least Square because it is a logarithmic probability (Trivedi and Cameron, 2010:24). Nonetheless,
it can help indicate the sign (direction) of the coefficient. Probit, like many other maximum
likelihood models, requires a postestimation procedure that can accurately compute the magnitude
and statistical significance of each estimator. In the present case, I estimate the substantive value of
the coefficient using the marginal effect postestimation.
Table 3 presents the results of specified models. In these two models M1 and M2,I use the
merged data of the 18 countries. As predicted, the independent variable MP listening out performs
all other independent variables. The results show a marginal effect of MP listening as the leading
cause that motivate citizens to initiate a contact with their MPs. In plain English, this means that
after keeping all variables at their means, the effect of MP listening is likely to boost contact with
MP by 2%. After assessing the effect of the MPs listening on the likelihood to increase contact
from merged data, I perform individual probit regressions for each of the 18 countries. The aim of
these individual regressions is to cross-compare the causal weight of MP listening in the countries
under investigation. The results are presented in Table 4. MP Listening has a stronger effect in
Lesotho (0.462) Tanzania (0.036), Ghana (0.35), Kenya (0.35) Uganda (0.028). Intriguingly,
listening has no effect in Madagascar. The second independent variable is clientelism. As argued,
the independent variable clientelism has no causal impact on the dependent variable contact with
MP from the merged data. One exception is Senegal (-0.012), a Francophone country where
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clientelism depresses contacts with MPs. This finding on clientelism support Lindberg’s stance and
is a cautionary warning tale to refrain from quickly generalizing. Besides these two exceptions in
Madagascar and Senegal, both the merged data and individual country analyses substantiate the fact
that private, good delivery from the MP does not motivate ordinary citizens to contact their MPs. It
might also suggest that the bulk of the Afrobarometer samples, essentially made up of ordinary
everyday people who barely encounter a political figure, have little to do with gift exchanges or
vote buying. These practices are limited to a circle of insiders (elite entourage) as Bratton and Van
de Walle (2001) hinted. Another important finding is political efficacy. Although not the leading
cause in the specified model, the coefficient of the variable of political efficacy is positive and
statistically meaningful in every model. As for the act of voting, the coefficient is highly significant
and negative in both merged data and country-specific data in the 18 countries surveyed. This
finding highlights the fact that voting is more a duty than an empowering act. Ordinary people who
vote do not see themselves as having the right to call on their MPs for any reason. On the other
hand, the low level of turnout might be the reason why having voted in the last election is not
conducive to initiating contact with one’s MP. Whether it be by the low level of voter turnout or
any other reason, the results echo Bratton and Logan (2006)’s suggestion that ordinary people are
“subjects, not citizens.” The second consistent finding is on the variable party closeness. Its
coefficient is negative across every single country, emphasizing the weakness of formal institutions
as a channel to connect with one’s MP. Finally, the variables electoral turnover and ascribing
responsibility to MP provide some silver lining among this consistent pattern of African behavioral
politics. For instance, in Cape Verde, knowing one’s MP duty and responsibilities is 4% more likely
to enable citizens to contact their MPs.
A Possible reciprocal relationship Between Contacts and Listening?
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The positive and meaningful impact of both political efficacy and MP listening warrant a
further analysis. Specifically, the fact that MPs’ listening ability has become the main causal factor
for citizens to contact their MP raises a question about a possible reverse causal relationship
between MP Listening and Citizens’ contact of MPs. Do contact and listening (action-reaction or
stimulus –response) have reciprocal relationship? When faced with such conundrum, social
scientists turn readily to the experimental method to help them isolate temporal precedence in the
course of the events. However, in the MP-citizen relationship in Africa such an experiment comes
with the ever-looming threat of the Hawthorn effect. The Hawthorn effect occurs in experimental
investigation when awareness of the subjects being studied lead them to provide unreliable
responses (Druckman et.al 2012:125). Fortunately, there exists an alternative way to cope with
endogenous relationship including the approach of instrumental variable, the two-stage least square,
and the three stage least square. The two and three least square are the key tools that evaluate the
distinct effect of each variable on the other. For instance, in the relationship between income and
educational attainment, the two variables seem locked into a reversal causal relationship. A
simultaneous equation can separate the entangled causal directions by indicating the respective
causal weight of each variable. In the specific case of listen and contact reciprocal relationship, the
three-least square fits squarely. It jointly determines the independent effect of each dependent
variable on the other using their correlated residual as an instrument. Developed in 1962 by Zellner
and Theis, the Three-stage Least Square(3SLS) gets interchanged frequently with the Seemingly
Unrelated Equation or (SURE). The two models are related but different. The difference lies in the
specification. In specifying the 3SLS, the two dependent variables may or may not share the same
independent variables (Zellner and Theis 1962:52). In contrast, for the SURE, the independent
variables must be different. Despite these differences, the 3SLS and the SURE share an important
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similarity highly relevant to the present analysis. Both the 3SLS and the SURE are extensions of
the Ordinary least square. The dichotomous level of measurement of the two outcome variables of
interest (MP listening and Contact MP) violates the linearity assumption for the use of the OLS
models. Faced with such limitations, James Heckman (1978) produced a model to cope with
categorical endogenous relationships. The model, “Biprobit,” adapts to dichotomous endogenous
variables and behaves exactly like a SURE (Heckman 1978: 931). The two models can be written
as: Y1 = B1X+BY0 and Y2= B2X+Y0 where Y1 is contact MP and Y2 is MP Listening. Since the
two seem locked into a reciprocal relationship, this can be written as: Y1<= > Y2, or Bi1X+BiYi0
<= > B2Xj2+Yj0. Upon performing the regression analysis, the findings do not support the fact that
there exists a reciprocal relationship. Although theoretically connected, the two variables are
causally separated. The rho is 0 indicating that a two separate probit regressions can be performed.
Furthermore, from the separate regressions, the variable contact MP has a greater effect (.983) on
MP listening than the other way around. This means that citizens have more chance to get their MP
to listen to them when they contact MPs. The variable listening has a relatively lower affect (0.20)
of contact with MP. Also, on the causes of MPs listening (Model 2), the variable clientelism is weak
but significant (-0.005), suggesting that representative-constituent relationship is more nuanced
than it appears.
5

CHAPTER V: CONCLSION

Direct interactions between citizens and their MPs are rare in Africa. Constituents and those
who are supposed to represent them seem to be living in two distinct worlds, each divorced from
the other. In most cases, survey results show that MPs tend to be alienated. The commonly known
narrative about the causes of this disconnect point to poverty, education, diseases, and other factors.
Citizens, we are told, are too poor, too uneducated, or two hungry to be concerned about policy or
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contacting MPs. All these may each play a role not negligible. But what keeps citizens out from
contacting their MPs is primarily MPs’ lack of responsiveness. Specifically, MPs’ lack of listening,
spending time with her constituents. Although direct contacts between citizens and their
representatives may raise some concerns about clientelistic behavior, they have far more potential
to build a citizen-centered democracy in Africa. Concerns about direct constituents-representatives’
interactions turning into patron-client relationships are real and undeniable in Africa. However,
they are circumscribed and limited to the elite and their immediate circle (van de Wall, 2001).
Survey results show that very few ordinary citizens get involved in it. Surveys show also that
ordinary citizens in Africa yearn for interactions with their representatives (Mattes and Mozzaffar,
2016). Statistical analyses in this article confirm that citizens want their MP to listen to them in
order to faithfully represent their views on national stage. A little bit of attention from the MPs
toward their constituents goes a long way (Bratton et.al.2005). In the dyadic relationships between
citizens and their representatives, the analyses above show that what motivates citizens is more
their MPs ability to listen to them. MPs’ attentiveness encourages constituents to express their
concerns. As an exogenous factor, this attentiveness has the reassuring effect that tells ordinary
people that “your concerns and voices will be heard.” The combination of the results from the
merged data and the individual country level data shows a complete picture. Although in general
clientelism is not a motivating factor in many countries, it does have an effect in Senegal, suggesting
that the dyadic relationship is more complex than it appears.
Under what conditions would citizens initiate a contact with their MPs? The response to this
question constitutes the central argument of this dissertation. It maintains that citizens would initiate
a direct contact with their MPs only if the latter display a willingness to listen to their constituents.
Citizens’ perception of their MPs’ ability or willingness to listen to them is the key motivator to
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contact those representatives. But from survey results, citizens’ perception of their MPs’ listening
ability is very low, making the level of direct contacts of MPs one of the lowest in the world.
Therefore, I contend that ordinary people contact their representatives to the national assemblies
through two intermediary informal institutions: membership in informal grassroots associations
(community civic groups) and traditional authorities and religious leaders. But before going any
further, it is worth enumerating a few benefits of a well-functioning constituent- representative
relationship for the African democratic process. Citizens’ contacts with their MPs allow meaningful
conversations between citizens and their representatives and greater citizens’ input in the policy
process. In an African specific context, these contacts contribute in emancipating citizens and
making them stakeholder in their political systems through peaceful deliberative process. Equally
important, these bottom up communications build a political bond between elected officials and
voters that often lacks in Africa. In short, these interactions give the primacy to citizens in every
country’s democratic process irrespective of their electoral systems. Unfortunately, the abysmal
rates of direct contacts between citizens and their representatives to national representatives make
these benefits illusory.
Through statistical analyses and empirical observations, the dissertation sheds light on two
institutions and their linking functions. The findings show that membership in informal grassroots
associations and traditional authorities play the roles of linking institutions between citizens and
their MPs. However, the place and functions of these institutions in the African democratic process
are subject of heated academic debates. The first debate pertains to the nature and democratic
dividend of informal grassroots associations. This debate opposes two camps. The first camp, those
who are skeptical about the democratic attributes of these unformal grassroots, posits that these
unformal grassroots organizations are merely extensions of kinship in Africa (Comaroff and
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Comaroff,1999; Jorgensen,1992; Ekeh, 1992). Because adhering to these associations is not
voluntary, these authors characterize African unformal grassroots organizations as “ascriptive.”
Ekeh states these grassroots associations lack the universalism that promotes equal treatment of
every members whether they are “in group” or “out group” (187). As a result, these grassroots
associations do not fill the space between the state and the society; they are neither parts of the civil
society nor can they serve as channel to vehicle citizens’ concerns. Scholars who see these unformal
grassroots association as beneficial to democracy refute this characterization. Bratton, 1994;
Smith,1997,1998; Totensen.et.al, 2001) argue that unformal grassroots associations can be seen as
parts of the civil society and they play social, economic and political roles for their
members(Totensen.et.al.2001). Chapter II of the dissertation addresses this debate and presents
each side’s argument. While acknowledging the argument of the skeptics, I side with the advocates’
position (Bratton, Totensen.et.al and Smith). More importantly, I argue that these unformal
grassroots associations work as a linking institution between citizens and numbers of political actors
including MPs, local officials, and government agencies.

Membership in these grassroots

associations also motivates citizens to attend community meetings. The analyses support these
hypotheses. For instance, being member of an unformal grassroots association increases the
likelihood by 75% on average to contact a local official in Uganda, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Burkina
Faso. As for contacts with MPs, being a member of an unformal grassroots associations boosts the
chance by 55% on average to contact MPs in Kenya, Liberia, Uganda, Burkina Faso, and in
Botswana.
The chapter makes an original contribution by casting a positive light on these unformal
grassroots institutions and by uncovering their connecting roles. Subsequently, this chapter has
some practical implications for African democratic consolidation. This chapter call the attention of
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democracy practitioner to focus on these neglected but widespread social networks and transform
them into real school of democracy where members not only can internalize effortlessly democratic
values but also learn to support genuinely its practice and defend it. The fact that membership in
these unformal grassroots organizations is predictive of contacting local officials raises the question
to know the roles these local officials play in the democratic process. It is worth mentioning that
the bulk of these local officials is made up of traditional authorities and or religious leaders. The
place and functions of these institutions in the constituent- representative relationship is the focus
of chapter three.
Chapter three makes the argument that traditional authorities and religious leaders serve as
linking institutions between citizens and their MPs. However, as in chapter two, the role and
functions that the traditional authorities should play in African democratic process stirs a heated
debate between “Modernists” and “Traditionalists.” The Modernists, led by Mamdani (1996),
contend that Traditional Authorities are nothing but a vestige of colonialism and now serve as the
instrument of the central powers. Modernists criticize African Traditionl Authorities as hindering a
genuine connection between ordinary folks with their political system in Africa. Modernists also
maintain that ATA have lost any legitimacy because they are weaponized their own people by the
reining powers. As a result, they need to be rid of. The so-called traditionalists reject this argument.
According to Traditionalists, ATA are a genuine emanation of ordinary people and should be seen
their representatives. Recognizing the merits of each argument, I make a middle of road and
pragmatic argument. I contend that framing the question about traditional authorities and religious
leaders in terms of either/or amounts to false dichotomy. ATA are parts and parcel of the African
social and political landscape. It stands to reason that one finds a way to make them useful for the
thriving of the African democratic process. I observe that ATA’s role as an intermediary institution

12

create two track political participation in Africa that simply need to be acknowledged. Due to their
social stewardship, ATA and religious leaders are implicated deeply in ordinary people’s day-to
day lives. For instance, according to Patterson, religious institutions provide 40% of health care in
Sub-Saharan Africa. ATA and religious leaders are also involved in cultural and traditional events
where people learn their social norms.
In order to substantiate the argument that ATA and religious leaders are de facto
intermediary institutions that connect citizens to their MPs, I contrast their connecting role with that
of a formal institution: political parties in Africa. In other words, I specify a model that
comparatively weighs the causal effects of both contacting party and contacting ATA on the
likelihood of contacting MPs controlling for other individual level variables and selection bias.
Specifically, I include in the model the closeness to party to control for a possibility of selection
bias. The issue of selection bias here refers to the same people with strong opinion who
simultaneously contact both MPs and traditional authorities. If the variable closeness to party has a
more powerful causal effect, then traditional authorities do not play the intermediary role
mentioned. However, the results from the statistical analysis supports the argument that ATA
indeed function as intermediary institution. The findings show that contact with ATA comes as the
most powerful indicator of contacting MP. This effect is consistent and strongly statistically
significant across all the 20 countries. As the argument suggests, the combined effect of these
institutions is credited of predicting .43% of chance to contacting MPs. As for contacting party, the
effect is nearly ten times lower at only 0.05%. The takeaways from this chapter similar to the one
chapter II. It mainly states that states and democratic activists need to focus on these unformal
omnipresent institutions to help democracy grow in Africa. Getting the minds and hearts of these
actors will give a genuine chance to democracy in Africa. Specifically, integrating these institutions
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will reduce the two-track participation into one track thereby reinforcing the direct connection and
the accountability linkage between citizens and their MPs.
Understanding the determinants of direct contact between citizens and their MPs is the
subject of the fourth chapter of the dissertation. While the preceding chapters(II and III) focus on
unformal linkage institutions, the chapter IV centers on the formal and direct contacts between
ordinary people and their MPs. As stated in the opening of the concluding chapter, contacts between
MPs and their constituents is the core of representative democracy. For any democratic transition
to succeed in Africa, it has to involve ordinary people. Otherwise, all the fuss about democratic
consolidation is meaningless.
Direct contacts between citizens and their MPs is very important for many reasons. For one
it contributes to empower constituents in increasing their sense of political efficacy. Equally, direct
contacts between ordinary citizens and their MPs play a key role in building a political bond
between them and their elected officials. Yet again, the promotion of such dyadic and person to
person contacts between ordinary people and their representatives in Africa is controversial. The
debate opposes two camps. The first camp contends that direct contacts between constituents and
their representatives mirror a patron-client relationship in Africa (Lindberg, 2003, 2009, 2010).
Lindberg and Morrison (2009) conduct serious studies in Ghana where they record MPs
complaining about their constituents. MPs in Ghana tell Lindberg that their constituents primary
reasons to contact their representatives is to ask for a private good delivery. The authors conclude
that direct contacts contribute in worsening clientelistic interactions between citizens and the elite
in Africa. However, other scholars reject this widely-held view about the African political process.
Specifically, Barkan, Mattes, Mozaffar and refute the clientelist accusation on the ground that MPs
in Africa misconstrue the needs of their constituents. Through survey results and statistical analyses,
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they show that ordinary citizens first and foremost want their MP to listen to them, to visit them.
To pay a little attention to them. Without denying the existence of the clientelist behavior in
African political interactions, I side with Barkan, Mattes and Mozzafar . I use the US as a
benchmark to argue that dyadic contacts build a bond and increase citizens’ perception of political
efficacy.
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